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Early liberal historians predominantly criticised the migrant labour system for its 
economic irrationality. After high GDP growth and steady benefits from gold mining 
in the 1960s, Marxist scholars in the 1970s pointed to the destructive impact of the 
system. Since 1994, the challenge inter alia has been to forge a new developmental 
path for the economy. In 2012 the National Development Plan set out its aim to 
“eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030”.1 This is the challenge. For the 
country or region to ‘develop’ and eliminate ‘poverty’ we need to know what we are 
trying to eliminate and what our development is trying to achieve.  
This thesis examines the migrant labour system in the Transkei through a lens of 
development and asks how and to what extent the system inhibited the development 
of the Transkei and its peoples. Using Amartya Sen’s conception of development – 
which sees development as a process of expanding social, political, and economic 
freedoms/capabilities – this thesis offers a view of migrant labour institutions in terms 
of how they created and engendered deprivation and unfreedom in the Transkei. It is 
an attempt to understand our ‘developmental past’ and to understand how 
development in the Transkei has been frustrated and inhibited by formal institutions. 
Amartya Sen’s notions of ‘development’ and ‘deprivation’ offer an autonomy- and 
freedom-centred approach to thinking about poverty and development.  Specifically 
the thesis examines the nexus of formal institutions underpinning the migrant labour 
system – including state laws, the Native Affairs Department, and the Native 
Recruiting Corporation – in terms of how they acted to inhibit the development of 
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Introduction, migrant labour, Amartya Sen’s development as freedom 
 
The life of money making is a life people are, as it were, forced into, and wealth 
is clearly not the good we are seeking, since it is merely useful, for getting 
something else.1 – Aristotle  
 
This thesis is an investigation of the ways in which formal institutions underpinned 
the Chamber of Mines’ migrant labour system, and how the Chamber’s actions were 
legitimated through a particular notion of ‘development’ of mineworkers. This thesis 
focuses on mine labour recruitment in the Transkei region of the Eastern Cape from 
the late 19th century until the 1970s. It demonstrates how a matrix of formal institutions 
– the political power embodied in Native Affairs Department (NAD) magistrates, 
commissioners, and headmen, and a raft of enabling legislation implemented by the 
colonial, national and apartheid states – supported the Chamber of Mines’ centralised 
recruitment agency, the Native Recruitment Corporation (NRC), and worked in 
concert. This nexus of formal institutions was used at the behest of the Chamber of 
Mines to narrow the range of choices available to Transkei men, precisely so that these 
men would be compelled to accept low wage unskilled mine work. They forged and 
sustained the mining industry’s migrant labour system in the Transkei region and 
created the conditions for the destruction of its developmental potential.  
In the Transkei mine work was an employment of last resort taken up by pastoralists 
whose alternative options had been pulverised by the repressive formal institutional 
architecture constraining their lives. Labour recruiters, Crush, Jeeves, and Yudelman 
have pointed out, performed better in “least-developed” regions where wages were 
low and employment prospects bleak.2 Underground mine work was among other 
                                                          
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans., Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [C4 
BCE]), 1103a – 1105a, 7. 
2 Jonathan Crush, Alan Jeeves, and David Yudelman, South Africa’s Labour Empire: a History of Black Migrancy to 
the Gold Mines (Cape Town: David Philip, 1991), 33.  
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things dangerous, morbific, poorly paid, and extremely physically taxing. Only when 
no other options were available, were workers unable to avoid mine work.3 The story 
of migrant mine labour recruitment in the Transkei in this thesis is a story of formal 
institutional mechanisms working in combination to nullify the choices and freedoms 
of persons so that the mining industry could successfully embroil persons in the low 
wage migrant labour system.  
The link between using formal institutions to constrain the freedoms of Transkei 
people so that they would accept mine work, and how this process related to the 
development of migrants and labour sending regions, is brought into sharp focus by 
an application of Amartya Sen’s conception of ‘development as freedom’.4 Using Sen’s 
conception of development - understood as a process of expanding the substantive 
social, political, and economic freedoms or capabilities of individuals – the formal 
institutions underpinning the migrant labour system are perceived as antithetical to 
development precisely because they aimed to destroy the economic, social and 
political freedoms of people in the Transkei.  
The contexts of deprivation in which mine recruiting could occur, that is to say, the 
contexts of nullified freedoms, were necessary conditions for successful recruiting. For 
the gold mines to maintain their position as the central driver of economic 
transformation in the South African economy, something of a developmental zero 
sum game had to occur, where labour sending regions needed to suffer a sufficient 
measure of deprivation (an absence of choice) in order to supply the low wage labour 
which underwrote gold mining production. Native Recruiting Corporation district 
superintendents in the Transkei would indeed use “recruitment condition” metrics – 
such as the condition and number of livestock, rainfall patterns, agricultural 
conditions, and disease prevalence – to estimate labour supplies in the coming 
months.5 As deprivation in the Transkei deepened, so estimates of labour supplies 
increased. NRC officials, who were in the best position to realise this, relied for their 
recruitment operations on the assumption that successful recruitment was premised 
                                                          
3 Crush Jeeves, and Yudelman, South Africa’s Labour Empire, 33. 
4 A detailed discussion of Sen’s concept of development follows. 
5 See chapter 3. 
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upon deprivation. This thesis examines how the deprivation-creating formal 
institutions of the mine’s labour system related to increasing deprivation in the 
Transkei from its creation in the late 19th century until the late 1970s. 
 
Migrant labour institutions and their relationship to development 
 
The gold mining industry was central to the development of the South African 
economy. Hobart Houghton described gold as providing South Africa with a “rocket-
powered thrust” to take off in classic Rostowian development and so provided the 
rationale for the Chamber’s actions. Using data they marshalled themselves, the 
Chamber of Mines pointed out the unquestionable necessity of vast numbers of low 
paid workers if the industry was to render profitable the deep level low grade ore 
which characterised many South African gold deposits.6 
The early liberal scholarship criticised the mining industry. De Kiewiet (1941), van der 
Horst (1942), and Hobart Houghton (1964) for the most part saw the industry’s 
migrant labour system and its accompanying institutions as wasteful, inefficient and 
unnecessarily costly.7 As liberals, they saw capitalist development as at its best when 
it was efficient, with production expanding so that the “optimum combination” of the 
factors of production – land, labour, resources, and capital – was accomplished.8 
Furthermore, as the liberal economic historian van der Horst put it, a “population can 
only become better off by increasing the production of wealth”.9 In this view, what 
was good for capitalism – efficiency, productivity, expansion – was good for human 
wellbeing.  
                                                          
6 D Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy, (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1964, reprinted 1973), 16.  
Alan Jeeves and David Yudelman, “New Labour Frontiers for Old: Black Migrants to the South Africa Gold Mines,” 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 13, no.1 (1986): 106. 
7 Sheila Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta & Co., Ltd., 1942), 180.  Houghton, The South 
African Economy, 90. C De Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic (London: Oxford University Press, 
1941, reprinted 1957), 166. 
8 Houghton, The South African Economy, 83, 90. 
9 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 301. 
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Relying predominantly on the Chamber’s official records, government commission 
reports, and the few secondary sources which existed, van der Horst was the first to 
systematically examine and document the manner in which the mining industry 
obtained its large numbers of low paid African workers. But she deviated from the 
official records, which stressed the strong relevance of formal institutions in securing 
low-wage workers. While noting that institutions like the Mines and Works Act 
(colour bar), and the Native Labour Registration Act (including the pass laws) were 
of “great assistance”, van der Horst denied that the benefits of the low wage labour 
could be understood apart from the additional statutory obligations contained in the 
laws and administrative regulations.10 The colonial state and the mining industry had 
to register contracts, provide recruitment licences, run the relevant bureaucracies, 
manage compounds, keep records, pay wages, house, feed, provide medical attention 
for, and repatriate miners. Van der Horst argued that these administrative and 
bureaucratic costs should be “set off against” the benefits of the low wage migrant 
labour achieved in light of the institutional environment.11 She argued that the 
institutions which controlled and coerced Africans into accepting mine work were 
problematic because they were economically costly to the mining industry and the 
state. She was also concerned that the restrictive institutions associated with mine 
migrant labour inhibited the “full use of South Africa’s greatest resources, the labour 
of her Native population.”12 The Mines and Works Act of 1911 (colour bar) which 
restricted Africans to the lowest paid echelons of mine work prevented “progress and 
growth in wealth”.13 In the final pages of her book van der Horst contends that the 
restrictive institutions of the mining industry had in the reserves engendered a “caste 
system” premised on “authoritarian action” which not only limited national income 
but was “highly unstable” and a significant cause of social turmoil.14 Van der Horst 
gestured towards the idea that economic prosperity cannot and should not be 
separated from the social and political context in which it occurs; that the political, 
                                                          
10 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 178 – 180. 
11 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 161, 179 – 180, 183 – 184. 
12 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 324. 
13 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa,) 324. 
14 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 324-325. 
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social, and economic spheres are not mutually separable. Though she still posited 
economic expansion and growth as the key aim of development – a “population can 
only become better off by increasing the production of wealth” – she was not unaware 
that authoritarian politics and deep social ills were antithetic to even this narrow view 
of development.15  
De Kiewiet conceived of the formal institutions underpinning the migrant labour 
system as limiting the value of labour and placing upon the mines the “burden of a 
social policy” intended to bring into being and defend the economic superiority of 
white settlers.16 He saw the main purpose of the post 1910 legislation as raising the 
“supply and tractability of native labour”.17 Like van der Horst and de Kiewiet, 
Houghton saw the high running costs of the migrant labour system’s institutions (on 
his understanding these comprised of the pass system, reference books, labour 
bureaux, and influx control) as the state “cross[ing] purposes with itself”.18 He argued 
that the persistent exodus of capable workers from Reserve areas also led to the 
“declining productivity” of labour sending regions, whereas de Kiewiet had argued 
that “low spending power” in the Reserves further hindered development.19 Migrant 
labour and its accompanying institutions, Houghton contended, also entailed low 
productivity in the urban areas, through an inability to acquire skills, a “quantitative 
waste” of “manpower”, “general instability” and an unnecessarily high turnover of 
labour.20  
These scholars did not criticise the official Chamber of Mines view that a centralised 
monopsonistic recruitment agency was required. In 1902 WNLA began operating in 
Mozambique and to the north of South Africa and in 1912 the NRC began recruiting 
within South Africa as well as in the three British protectorates. Like the Chamber of 
Mines, these scholars believed that competition among recruiters was driving up 
                                                          
15 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 324 – 325. 
16 De Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 166.  
17 De Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 163, 230. 
18 Houghton, The South African Economy, 85. 
19 Houghton, The South African Economy, 85. De Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 237. Van der Horst, Native 
Labour in South Africa, 317. 
20 Houghton, The South African Economy, 85, 90 – 99. 
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costs, encouraging desertion, and engendering widespread fraud and duplicity on the 
part of touts and private recruiters. Since competitive recruiting did not, according to 
the Chamber, increase the flow of workers onto the goldfields, it was more or less 
accepted that a centralised recruitment agency made economic sense – since as sole 
purchaser of labour it could control the price and, by pooling resources, extend its 
operations further afield to increase supply.21 Van der Horst was aware that large scale 
recruitment in the Reserves was driven by the tax burden placed upon Africans, as 
well as the inevitable debt incurred from purchasing European goods.22 How mine 
migrant labour and its institutions circumscribed development in the labour sending 
regions, however, was not a topic of focus in the early liberal scholarship. When the 
enabling formal institutions of the migrant labour system were criticised in the liberal 
scholarship it was in terms of narrowly economic concerns, while the pervasive social 
and political harms and unfreedoms entailed in such institutions were not seen as 
themselves inimical to development. This tied in with the liberal conception of 
development as the generation of wealth through optimal employment of the factors 
of production. 
In sum, while paying cursory attention to the specific developmental effects of 
migrant labour institutions in the labour sending regions, the liberal scholarship was 
predominantly concerned that the migrant labour system in general prevented 
capitalism from most efficiently and productively using workers to generate wealth. 
The generation of wealth was held to be the guiding telos of successful capitalism, and 
migrant labour was criticised on the grounds that it inhibited the most efficient 
production of wealth. Since all South Africa’s major sectors – mining, transport, 
commerce, agriculture – were based upon large numbers of unskilled workers 
recruited via the migrant labour system, the inefficient and restrictive nature of the 
system was a problem for the entire economy.23  
                                                          
21 Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 163; De Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 161, 218.   
22Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 316 – 317. 
23 Houghton, The South African Economy, 96. 
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In 1972 Francis Wilson offered a more rigorous critique of the mining industry’s 
migrant labour system.24 While he did not elaborate, Wilson contended that legislation 
(or formal institutions) structuring the reserves and the Chamber’s recruiting 
organisations were critical to ensuring sufficient labour supplies.25 Two classes of 
laws, labour taxes and restrictions on land ownership, Wilson argued, had their 
origins in the Glen Grey Act (described by Alan Jeeves as the “epitome of capitalist-
induced, labour-mobilizing legislation”), and the third, the pass laws, which 
controlled the movement of Africans after slavery was abolished in 1834, were passed 
at the “behest” of the Chamber of Mines in 1895.26 Wilson was keenly aware of the 
“economic necessity” which drove men from the reserves in South Africa to seek 
employment on the mines, and cited Hobart Houghton’s 1955 study of the Ciskei’s 
Kieskammahoek which found that without migrant remittances the population of the 
district “would starve”.27 Whereas earlier liberals noted the declining productivity of 
the labour sending reserves, Wilson went further. So overcrowded and denuded were 
the reserves by 1955 that subsistence in most of the Transkei and Ciskei could only be 
achieved if 57% of the residents exited the district permanently.28 The relevance of 
migrant labour institutions to the development of labour-sending regions was not a 
central theme for Wilson, however, and descriptive facts evincing the reserves’ failure 
to develop were left to an appendix.29  
In the 1970s the liberal claims that migrant labour and its institutions were antithetical 
to efficient growth – that migrant labour was harmful to capitalism – came to seem a 
little less plausible as South Africa’s growth rates continued to climb. High growth 
amid increasing poverty led to the vigorous emergence of revisionism and an 
adoption of class analysis in the historiography of mine migrant labour.30 The three 
                                                          
24 Francis Wilson. Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911- 1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1972). 
25 Wilson, South African Gold Mines, 2. 
26 Wilson, South African Gold Mines, 2-3. Francis Wilson, "Minerals and Migrants: How the Mining Industry has 
Shaped South Africa," Daedalus 130, no. 1 (2001): 104. Quote is from Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour 
Supply, 16. 
27 Wilson, South African Gold Mines, 130. 
28 Wilson, South African Gold Mines, 134.  
29 Wilson, South African Gold Mines, 188 – 189. 
30 Martin Legassick, “Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa: From Periphery to Sub-metropole 
as a Forced Labour System,’ in The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, ed. R Palmer and N 
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most representative contributors to this shift in methodology are the Canadian 
Marxist Frederick Johnstone, Martin Legassick, and Marxist scholar Harold Wolpe.31 
They broke from the liberal view of the irrationality and inefficiency of migrant 
labour, and demonstrated a “basic compatibility” between the mining industry’s 
desire for “ultra cheap” and “ultra exploitable” labour, on the one hand, and South 
Africa’s racist and discriminatory (formal) legislation on the other. In 
contradistinction to the liberals, Johnstone found a pronounced “economic 
rationality” at play in the oppressive institutions undergirding the migrant labour 
system.32 Johnstone noticed that race and class converged; rather than the colour bar 
being dysfunctional to capitalism, as liberals had previously argued, Johnstone 
interpreted the colour bar as a “class instrument” – institutions on this view were 
racist precisely because they served the class interests of the white minority.33 Radical 
revisionists were centrally preoccupied with the question of how the unfolding of 
‘capitalist development’ came to forge and shape racist policies and institutions.34 In 
a seminal paper in 1974, Legassick endeavoured to show that “specific structures of 
labour control”- or, institutions underpinning migrant labour - were “increasingly 
functional to capital” and facilitated capitalist growth in South Africa.35 He was 
followed by Wolpe who, influenced by the social anthropology of French Structuralist 
                                                          
Parsons 175-200. (London: Heinemann, 1977), 175 – 200. Martin Legassick and F. de Clercq, "Capitalism and 
Migrant Labour in Southern Africa: The Origins and Nature of the System," in International Labour Migration: 
Historical Perspectives, ed. Shula Marks and Peter Richardson, 140 – 166. (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1984), 
140 – 166. Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power in South Africa: from Segregation to 
Apartheid," Economy and Society 1, no. 4 (1972): 425 – 456. Martin Legassick and Harold Wolpe, "The Bantustans 
and Capital Accumulation in South Africa," Review of African Political Economy 3, no. 7 (1976): 87-107. 
31 Fredrick Johnstone, Race, Class and Gold, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). Martin Legassick, "South 
Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence," Economy and Society 3, no. 3 (1974): 253-291. Frederick Johnstone, 
"White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today," African Affairs 69, no.275 (1970): 124-140. Robert. 
Davies, D. Kaplain, M. Morris and D. O' Meara, “Class Struggle and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa,” 
Review of African Political Economy, 7 (1976):  4-30. 
32 Belinda Bozzoli and Peter Delius, "Editors' Introduction: Radical History and South African Society," Radical 
History Review 1990, no. 46-47 (1990): 20. Robert Davies, “Review: Class, Race and Gold: A Study of Class 
Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa by F.A Johnstone,” Review of African Political Economy, no. 
7, (Sep - Dec 1976): 127 – 131. Jon Lewis, "South African Labor History: A Historiographical Assessment," Radical 
History Review 46 – 47, (1990): 213-235. 
 
34 Deborah Posel, "Rethinking the ‘race‐class debate’ in South African Historiography," Social Dynamics 9, no. 1 
(1983): 50. Davies, Robert H. Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960: an Historical Materialist 
Analysis of Class Formation and Class Relations. Vol. 2 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979). Norman Levy. The 
Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour System (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 447.  
35 Legassick, “South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence”, 269. 
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Claude Meillassoux, offered a strongly structuralist account of apartheid and its 
formal institutions.36  
For Wolpe, apartheid was a structural response to the decline of the reserves. He saw 
segregation and apartheid institutions as “mechanism[s]” to maintain “capitalist 
exploitation” such that a “cheap and controlled labour force” was guaranteed by 
ensuring that workers continued to partially subsist on rural production and therefore 
reproduced themselves in labour sending regions.37 He saw labour sending regions as 
a rural precapitalist “mode of production” in a “functional” relationship with the 
urban capitalist mode of production. In this view, Apartheid policies and institutions 
are a "function of the economic changes in the Reserves, which generate[d] a threat to 
the cheapness of labour power”38. As “material” circumstances in the reserves 
degenerated, and thereby threatened the “reproduction of [the] labour force” on 
which capitalist development was premised, so institutions would emerge to maintain 
“conditions of reproduction” and enable the reserves to persist in their functional 
capacities as reservoirs of cheap and dominated labour. In Wolpe’s rigidly 
structuralist model, labour sending regions and their inhabitants are paid scant 
empirical attention and are perceived as an expression of capitalism’s need for cheap 
labour.39 Capitalism acts upon migrants, in this view, and the autonomy of labourers 
is not a major theoretical concern. In sum, the revisionist scholars argued that the 
migrant labour system and its institutions were coercive in the interests of a cheap 
labour system highly functional to the white minority capitalist class. The revisionists 
showed a greater acknowledgement of the crucial role of formal institutions in 
maintaining the mining and apartheid labour system, but like the liberals they did not 
ask precisely how such formal institutions related to the development of migrant 
workers and labour sending regions. This thesis seeks to address the ways in which 
                                                          
36 C. Meillassoux, "From Reproduction to Production: a Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology," Economy 
and Society 1, no. 1 (1972): 93 – 105. Bozzoli and Delius, “Radical History and South African Society”, 21. Nicoli 
Nattrass, "Controversies about Capitalism and Apartheid in South Africa: an Economic Perspective," Journal of 
Southern African Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 662. 
37 Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power”, 430 – 431. 
38 Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power“, 442. 
39 For further discussion see Bozzoli and Delius, “Radical History and South African Society”, 21.  
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formal mine migrant labour institutions nullified the freedoms of African migrants 
and inhibited their development. 
Sociologist Michael Burawoy argued that the distinguishing feature of institutions 
underpinning migrant labour were their functional role in separating the processes of 
“renewal and maintenance” of the labour force.40 He worried, however, that the 
notion of cheap labour was essentially question-begging. ‘Cheap for whom?’ he 
asked.41 He showed that the migrant labour system could only be understood as cheap 
when viewed exclusively from the perspective of the state and the Chamber of Mines. 
Burawoy assumed that migrant labour institutions would unavoidably frustrate 
efforts of these areas and their inhabitants to develop but he did not make nor explore 
this point explicitly. 
As part of a growing literature on ‘underdevelopment’ in Latin American and Africa, 
Colin Bundy and Roger Southall described the Transkei’s shift from a pastoral, 
subsistence economy to a migrant labour reservoir in terms of “underdevelopment” 
and a “structural dependence” on the commodity markets of the Cape’s mercantile 
economy.42 The political economy approach enabled Bundy and Southall to show that 
capitalism in the Transkei entailed political decline, drastic changes to class and social 
structures and served to ‘underdevelop’ the region.43 These scholars demonstrated 
that during the late 19th to the early 20th century the Transkei was stratified into a 
wage-labouring majority and a small privileged elite.44 Bundy and Southall were alert 
                                                          
40 Michael Burawoy, “The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labour: Comparative Material from Southern 
Africa and the United States,” American Journal of Sociology 81, no. 5 (1976): 1050, 1060. 
41 Burawoy, “Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labour”, 1056. 
42 Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (Cape Town: David Philip, 1988), xii, 59 – 60, 124 
– 133. Roger Southall, South Africa's Transkei: the Political Economy of an 'Independent' Bantustan (London: 
Heinemann 1982),73 – 88. Important literature on underdevelopment and the process in Africa includes Andre 
Gunder Frank, Latin America and Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Samir Amin, 
"Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa—Origins and Contemporary Forms." The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 10, no. 04 (1972): 503 – 524. Samir Amin, "Accumulation and Development: a Theoretical 
Model." Review of African Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1974): 9 – 26; Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Three Stages of 
African Involvement in the World Economy,” in Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, (eds) Gutkind, Peter 
Claus Wolfgang and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein (London: Sage Publications, 1976), 32 – 39;  Colin 
Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: the Political Economy of Neo-colonialism, 1964-1971. London: Heinemann, 
1975. 
43 Bundy, Rise and Fall, 59, 126 – 133. Southall, Political Economy of an 'Independent' Bantustan, 73 – 88. 
44 Southall, Political Economy of an 'Independent' Bantustan, 87 – 88. Bundy, Rise and Fall, 133. 
11 
 
to the strong relevance of formal institutions in undermining the independence and 
livelihoods of Transkei inhabitants.45 This thesis draws heavily on these accounts but 
employs Amartya Sen’s agency-centred conception of development and focuses 
specifically on the effects of formal institutions on the agency and developmental 
prospects of Transkei inhabitants.46 
Social and cultural historians saw human agency and symbolic meaning as critical to 
the history of mining in South Africa.47 It was these cultural and social historians who 
first depicted migrant workers as full, rich humans exercising agency in their own 
right and embedded ontologically in cultural and social worlds of their own. This 
emphasis meant that migrant workers were no longer faceless, acted upon, and 
passive; it meant that Africans should be perceived as featuring meaningfully in the 
development of South African capitalism. This group of historians offered a ‘history 
from below’ where culture, social systems, and human agency were portrayed as 
inseparable from, rather than being merely subordinated to, the workings of capitalist 
development, as the characterizations the liberal and radical scholars had 
misleadingly put forth.48  
Delius demonstrated that in Sekhukhuneland migrant labour offered the only 
opportunity whereby young culturally initiated men could attain the required funds 
to marry and build homesteads and thus attain “full adult status”.49 Achieving adult 
personhood and the cultural and social value it conferred, then, was contingent upon 
accepting mine work. Similarly, Patrick Harries, using the writings of missionaries, 
                                                          
45 For instance Southall, Political Economy of an 'Independent' Bantustan, 79, 81 – 84. Bundy, Rise and Fall, 129, 
134. Colin Bundy, "The Abolition of the Masters and Servants Act," South African Labour 
Bulletin 2 no.1 (1975): 37 – 50. 
46 Discussion of Sen’s notion of ‘development’ follows below. 
47 Charles Van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933, (London: Pluto Press, 
1980). Peter Delius, The Land Belongs to Us: the Pedi Polity, the Boers, and the British in the Nineteenth-century 
Transvaal (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1983), passim. Peter Delius, "Migrants, Comrades and Rural Revolt. 
Sekhukhuneland: 1950-1987,” Transformation 13 (1990): 2 – 26. Patrick Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity: 
Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910 (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 
1994), xiv. William Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland, 1860-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), passim. William William Beinart, "Joyini Inkomo: Cattle Advances and the Origins of Migrancy from 
Pondoland," Journal of Southern African Studies 5, no. 2 (1979): 199-219.  
48 See Bozzoli and Delius, “Radical History and South African Society”, 29 and Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity, 
xiv – xvii for a historiography of cultural history relating to migrant labour. 
49 Delius, "Migrants, Comrades and Rural Revolt”, 4, 6. 
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folklore, songs, idiom, and oral testimony, indicated the role played by culture in 
compelling men to work on the South African mines. Harries described the force of 
culture in securing sufficient mine labour.50 “Labour recruiters”, he wrote, “described 
migrancy as a rite of initiation” and migrants who returned from the mines were 
esteemed for their “wealth, experience, and generosity” as well as being “markedly 
superior in status to men who refused to work on the mines.”51 Men who refused mine 
work were socially and culturally scorned as mamparas or “inexperienced and 
ignorant provincials”.52 For Harries, mine recruitment was premised upon more than 
simply economic necessity, it was a means to adulthood and social standing – migrant 
labour conferred a cultural prestige. Importantly recruiters played the cultural value 
attached to marriage and experience to their advantage.  
Culturalist and social historians demonstrated that in labour sending regions culture, 
social norms and informal institutions could not be divorced from the workings of the 
migrant labour system, and that both formal and informal institutions worked in 
ineluctable combination to drive men onto the gold mines. These authors depicted 
recruitment processes and formal institutions as locking into cultural and social 
institutions (like initiation, cultural prestige, and marriage) so that the former could 
function; they spotlighted the strong cultural and social reasons informing and 
entrenching the migrant system. Institutions of chieftaincy, as Delius argued, for 
example, were crucial to the workings of labour recruitment, and as they increasingly 
received state legitimacy and salaries, chiefs felt less accountable to their communities 
and became more amenable to the apartheid state and to securing migrants for 
mines.53 With the introduction of tribal labour bureaux, chiefs found that they could 
effectively control their peoples by denying employment or land to fractious or 
unbending citizens.54  
                                                          
50 Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity, 129 – 157. 
51 Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity, 157. 
52 Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity, 157.  
53 Delius, "Migrants, Comrades and Rural Revolt”, 13. 
54 Delius, "Migrants, Comrades and Rural Revolt”, 12. 
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Importantly, these authors offered an analytic shift in perspective from big 
overarching categories like ‘capitalist development’ and ‘modes of production’ to a 
recognition of agency and informal (social and cultural) institutions in the workings 
of the migrant labour system. As explained in the next section, this thesis expands this 
analytical shift by placing agency at the centre of how development is theoretically 
conceived, and explores the association between formal institutions and the 
circumscription of agency. 
In the early 1990s three important labour migration scholars, Crush, Yudelman, and 
Jeeves pooled their vast sources and produced a comprehensive and empirically rich 
history of black migrancy to the South African gold mines.55 On the question of formal 
institutions, like the colour bar, these scholars argued that, in terms of monetary costs 
and productivity, the Chamber of Mines was keenly aware of the higher costs entailed 
in protecting white jobs, but found that they could “off-load” much of these costs onto 
black workers.56 Moreover, in order to employ higher-skilled black workers 
productively the Chamber would have had to stabilise its work force, and provide 
permanent family housing and requisite pay, which would have been antithetical to 
the influx controls so energetically pursued by the state.57 Apart from noting that 
formal institutions crucially underpinned the production of gold, these authors did 
not explore formal migrant labour institutions in depth.58 
Although Wolpe and Legassick’s ‘labour-reserve’ thesis had gained currency in the 
1970s, Crush et al disagreed with these authors on how recruitment of workers in the 
reserves was undertaken.59 Understanding it to be a central feature of the labour 
reserve thesis, they conceded that before 1950 mine bosses were eager for the state to 
impose taxes, land title restrictions, and other devices to impoverish Africans, 
undermine rural self-sufficiency, and thereby drive African men into mine 
employment.60 Taking seriously the Chamber’s submissions to the Fagan (late 1940s) 
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and Tomlinson (early 1950s) Commissions, which emphasised the overly forlorn 
reserve economies, these authors argued that the Chamber of Mines “paradoxically” 
requested that the state intervene in the reserves by way of “large-scale government 
investment”. The Chamber feared that wholesale collapse of reserve economies was 
imminent, and that this would threaten the basis of its migrant labour system.61 
Ironically, it was the forced removal of hundreds of thousands of black persons from 
white areas into the reserves which enabled the NRC (and TEBA after 1977) to fill the 
Chamber’s labour quota in the 1970s.62 Moreover, Crush et al argued that, at least up 
to the 1950s, before the full scale forced removals, migrant labour was a means of 
“preserving the economy of the rural household” rather than the “primary means of 
its destruction”.63 Of course, that these rural households depended on subsidies from 
migrant remittances does not imply that migrant labour developed labour sending 
regions. Rather, Crush et al reiterate the view - put forward by Wilson and Ramphele 
and others - that mine migrant remittances merely enabled households to survive.64 
Like the scholars which preceded them and while grasping the importance of such 
institutions in maintaining the labour system, the question of how migrant labour 
institutions related to the developmental prospects of migrants and labour sending 
regions was not taken up. These authors did not focus on how the contexts of 
deprivation in which mine remittances enabled rural households to survive were in 
large part exacerbated by and premised upon formal institutions associated with the 
mining industry.  
Wilmot James’ 1992 study, which presented a sociological and historical account of 
migrant labour to the gold mines from 1970 – 1990, and drew on NRC and TEBA 
official records, devoted a full chapter to the Chamber’s recruitment operations. James 
distinguished what he called “dependency processes” as necessary to securing 
adequate labour supplies in the 1970s. He thought that, while necessary, dependency 
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processes were not sufficient to attract labour. Work seekers from the Bantustans in 
the early 1970s when migrant worker numbers from outside the country were 
declining sharply had to be “actively drawn” into the labour market by means of 
shorter contracts (26 and 28 week contracts rather than the hitherto 52 week 
contracts).65 While all these authors appear aware of the relevance of formal 
institutions in enabling the Chamber of Mines to sustain and forge its labour force, 
none of them specifically examined the relations between such formal institutions and 
the developmental prospects of migrants and their communities.  
It is clear from the historiography that scholars have long acknowledged the 
importance of formal institutions in the workings of the migrant labour system. 
However, there has been no direct examination of how a combination of formal 
institutions – including the Chamber of Mines, the NRC, the Native Affairs 
Department, and the legislation of various permutations of the state – worked in 
league to forge and maintain the migrant labour system. This thesis spotlights the 
formal institutional context of mine migrant labour, examines how these interlocking 
institutions worked in combination, and explores the ways in which such institutions 
either constrained or enabled the development of mineworkers and labour sending 
regions. The thesis does not offer a social or culturalist ‘view from below’, nor a ‘view 
from above’ which describes the economic history of the Transkei in terms of grand 
concepts like ‘capitalist development’, modes of production, dependency, or 
structural underdevelopment. Rather it locates itself ‘in between’ these two 
conceptual frameworks by focusing on the manner in which formal institutions 
actually functioned to forge and maintain the Transkei’s mine migrant labour force – 
and how these migrant labour institutions related to the ‘development’ of 
mineworkers and the Transkei. Following the cultural and social historians, and 
breaking from the revisionists, this thesis recognises the primary relevance of agency, 
and it endeavours to examine formal institutions in terms of how they impinge upon 
or enable agency.  
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Beyond the South African historiography, institutions and capabilities 
 
Following Douglass North, economic historians several Nobel Laureate economists, 
have since the 1970s understood formal institutions such as constitutions, laws, and 
property rights as vital to variations in the growth paths economies follow.66 
Bureaucratic institutions are understood by New Institutional Economists as 
comprising the ‘players of the game’, where laws, constitutions, and property rights 
were the ‘rules of the game’.67 One important weakness of the NIE and the Cliometric 
school, however, is their attachment to neoclassical economics as the staple and most 
valid economic theory, so that getting the ‘rules of the game’ right amounts to 
achieving the most efficient and unhindered allocation of resources (a free market) to 
drive economic growth.68 In this view, formal institutions are decisive in enabling 
efficient free market trade, which in turn powers economic growth.69 
A few NIE scholars have worked on African institutions. Rod Alence has analysed the 
relationship between political institutions and governance quality in sub-Saharan 
Africa, while stressing the need to align short term political incentives with the 
requirements of longer-term economic development.70 In similar vein, Nicholas 
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Amponsah’s study of Ghana’s economic performance highlighted the need for 
efficient bureaucratic machinery, the upholding of contracts and law, and the 
protection of property rights to create “institutional credibility”.71 Institutions are 
good, Amponsah argued, insofar as they attract domestic and foreign investment and 
enable investors to “cooperate in the national development endeavour”.72 More 
specifically Acemoglu and Robinson have analysed the Eastern Cape and emphasized 
institutional features such as the 1913 Land Act and the colour bar in explaining the 
failure of the Transkei to develop.73 These authors argued that the Transkei’s poverty 
and lack of development were the outcome of government policy creating a labour 
reservoir for the mines and farms by “forcibly stamp[ing] out” African economic 
activity.74 By focusing on property rights (1913 Land Act) and the removal of economic 
incentives (the colour bar), these authors simply reiterate the parochial view that 
economic and political institutions are best when they are conducive to “economic 
progress” or growth in the size and scope of the economy.75 When Acemoglu and 
Robinson discuss the social and cultural power of chiefs they do so only in relation to 
the chiefs’ control over land distribution (property rights), and ignore the social and 
political unfreedoms entailed in apartheid chieftaincy systems.76  
The central core of NIE-driven institutional studies is the link between institutions and 
economic growth or incentives. In South Africa an unfree labour market and unfree 
workers powered the gold mining industry, which in turn powered economic growth. 
High economic growth, however, was coupled with widening and deepening 
deprivation, and therefore institutions in South Africa can be viewed as obstacles to 
development. 
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Absent from these approaches is a conception of economic growth linked to the 
growth of human capacities, freedoms, and potential. In contrast, Amartya Sen’s 
capabilities approach is an attempt to shift the analytic focus so that human 
development – or its opposite, deprivation – is placed at the centre. Rather than asking 
how institutions relate to economic growth, this thesis asks how institutions relate to 
the expansion or circumscription of human freedoms or agency.  
Where most of the NIE and Cliometric school understood economic growth as a 
primary goal for development, Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach is a broader, 
agency-centred conception of development. Following Sen, this thesis examines 
institutions in terms of how they relate to development and human agency/freedoms. 
Since Sen defines development as a process of expanding freedoms/agency, this 
conception of development enables a broader view of how mine migrant labour 
institutions related to development. The next section describes Amartya Sen’s 
conceptions of development and deprivation, and explains how they are applied in 
this thesis. 
 
Development as freedom 
 
In the early 1970s philosopher and economist Amartya Sen first began to articulate a 
powerful challenge to the dominant understanding of development. Both liberals and 
Marxists thought increasingly generating wealth must relate in some measure to the 
increased wellbeing of a given population, so when development economics emerged 
after the Second World there was a strong focus on achieving rising GNPs and full 
employment.77 In a series of papers, which culminated in his book Development as 
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Freedom, Sen argued that a focus on growing GNPs and rising per capita incomes 
obscured the fact that generating wealth is only one of the means to development and 
is not an end in itself.78 This critique cuts to the heart of economics as a discipline, for 
it argues that economics cannot coherently be concerned only with how to generate 
and distribute wealth. The social and political spheres are inextricably bound up with 
economics. The telos of development, argued Sen, is not to generate wealth tout court.  
Wealth is not wanted for its own sake, but for its instrumental value, for what it can 
do to achieve something else. For Sen, human wellbeing is the goal of development. 
Generating wealth, therefore, cannot be the telos of development, for generating 
wealth (measured in terms of rising GNPs and per capita incomes) does not translate 
straightforwardly into increased human wellbeing. Efficiently produced wealth does 
not trickle down into operationalized human wellbeing. To powerfully and 
unmistakeably illustrate this point, Sen examined a cluster of five developing 
countries; namely, China, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa.79 As 
illuminating - if rough - proxies for wealth generation and wellbeing, Sen employed 
two indicators, GNP per capita and life expectancy at birth. 
 
Figure 1: GNP and life expectancy in five middle income countries (1984) 
 
Country GNP per capita (US dollars) Life expectancy at birth 
China    310 69 
Sri Lanka    360 70 
Brazil 1 720 64 
Mexico 2 040 66 
South Africa 2 340 54 
Source: Amartya Sen, “The Concept of Development,” in Handbook of Development Economics, Vol 1,  ed. 
H Chenery and T.N Srinivasan (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1988), 12. Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12. 
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Drawing on data from 1984, Sen showed that despite China having the lowest GNP 
per capita ($310), its citizens’ life expectancy at birth (69 years) was second only to the 
life expectancies of Sri Lankan citizens; Sri Lanka’s GNP per capita was the second 
lowest ($360), and yet its life expectancies the highest (70 years). But it was South 
Africa which vividly and demonstrably drove home Sen’s distinction between the 
means to and the ends of or telos of development: While South Africa’s GNP per capita 
was the highest among the cluster of countries ($2 340), the life expectancy of its 
citizens (54 years) was the lowest by ten years. While South Africa scored 
comparatively well in terms of one of the means to development (generating wealth), 
its fared appallingly in terms of the ends of development (human wellbeing). 
Equatorial Guinea’s wealth from oil booms further demonstrates that the generation 
of wealth does not necessarily imply increased human wellbeing: economic growth is 
not a sufficient means for attaining the ends of development. With per capita 
purchasing power parity at $50 240 Equatorial Guinea could boast the second highest 
GDP per capita in the world in 2005, yet its citizens’ life expectancy was among the 
lowest (46 years for men and 49 years for women), and in 2005 the World Bank’s 
purchasing power indicators described 76.8% of the country as living in poverty.80 
Equatorial Guinea’s GDP was, however, among the fastest growing in the world; the 
IMF predicted its economy would grow at 45% in 2005.81 Economic growth may be a 
necessary condition for development, but the case of Equatorial Guinea undermines 
the view that economic growth is a sufficient driver of development.82 The GNP 
approach does not correlate well with key elements of human wellbeing. Human 
wellbeing, in Sen’s account constitutes the end of development and is calibrated in 
terms of the degree to which one’s freedom is operationalised.83 Combining notions 
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from Adam Smith, Aristotle, and Karl Marx, Sen defined freedom as possessing the 
capabilities or choices and opportunities to live a life one has reason to value.84  
 
As Sen and Dreze put it, 
It should be clear that we have tended to judge development by the expansion 
of substantive human freedoms — not just by economic growth (for example, 
of the gross national product), or technical progress, or social modernization. 
This is not to deny, in any way, that advances in the latter fields can be very 
important, depending on circumstances, as ‘instruments’ for the enhancement 
of human freedom. But they have to be appraised precisely in that light — in 
terms of their actual effectiveness in enriching the lives and liberties of people 
— rather than taking them to be valuable in themselves.85 
Sen’s greatest insight was to perceive economic growth and rising income levels, not 
as an ends in themselves, but as means or instruments to achieve freedom, the latter 
being of ultimate, or inherent value. The raison d’être of development is securing 
freedom, not merely generating wealth: generating wealth is a means to an end (and 
is of instrumental value), whereas securing freedom is an end in itself (and is of 
inherent value). Freedom is the telos of development, and wealth generation is merely 
an instrument of subordinate value used to achieve freedom, but not worthy of being 
pursued in and of itself.  Since development is defined as expanding substantive 
freedoms/opportunities/capabilities to choose the life one has reason to value, all 
obstacles to such freedoms are antithetical to development.86  
Freedom for Sen consists broadly of two parts. On the one hand freedom is concerned 
with having access to the “processes” which enable freedom of decisions and action.87 
Access to processes of freedom relate to political rights (free speech and election 
participation), as well as civil liberties (like freedom of movement and association) 
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and the freedom or entitlement to sell one’s labour and participate in the market 
unhindered.88 Secondly, freedom is concerned with social and economic “capabilities” 
or “opportunities”, like the capability to acquire basic education, and/or a skill or 
trade; the capability to be healthful (secure primary healthcare) and escape morbidity 
and premature death.89 Rather than calibrating development in terms of per capita 
incomes and GNP, Sen argued that development should be calibrated in terms of the 
extent to which people have the capability to choose lives they have reason to value; 
oppositely, deprivation and poverty should be calibrated according to the 
circumscription of freedoms, the extent to which one is unfree. The freedom and 
choice to select and live a life one has reason to value is at the centre, is the guiding 
lodestar, of Sen’s understanding of development.  Rather than being understood in 
terms of lowness of income, poverty and deprivation is understood as having one’s 
capabilities and freedoms constrained and frustrated. Poverty and deprivation is then 
more to do with the inability to acquire basic health, education or a skill, being unable 
to exercise political freedoms and civil liberties, or participate in markets freely and 
gain access to credit. Since none of these freedoms are suitably captured in an income 
graph, the informational base used to characterise the nature of poverty and 
deprivation is richer and broader than what an income graph can grasp. Moreover, 
expanding human capabilities and freedoms is simultaneously a means to and an end 
of development. In Sen’s language, the expansion of human freedoms is both 
“constitutive” of freedom (the end or telos of development), and also “instrumental” 
in further securing and entrenching development (the means to development). Apart 
from being an achievement in its own right, expanding basic human capabilities (like 
education, skills, health care) is also an effective means of generating wealth, since a 
skilled, educated, and healthy citizenship is generally agreed to foster increased 
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productivity and efficiency.90 Sen’s ideas on capabilities indeed constitute some core 
principles of the Human Development Reports.91 
By employing a conception of development which speaks directly to the ends of 
development (political, social, and economic freedoms), this thesis is able to explore 
more broadly the developmental impacts of the migrant labour system’s institutions 
on migrants and the Transkei region. When deprivation is understood as an absence 
or paucity of political freedoms, social opportunities, and economic choices, a far 
richer picture of how migrant labour institutions engendered deprivation emerges. 
Since, as this thesis argues, migrant labour institutions functioned in large part to 
foreclose alternative choices, such that morbific, dangerous, poorly paid, unskilled 
migrant mine work became the last option available to men, migrant labour 
institutions were effectively used to create conditions of deprivation and forestall 
development. In brief, the colonial administration of hut and other taxes, political 
subjugation, laws pertaining to free movement, restrictions on freedom to trade and 
accumulate cattle, laws forbidding unionization, blocked access to semi-skilled and 
skilled occupations, the criminalization of contract breaking, as well as ecological 
disasters, all acted to impinge upon the agency or freedom of rural Africans in and 
from the Transkei and elsewhere.92 Colonial institutions clamped down powerfully 
on social and political freedoms. In the capabilities approach, such institutions are 
conceived as freedom-destructive institutions, or institutions of unfreedom. 
Prospective Transkei migrants faced an onslaught of institutional mechanisms 
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attempting to diminish their social, political and economic freedoms so that mine 
work would become the last alternative.  
In the history of the NRC, the Native Affairs Department and enabling legislation and 
institutions of the colonial, national, and then apartheid government created a context 
of deprivation (constrained choice) within which the NRC could successfully draw 
workers into the oscillating low wage migrant labour system. The multiplicity of 
formal institutions shoring up the oscillating migrant labour system in the Transkei 
amounted to a series of destructive obstacles to development. Despite the benefits of 
state legislation and formal institutions in the development of South Africa’s economy 
– Charles Feinstein describes such institutions as those which “enabled gold to drive 
forward South Africa’s economic transformation” – these institutions entailed 
devastatingly inhibitive obstructions to the development of labour sending regions 
like the Transkei and the people who inhabited these regions.93 Sen’s notions of 
development and deprivation provide a powerful conceptual framework to 
understand the multiple hindrances to rural development entailed in the mine 
migrant labour system institutions. Rather than examining institutions as tied 
exclusively to economic performance and incentives, this thesis examines how formal 
institutions relate to the ends of development (or the substantive freedoms people 
enjoy).   
The thesis is comprised of four chapters. This chapter has provided an overview of 
the ways in which formal migrant labour institutions have been previously 
understood by scholars, how these views related to understandings of the 
development of labour sending regions, and how studies of formal institutions and 
economic development have been conducted in the past. In doing so it locates this 
thesis within the existing literature. More particularly, this chapter has introduced an 
explanation of Amartya Sen’s conceptions of ‘development’, ‘deprivation’, and 
‘capabilities’, and motivated for the use of these concepts when studying the mining 
                                                          
93 Charles Feinstein, Economic History of South Africa, 99, 107 - 109. De Kiewiet, History of South Africa, 1941, 156. 
Duncan Innes, Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa (Johannesburg, Raven Press, 1984), 69. Crush, 
Jeeves, and Yudelman, South Africa’s Labour Empire, 8 – 9. 
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industry’s migrant labour system and its effects on labour sending regions like the 
Transkei.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the emergence of the NRC in 1912 and examines the Chamber’s 
attempts from the late 19th century to institutionalise a low wage oscillating migrant 
labour system until monopsony was achieved in the Transkei in the early 1920s. It 
develops an exploration of how formal institutions, especially after Union, were 
necessary for the construction of a labour monopsony in the Transkei. It examines the 
ways in which the Chamber of Mines was able to secure the support of the boer and 
colonial states’ formal legislation, as well as the Native Affairs Department’s interest 
in transforming the Transkei into a labour exporting economy. The South African gold 
mining industry, this chapter argues, could only function as it did with the assistance 
of freedom-destructive state legislation in the creation of its low wage labour 
monopsony. 
Chapter 3 centres on the relationship between deprivation and the migrant labour 
system and its associated institutions. It traces the deepening conditions of 
deprivation in the Transkei from the 1920s until the 1970s and spotlights the ways in 
which successful recruitment was directly related to an absence of choice. Even during 
the terrible droughts of the 1960s, when deprivation was exacerbated, there were 
frequent NRC reports that prospective migrants refused to accept work on 
‘unpopular’ mines. Migrants preferred to face acute hunger rather than work on such 
mines. By examining the multiplicity of disincentives making mine work 
unappealing, in the context of institutionalised capability destruction, chapter 3 
attempts to account for why it was rational for migrants to face hunger rather than 
work on unpopular mines. Chapter 3 further examines the disease burdens 
externalised via the migrant labour system, and explores the ways in which such 
burdens constituted significant obstacles to the development of mineworkers, their 
families, and the Transkei generally. 
The final chapter studies the NRC’s Deferred Pay Interest Fund (DPIF), and examines 
how interest earned on mineworkers’ deferred wages was used to finance so-called 
welfare projects in Transkei from the 1950s to the 1970s.  By examining examples of 
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how the NRC spent Deferred Pay Interest Fund, which was earmarked for welfare 
projects, this chapter offers insights into how the Chamber of Mines  and its recruiting 
arm understood the welfare of Africans, and shows that in combination with the 
NAD, the Chamber had created a sinister kind of ‘corporate social responsibility’ fund 
in 1917. The Deferred Pay Interest Fund attempted to market the NRC as a 
philanthropic institution and financed projects such as sports stadiums and beauty 
competitions which had nothing to do with the welfare of labour sending regions. By 
spotlighting the NRC’s refusal to fund education projects, the final chapter argues that 
the NRC was faced with the perverse incentive not to direct funds towards any 
projects which would expand the capabilities and freedoms of migrants, since this 
would then undermine their recruiting activities.  
This thesis provides a fresh perspective on the investigation of the NRC as an 
institution. It examines the institutional values of the NRC and how it was embedded 
within a nexus of formal institutions, the roles these institutions played in shutting 
down social, political and economic capabilities, and how this hindered and pre-
empted the development of migrants and the Transkei from the late 19th century until 
the 1970s. It both recasts historiographical debate and examines new material on the 




The Native Recruiting Corporation as an institution of unfreedom, 
1886 – 1920 
 
Development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave 
people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned 
agency. The removal of substantial unfreedoms ... is constitutive of development.1 
– Amartya Sen 
 
Since achieving control of the supply of labour (to drive down wages and secure an 
adequate supply) was one of the Chamber of Mines’ principal objectives, the 
centralized monopsonistic recruiting agencies (WNLA and NRC) were a central 
feature of the Chamber of Mines and the mining industry generally.2 In his sanitised 
and industry-endorsed history of the Chamber of Mines, Jonathan Lang is 
unambiguous about the Chamber’s concern with labour and state intervention:  
The underlying motive of the… Chamber was to contain the costs of mining, 
especially those which resulted from the action or inaction of the state, or the 
unbridled competition for goods and labour in short supply.3   
After the formation of the Chamber of Mines in the late 1880s, achieving monopsony 
in the South African labour market took some thirty years to materialize, after which 
the gold mining industry’s formal institutions and labour system were more or less 
secure and unfaltering for the next 50 years (1920 – 1974).4  
                                                          
1 Sen, Development as Freedom, xii (emphasis in original).  
2 See Innes, Rise of Modern South Africa, 52.  
3 Jonathan Lang, Bullion Johannesburg, Men, Mines and the Challenge of Conflicts, (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 
1986), 42, 43, 79. 
4 Jeeves and Yudelman, “New Labour Frontiers”, 103. 
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This chapter traces the formation of the Chamber’s recruiting agencies, their successes, 
failures, and most importantly the formal institutions underpinning their functioning 
before the early 1920s. 5 It argues that the NRC and the institutions associated with 
mine labour recruitment impeded the social, political, and economic freedoms of 
Transkei migrant workers, and so directly impinged on the ends of development. 
These institutions brought about an assault on the constitutive elements of rural 
development in the Transkei. Antithetical to development, in Senian terms they were 
institutions of unfreedom par excellence. The overarching telos of these institutions 
was the creation of a controlled, unfree, politically voiceless, and obedient labour force 
which had no choice but to accept below-subsistence wages, and thereby subsidise the 
mining industry at the expense of their human, social, and material development.6 
These institutions, this chapter will show, were a necessary feature of the migrant 
labour system. The use of powerful formal institutions to cement a low wage 
oscillating migrant labour force entailed the capability destruction, not only of 
migrant labourers themselves, but also of the developmental prospects and 
capabilities of labour sending regions like the Transkei. It will argue that the success 
of the Chamber of Mines’ monopsonistic recruiting agencies in the Transkei was in 
large part predicated upon the power of formal state institutions circumscribing the 
freedoms of Transkei migrants.  
Capability-destruction meant that these institutions served to constrain the options of 
Transkei residents by systematically shutting down and foreclosing the range of 
avenues that they could pursue to meet their needs. The flow of mine migrants from 
the Transkei in the late 19th and 20th century increased in proportion to the level of 
deprivation (absence of choice) in the Transkei.7 WNLA and the NRC in large part 
depended on these institutions to sustain their monopsonies. To be sure, African 
collaborators, including chiefs and headmen inserted within colonial political 
                                                          
5 This chapter draws heavily on Alan Jeeves’ accounts of this period, especially, Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' 
Labour Supply. And "The Control of Migratory Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the era of Kruger and 
Milner," Journal of Southern African Studies 2, no. 1 (1975): 3-29.  
6See for instance Bundy, Rise and Fall, 134; Southall, Political Economy of an 'Independent' Bantustan, 21; Beinart, 
Political Economy of Pondoland, 62. 
7 This point is further developed in chapter 3. See Southall, Political Economy of an 'Independent' Bantustan, 75. 
On Mozambique’s outstandingly severe deprivation, see Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity,  especially 145 – 152. 
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structures, were from the earliest days (late 19th century) crucial to the gold mining 
industry’s labour system. Throughout the 20th century the state (in its discrete 
realizations) and industry would not have drawn Transkei workers successfully onto 
the Rand without the assistance of local headmen or state-favoured chiefs.8 These 
processes of collaboration between colonized elites and colonial powers express in 
part what Jean-François Bayart has referred to as “strategies of extraversion”.9 By 
strategies of extraversion Bayart means the strategies for accumulation and political 
power which Africans enact by drawing their people into unequal (even dependent) 
relationships with an external colonial power.10 In the case of the Transkei, there is 
much evidence that African elites played important functional roles in the NRC’s 
labour recruitment system, and that there were material and other benefits making 
this role attractive to African elites dependent on the colonial state for stipends.11 
Chiefs, elites, and institutions like the NAD and other state legislation are an 
important part of the reason Transkei men came to choose mine work as a last option. 
On the other hand a range of forces like drought, crop failure, depression, war, 
initiation into adulthood, the desire for guns or money for bride wealth, as well as 
cattle diseases, and other ecological catastrophes also served to drive reluctant 
migrants to the mines.12  
These broad, causative, and enabling forces in the emergence and success of the NRC 
in the Transkei provide the context in which the formal institutions underpinning the 
migrant labour system were generated. The question posed in this chapter is how 
these institutions constrained the autonomy and freedom of people in the Transkei 
and other Southern African migrants and prevented the Transkei from developing. 
The argument made is that that in many cases the ecological and other disasters which 
befell the people of greater Xhosaland (Transkei, Ciskei and beyond) were strongly 
                                                          
8 Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 156, 157, 163, 165. 
9 Jean-François Bayart, "Africa in the World: a History of Extraversion," African Affairs 99, no. 395 (2000): 221 – 
225. 
10 Bayart, “History of Extraversion", 222 – 224.  
11 Discussion of this follows. See also Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 153 – 183. 
12 See chapter 3. 
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exacerbated by the colonial institutional context.13 This chapter employs Sen’s 
autonomy-centered conception of development, which sees the end goal of 
development as the freedom to choose a life one has reason to value.14 It shows how 
‘institutions of unfreedom’ linked to the migrant labour system were obstructive to 
the development of labour sending regions.  
 
The formation of the Chamber of Mines, 1886 – 1900 
 
The discovery of promising deposits of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 galvanised 
deep social, economic, and political transformations both in South Africa, and the 
Southern African region more generally.15 Before the turn of the century, South 
Africa’s mining industry was the largest gold producer in the world.16 The Transvaal’s 
revenue shot up markedly (almost tenfold) from £178 000 in 1885/6 to £1 500 000 in 
1888/9.17 In the immediate aftermath of the 1886 discoveries, a flood of investors, 
engineers, technicians, geologists, prospectors, lawyers, traders, labourers, and vast 
sums of capital were drawn to the Transvaal’s gold deposits.18 Significantly, by 1887 
powerful mining companies had formed an association known as the Chamber of 
Mines.19 The increasing concentration of capital in fewer and fewer monopoly firms 
in the early 1890s came to be the ‘group system’ of the Chamber of Mines – whose 
primary desire for a rigorously controlled labour system is central to understanding 
the system of recruitment that followed.  
The motivation for a great many joint stock companies and smaller mining finance 
houses joined up in a ‘group system’, where smaller companies and mining houses 
were subsumed and consolidated into larger monopolistic ‘parent’ companies, had 
                                                          
13 See for instance, William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
204. 
14 Refer to chapter 1 for a discussion of Sen’s ‘development as freedom’. 
15 See for instance Bundy, Rise and Fall, 111. Roger Southall, "The African Middle Class in South Africa 1910 –
1994,"Economic History of Developing Regions 29, no. 2 (2014): 288. 
16 Innes, Rise of Modern South Africa, 75. 
17 Bundy, Rise and Fall, 111. 
18 Callinicos, Gold and Workers, 8 – 9. 
19 Callinicos, Gold and Workers, 18. 
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much to do with the gold market, and the nature and location of South Africa’s gold 
bearing ore.20 By 1892 discoveries of gold on the Witwatersrand indicated to the 
industry that while long term mining projects were viable, the deep level low grade 
ore implied that profit maximization required a low wage and tightly controlled cost 
structure to achieve long term profitability.21 Since gold was in high demand by 
countries adhering to the gold standard from at least 1870 onwards, and despite the 
price remaining static for long periods, the market for gold was essentially 
unlimited.22 The Bank of England, for instance, doubled its gold reserves to a total of 
£49 million in 1896.23 Importantly, an unlimited market for gold meant that companies 
did not have to compete for market share. This absence of competition for gold 
markets was, according to Duncan Innes, the “dominant factor” which drove 
companies and mining houses towards monopoly collusion in the late 19th century.24  
That gold was predominantly exported implied also that the Chamber had no 
incentive to raise the purchasing power of mineworkers.25 To drive for the maximum 
exploitation of ore, and maximum financial returns, companies needed only to 
concern themselves with raising sufficient capital to float their ventures and maintain 
low costs. Moreover, since there was little the Chamber could do to control the costs 
of equipment, supplies, machinery, skilled labour and so forth against inflation, 
coupled with the fact that the gold price would remain steady from 1870 – 1920, the 
Chamber’s principal area of cost reduction became its low wage oscillating migrant 
labour force.26  Strategies to reduce costs could render profitable low grade ore that 
would otherwise have remained underground. The Chamber of Mines reasoned that 
African migrants could be paid less than white settlers because black families were 
supported by subsistence agriculture, and old and sick miners received care from their 
                                                          
20 Innes, Rise of Modern South Africa, 53. Feinstein, Economic History of South Africa, 263. 
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kin networks.27 In its own terms, then, the Chamber of Mines was subsidized by 
deeply impoverished labour-sending regions. Beinart has described the industry’s 
refusal to pay adequate wages to black mineworkers, and their justification for doing 
so, as the “Logic of the Mines”.28 Migrant labour institutions relating to Africans 
increasingly came to reflect the Chamber’s implicit view that Africans were 
ontologically subordinate to white persons: white supremacy would become 
institutionalized in the Chamber’s labour system.  
During the 1890s, however, the supply of capital on the Rand was not sufficient for 
the large-scale longer term projects of deep-level low grade ore extraction, and 
considerable investment from capital markets in Europe was required. To attract such 
capital, investors had to be ensured of high returns and low risk. High returns could 
be achieved by maintaining a low cost structure, while risk could be reduced by 
diversifying investments across a number of ventures. The group system ostensibly 
offered a solution to both these difficulties.  By melding a number of mining houses 
and joint stock companies into discrete parent companies or ‘groups’, investors could 
spread risks and reduce the speculative nature of investments. The colossal companies 
which emerged in this manner were able to diversify investments into other sectors, 
and even countries, and so further diminish the prospects for loss.29 Once melded into 
discrete groups, companies would not only benefit from economies of scale, as with 
bulk purchases of chemicals and other required inputs, but could also augment and 
share their resources, expertise, technology, insights, and equipment – and thereby 
keep down costs.30 By the early 20th century six major groups dominated gold mining 
on the Rand.31 While the ‘group system’ emerged to attract investment, and lowered 
costs by centralizing production and administration, the group system alone could 
not maintain a sufficient supply of low cost labour. The Chamber of Mines acted on 
behalf of member groups and mining houses, sought to coordinate and control the 
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expansion of the labour supply, and provided a unified voice with which to implore 
the Boer Republic authorities to implement formal institutions favourable to mining 
interests.32 The Chamber shared expertise and knowledge, facilitated cooperation, and 
produced industry-wide statistics, and in this way wielded immense power with 
which mining groups could act in league.33  From the first the Chamber desired to 
drive down African wages while increasing supply.34 
The gold mines were unremitting in their quest for low wage labour during the first 
hundred years of their existence. In 1890 the mines had attracted some 15 000 Southern 
African migrant workers, and despite a declared shortfall of 12 000 workers on the eve 
of the South African war (1899), over 100 000 migrants were by then working the gold 
mines.35 In the early years on the Rand, workers made their own way or were marched 
and transported by touts and recruiters to the mines. These migrants came from 
various regions in Southern Africa, including Mozambique (the largest labour source), 
Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Natal, and the Transkei.36 Migrants were subsistence 
peasants drawn to the mines for reasons of taxation, the desire to purchase farming 
implements, guns or other assets, the need to earn cash for bride wealth, to build a 
homestead, or simply on the chief’s instruction (in turn inspired by local or mining 
interests).37 None of these factors proved sufficient to drive young men to the mines 
on an adequate scale and – most importantly – at the price the Chamber desired.  
For the Chamber of Mines this pell-mell and uncoordinated supply of migrant labour 
entailed endless problems. The dangers encountered en route to the mines, the rising 
costs of middlemen, theft of recruits, contract fraud, high desertion rates, and intra-
industry labour competition generally, all served to constrain the unpredictable 
labour supply while also driving up costs.38 The Chamber of Mines was by the late 
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19th century acutely aware that constructing the labour market and migrant labour 
system it desired would not be achieved without the assistance and backing of a 
strong state. It was recognized at the outset that a laissez-faire labour market was 
unacceptable. Capitalism in South Africa emerged in concert with the formation of the 
state – both the colonial government, the Boer Republic, and after 1910 the national 
state. Global historian Sven Beckert in his history of cotton and capitalism has argued 
that modern capitalism is by necessity dependent on state intervention for its 
emergence and success.39 
In its quest for state support in the late nineteenth century, the Chamber of Mines 
beseeched the Boer Republic executive to intervene in the construction of its labour 
market. To this end, in late 1889 Paul Kruger, president of the Transvaal Republic, was 
asked to take the position of Honorary President of the Chamber of Mines.40 Cutting 
to the chase, the Chamber wrote to Kruger early the following year, stating 
unequivocally that: 
Private enterprise has repeatedly failed in attempting to organize and maintain 
an adequate supply of Kaffirs. The task must be undertaken by the Public 
Authorities, and the Chamber trusts that the Government will lend it their 
indispensible assistance.41 
Kruger’s government was not forthcoming, and despite enacting the pass laws drafted 
by the Chamber in 1895, the Transvaal government did not render the labour system 
the Chamber was after. The Chamber complained that the pass laws (prefigured by 
Cape slave passes of 1760) remained ineffective so long as the state lacked capacity to 
enforce them.42 Irrespective of how effectively the pass laws were administered, it is 
significant that that the Boer state was willing to intervene in constructing a labour 
market. With respect to its labour market, however, and so in large part the viability 
of its constituents’ companies, the Chamber wanted a vast, low wage, strictly 
controlled, predictable, and docilic labour supply. In the late 19th century, on behalf of 
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the Chamber of Mines, the Boer state passed legislation to hinder the free movement 
of Africans. It was a direct move to encroach upon the autonomy of Africans. The 
Chamber had a form of state ready to use legislation to close down the choices of 
Africans (deprive them, and hinder their development). The Chamber wanted far 
more forceful state intervention, however; it wanted a state that could shore up an 
entire labour market monopsony.  
 
Rand Native Labour Association and the creation of WNLA, 1890 – 1912 
 
Attempts to achieve monopsony via the Chamber of Mines failed persistently at least 
until the 1920s.  Soon after the formation of the Chamber, the association undertook 
its first industry-wide wage reduction (from 63 to 44 shillings per month) and saw an 
immediate decline of mineworkers (15 000 in 1890 to 12 500 in 1891), which quickly 
convinced them to jettison the monopsony attempt.43 The Chamber was compelled to 
increase wages and by 1893 29 000 Africans worked the mines (with as many as 75% 
coming from Mozambique).44 By 1985 African miners earned between 40 and 60 
shillings with drillers earning up to 70 shillings per month, but this increased cost to 
the Chamber was largely offset by a share price boom in Europe between 1894 and 
1895.45 While the boom offset the Chamber’s wage bill, the Chamber worried that 
marginal mines (which mined low grade ore and were absorbed by larger mining 
groups) would not be productive unless wage costs were cut considerably. In 1896-7 
the Chamber once again tried to establish monopsony by setting up the Rand Native 
Labour Association (RNLA, the centralized recruiting organization which presaged 
WNLA and the NRC) and reducing wage rates across the industry.46 Without strong 
backing from Boer state enforced institutions, a fall in the number of recruits meant 
that intra-industry competition (a laissez-faire labour market) soon won over. When 
RNLA cut wages workers responded by withholding their labour. The private 
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recruiters and touts who supplied labour once again extracted large costs and thereby 
drove up wage bills.47 Despite drawing labour from as far as Sierra Leone, the Gold 
Coast, and Liberia, by 1899 the industry was both short of labour and relied heavily 
on private recruiters to deliver unpredictable and costly labour.  
The South African War (1899 – 1902), which saw a British Imperial administration take 
control of the former Boer Republic, brought the mining industry’s operations to a 
standstill. At the time the mining industry saw the Boer state as an “essentially rural 
agrarian economy” and claimed a “general inability of the Boer to understand 
capitalist development and industrialization”.48 Noting Alfred Milner’s 1897 vision of 
a self-governed white community “supported by… a black labour force from Cape 
Town to the Zambezi”, Marks and Trapido have argued that the failure of the Boer 
state to create the Chamber’s desired labour system is “key to understanding both the 
[Jamison] Raid and the [South African] war.”49 Given its regional interests, Britain’s 
military intervention had everything to do with the gold deposits on the 
Witwatersrand and the need for an Imperial power to control and enable a suitable 
migrant labour system (which would need to stretch across the entire Southern 
African region).50 This perspective was no doubt inspired by the Chamber of Mines. 
Two years before the war had drawn to a close, the Chamber wrote to the British 
Administration entreating them to take responsibility for recruiting African workers 
for the gold mines.51 Although the request was refused, the colonial state would 
increasingly intervene in the construction of the Chamber’s labour force.52  
Taking matters into their own hands, the Chamber’s next major institutional attempt 
to monopsonise recruiting saw the creation of the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association in 1900. This was the Chamber’s third attempt to establish itself as the sole 
buyer of labour. Although effectively stimulating supply, private recruiters, touts, 
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desertions, and internecine intra-industry competition for labour had raised costs 
considerably, and the Chamber wanted to use WNLA to align all groups’ interests in 
low wages.53 WNLA was a centralized recruiting organization, representing Chamber 
of Mines member groups/companies, which attempted to establish itself as the sole 
purchaser of labour for the industry. Its board was comprised of major group 
representatives, Chamber of Mines executives, senior recruiters, a general manager, 
and a chairman. To give a sense of the type of person in charge of WNLA, it should 
be noted that the agency’s first chairman, Frederick Perry, was previously stationed 
as the Imperial Secretary, while WNLA’s first general manager, Major G.A Goodwin, 
had previously served as an official in the Transvaal military government: WNLA 
leadership was the preserve of imperialists and military men. 549 From the first 
WNLA’s operations were tied to objectives of the Native Affairs Department, and the 
colonial state. The idea was that recruiters, traders, and rural elites would sell labour 
to WNLA, not individual groups or companies – in this way WNLA would be able to 
control the price.  
Immediately after the war WNLA cut wage rates almost in half, from a pre-war 
average of R5 per month to R3 in 1902 – at the time, these were probably the lowest 
cash wage rates in the whole of Southern Africa.55 In 1902 fathers watched their sons 
accept wages that were 60% lower than those they received in 1890.56  In the Cape 
WNLA commanded little by way of permanent staff and relied substantially on the 
1000 odd traders operating in the Transkei by the early 20th century.57 A majority of 
recruiters were traders who passed out advances and loans, and stimulated 
recruitment by locking Africans into debt.58 Describing the period under 
consideration, the Chamber of Mines President later remarked in 1912 that only by 
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paying out large sums to recruiters, who in turn endeavour to induce the 
natives to come to work by offers of loans and the wherewithal to pay 
their taxes and their debts to the traders who have given them credit, that 
we have been able to keep up the supply of labour to what it is today.59 
This was the essential difficulty that the Chamber needed to overcome: private 
recruiters supplied high rates of labour, but exacted a high price, encouraged 
desertion, mislead migrants, and encouraged intra-industry competition (which 
undermined monopsony collusion). Since they controlled access to rural credit in a 
context of widespread deprivation, and were the sole purchasers of peasant produce, 
monopolized traders could impose a strong influence on men in the rural areas. These 
traders formed a crucial link between the reserve economy and the external labour 
market.60 Fearful of limiting supply, the NAD did not comprehensively attempt to 
undermine the position of traders in the early 20th century. 
Scholars of the Native Affairs Department have understated the institution’s role in 
forging and sustaining a labour reservoir in the Transkei. Evans claimed misleadingly 
that the institution’s “involvement in the gold mining industry was minimal”, while 
Posel notes that the Chamber of Mine’s influence on the NAD was powerful.61 
 However, even before 1910, when the NAD became the Department of Native Affairs, 
the relationship between the Chamber of Mines/WNLA and the NAD Department 
was strengthened considerably.62 After studying NAD correspondence files from the 
time, Alan Jeeves argued that “it would be easy” to make the case that the 
Commissioner of Native Affairs (Godfrey Lagden) and his officials answered directly 
to the Chamber of Mines and WNLA rather than to their superiors in government.63 
The Commissioner, and his Secretary of Native Affairs, W. Windham, exchanged 
extensive correspondence with the Chamber and WNLA, and met frequently with 
these organisations. Chamber and WNLA officials were cautiously regarded by 
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Native Affairs officials.64 Jeeves found that a tight relationship between the Native 
Affairs Department and the mines developed at “every level of the administrative 
hierarchy”.65 The NAD Commissioner was briefed and consulted before WNLA 
pursued policy changes, and in this way government criticism was forestalled. The 
desire for the Transkei to be a low wage labour exporting economy was shared by 
both the NAD and the Chamber of Mines. 
Blocking African peasants from free trade and access to credit on even terms was a 
feature of colonial institutions and the Native Affairs Department, and it trapped 
many men into accepting mine contracts through white traders.66 The operations of 
traders relied on racist NAD policies pursued to realize the NAD’s goal of stimulating 
the Transkei economy by exporting labour.  Africans in the Transkei were 
predominantly unable to sell their produce or labour freely, stripped of political 
agency, compelled to pay taxes, and crammed into spaces wholly inappropriate for 
rural cultivators. In this way the NAD viewed the Transkei as a labour sending region 
where the Transkei’s inhabitants were to be institutionally bereft of choice – it was in 
this manner a vision of deprivation. Mining interests were by the end of the war 
dominant in colonial regions like the Transkei, and colonial officials had already 
abandoned the idea of Africans becoming surplus producing peasants.67 The Transkei 
economy, Native Affairs officials had decided, would be powered by the export of 
migrant labour, and the NAD’s policies reflected this decision. Although not decisive, 
taxes (like the hut, poll, and labour taxes) were an important means for authorities to 
simultaneously finance colonial systems of governance, and at the same time push 
people in the Transkei into the external economy.68 A government report from 1903 
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openly disclosed that taxes were devised precisely to “force the Natives to work in the 
towns and on the mines”.69   
Colonial political administrations were increasingly consolidated and bureaucratised 
in the early 20th century. Already by 1903 the Magistracies of Pondoland, East 
Griqualand, Thembuland and the Transkei were melded to together to form the 
United Transkeian Territories under a Chief magistrate in Umtata.70 Magistrates in 
each district were responsible for governing their respective locations. As 
embodiments of legal institutions and colonial control, magistrates were heavily 
involved in recruiting, and the Native Affairs Department had as early as 1899 
communicated to its officers that magistrates were “in the best position to bear on 
[potential recruits] and encourage them to go out and work”.71 As Alan Jeeves put it, 
“virtually nobody in Native Affairs could see any alternative to migrancy”.72  
Similarly, after 1902, and although not sufficiently effective, the colonial state was 
increasingly willing to intervene in the labour market by enforcing the pass laws and 
the Master and Servants Act more rigorously, thereby further controlling African 
movement and driving Africans into unfavourable unskilled employment.73 If one 
generalization can be made about the colonial state and NAD institutions imposed on 
Transkei men, it is that these men were cast as labour units – profitably exportable 
commodities – rather than full autonomous persons. The point of early NAD and 
colonial state legislation relating to migrant labour was to constrain the choices of men 
(impose deprivation), so that they would have to accept mine work as a final option.  
Despite these efforts, and notwithstanding the pressures of taxation, diminishing 
access to land, political subjugation, ecological disasters like the rinderpest epidemic, 
and worsening deprivation, all of which constrained the options of Transkei 
inhabitants, WNLA’s wage cuts in 1902 brought about crippling labour shortages.74 
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WNLA soon raised wages to the 1896/7 schedule (desperate for labour, many mines 
broke rank and paid wages above this raised rate).75 The assistance of NAD officials 
and government laws like the Mines and Works Act and the pass laws, were not 
strong enough to undermine the lucrative private recruiting business. As long as 
private recruiters supplied labour, and groups and companies competed for this 
labour – or as long as the labour market was somewhat free – the Chamber was unable 
to drive down wage rates while maintaining supply and unable to secure its low cost 
structure. Notwithstanding the NAD and WNLA’s close cooperation and shared 
interest, the Chamber needed stronger and more coherent state institutions to drive 
out private recruiters and thereby force prospective migrants to accept the Chamber’s 
low wages. In other words the mining industry and pre-Union governments simply 
did not possess the capacity to monopsonise the labour market. 
Only in Southern Mozambique did WNLA’s monopsony attempt meet success. A 
tragic and hideous combination of colonial conquest, civil war, harrowing ecological 
catastrophes in the preceding decades, hefty taxation, and a controlled recruiting 
agreement between Portuguese officials and the Chamber of Mines in 1897 rendered 
mine work unavoidable for many Mozambican men and quickly established WNLA’s 
monopsony in southern Mozambique.76 With over 1500 employees, by 1905 some 65 
feeding stations (one every 300 square miles) delivered thousands of men to the 
fourteen WNLA camps in Southern Mozambique.77 WNLA’s stature and influence in 
Southern Mozambique was matched only by the Portuguese colonial 
administration.78 By contrast, in the Transkei WNLA was heavily reliant on loan-
offering trader recruiters and advance-offering private recruiters. Mozambicans were 
unable to access credit in this way. In South Africa, traders offered credit and private 
recruiters offered loans to repay this credit – this was the predominant means whereby 
Transkei men accepted mine contracts before the formation of the NRC in 1912. 
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As a monopsonistic recruitment agency, WNLA recruited workers for general 
distribution across the industry, and in doing so encroached upon the little freedom 
available to Transkei migrants to choose between discrete mines and working 
conditions. Private recruiters offered migrants the choice between mines but WNLA 
did not. While private recruiters and traders offered higher wages and advances, 
WNLA cut wages and wanted to remove advances. Its inability to control the traders’ 
rural credit system was a large part of WNLA’s failure. By 1906 WNLA was 
“completely discredited” in the South African territories and had earned itself the 
epithet Mzilikazi (after the Ndebele King), which signified the institution’s tyranny, 
oppression, and failure.79 WNLA failed between 1900 and 1906 for much the same 
reason previous monopsony attempts failed.80 The different mines represented by the 
Chamber failed to agree on labour matters, they did not unanimously support WNLA, 
and the extent to which state legislation would supply labour was keenly exaggerated 
by the Chamber.81 Essentially WNLA failed to recognize that the advances and credit 
offered by labour contractors and private recruiters were the principal obstacle to 
eliminating competition, and that any monopsony attempt in South Africa would 
have to undermine the power of such independent recruiters and contractors.82 The 
moment a few mines offered higher wages, the monopsony was broken and 
competition for labour raised wages. Despite the post war depression, and a general 
recession until 1908, increasing proletarianisation, ecological calamities, and pass laws 
and taxation, Transkei men proved resilient in avoiding mine work.83 Since the post 
South African war colonial state had assisted the Chamber in securing some 50 000 
Chinese workers between 1904 and 1906, WNLA’s failures in the Transkei were not 
an immediate cause for alarm.84 By the end of 1906, however, further Chinese 
recruiting was prohibited, and the Chamber of Mines turned its energies towards the 
Transkei as a key labour sending region. 
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In the first decade of the 20th century, colonial officials in the Transkei were concerned 
not to pursue any policies which would discourage Transkei men from accepting mine 
work.85 Migrant wages were vital to the Transkei local economy, and were in part 
used to finance colonial administration. All reforms which could impede the flow of 
labour from the Transkei had to be deferred. The NAD did not attempt to limit the 
number of recruiting licenses or the amount that could be advanced, since, like the 
Chamber, they feared that this would limit the flow of labour. Nor did the colonial 
state have the bureaucratic capacity to enforce control of the industry’s labour system. 
WNLA’s failure to achieve monopsony is explained by its inability to control private 
recruiters and the rural credit system.  
Alan Jeeves rightly placed strong emphasis on the necessary role of private recruiters, 
costly advances, and competition between mining houses in stimulating and 
augmenting the labour supply from the Transkei.86 Disagreeing with scholars like 
Johnstone and Davies, Jeeves denied that there was any “inexorable drive to 
monopsony”, and argued, by contrast, that between 1906 and 1911 Transkei men faced 
a “seller’s market”.87 Between 1904 and 1910 labour from the Cape colony increased 
from 5.2% to 30% of the total unskilled workforce on the mines, representing over the 
same period a quantitative increase from roughly 4 000 mine migrants to in excess of 
50 000.88 This proportional and quantitative increase in labour from the Transkei was 
a direct result of private recruiters’ higher wages and larger advances. WNLA could 
not weaken the position of private recruiters and traders. After 1906 WNLA was out 
of the picture in the Transkei, mining houses again competed aggressively for labour, 
costs ascended drastically, thousands of African runners were employed, and vast and 
unsustainable sums were injected into the Transkei in the form of cattle and cash 
advances.89 In Pondoland in mid-1904, the total value of advances over £26 per recruit 
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stood at  £142, by the end of the year, the figure stood at £2 951, and by 1905 the sum 
rose to £17 264.90 While WNLA broke down by 1906, cattle and cash advances became 
increasingly widespread.91 Although the use of substantial advances and recourse to 
private recruiters was costly, wasteful, encouraged desertion and was ultimately 
unsustainable, these methods were effective at raising the participation rate of 
Transkei men with celerity. Where the pressures of WNLA, the market, natural 
calamities, and government intervention failed to supply sufficient labour in the early 
20th century, advances and costly private recruiters and contractors succeeded. 
Importantly, Jeeves argued against the view that the “making of the mine labour 
force” in the Transkei could be explained by invoking structural changes in the 
Transkei economy, proletarianisation, the persistence of recession, natural disasters, 
or government coercion.92 Had these means been sufficient, Jeeves argued, it would 
have been unnecessary to pour so much money into private recruiter fees and cash 
and cattle advances.93 Moreover, even during the post war depression, most men 
found means of avoiding mine work, despite the increasing poverty and 
proletarianisation described by Bundy (in 1904 only 4000 men in the Transkei were 
drawn onto the mines).94 For Jeeves, the wage advance system and high recruiting fees 
“alone explain the making of the Transkei labour pool”.95  
But the creation of a labour pool at whatever cost was not the Chamber’s aim. The 
point of WNLA was to decrease wages while augmenting supply. The mining houses 
undoubtedly preferred expensive labour to no labour at all, but by 1909 in no real 
sense was a labour pool created. At best, private recruiters and the advance system 
created a necessarily short-lived and unsustainable labour pool. Private recruiters and 
advances raised participation rates, to be sure, but they did so unsustainably and 
participation was thus necessarily transient: the creation of the labour pool was by 
1909 contingent upon unsustainable costs. As an implication of Jeeves’ argument, 
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were the unsustainable advances and recruiter fees to disappear, the “labour pool” 
too would disappear. High recruitment fees and advances were essentially an 
expedient and transitory strategy to induce Transkei men into mine work. Especially 
after Union, it was the national state intervention and formal institutions alongside 
increasing deprivation in the Transkei that enabled the Chamber to reduce costs and 
maintain high participation rates. Of course the increasing deprivation which afflicted 
the Transkei population throughout the first two decades of the 20th century was a 
significant catalyst for migration, but this general process of deprivation was also 
ineluctably bound up with the destructive institutions which characterized the 
Transkei after colonial conquest.96 It was institutions of unfreedom which created the 
Transkei labour pool: furthermore this only occurred in the second decade of the 
century. 
The establishment of the Government Native Labour Bureau (GNLB) in 1907 
represented a new and important involvement of government in the control, 
regulation, and recruitment of mine labour – it was a direct response to WNLA’s 
failure to restrict competition for labour and regulate supply.97 Wanting to undermine 
the position of private recruiters, the secretary of Native Affairs in the Cape (E. Dower) 
and the head of the Transvaal Native Labour Bureau (H. Taberer) agreed to use the 
GNLB to channel ‘voluntaries’ onto the mines by providing independent migrants 
with ‘free’ railway transport and food.98  Once at the bureau’s depot in Johannesburg, 
migrants would make their own agreements with mine employers – in this way 
private recruiters were bypassed and the GNLB avoided having to place migrants on 
unfavourable mines (which was part of WNLA’s downfall).99 Although only the 
beginning of a drawn-out and expensive administrative effort, the Transvaal and 
Cape agreement signalled an early but tight inter-regional cooperation on labour 
matters. The formation of the GNLB symbolized the Chamber’s active and progressive 
movement towards stronger state assistance in the forging of its labour market and 
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migrant system. The Assisted Voluntary Scheme was only properly operative in 1909 
– 1910 when GNLB registrars took responsibility for labour matters and registration 
from Cape magistrates.100 The AVS system was not successful, however.101 Most 
relevantly, the collaboration signified a drive towards national legislation and 
institutions, which - though necessary - could only be realized after Union in 1910. 
By 1908 the deterioration of recruitment operations – escalating costs, high desertion 
rates, and unpredictability – made it clear to most colonial officials that more 
comprehensive inter-region state intervention to control private recruiters had 
become a necessity.102 Since recruitment levels were relatively high, the Chamber and 
Transvaal and Cape officials believed that reform of the previously expedient system 
could now be pursued. At this juncture the Chamber had secured an acceptable 
supply of labour at unacceptable costs. The private recruiters had successfully raised 
participation rates in the Transkei (from less than 5% of total mine labour in 1904 to 
30% in 1909), now the Chamber moved to cut advances, restrict licenses and 
effectively take back the labour market share from independent recruiters. At a 
conference in Cape Town in 1909 the Transvaal and Cape authorities agreed that 
labour bureaux should be set up and administered in each recruiting district and 
staffed by a new class of registry officials.103 This signified the increasing 
bureaucratisation of the labour system. Other proposed reforms included stringently 
licensing recruiters and runners and imposing a strict limit on wage advances, which 
– it was thought – would in turn make the Assisted Voluntary Scheme more attractive 
to prospective recruits.104 Essentially the conference consisted of proposals for 
national state institutions and legislation to undermine the position of private 
recruiters, and provided a “blue print for later legislative and administrative action 
by the Union government”.105 The conference clearly marked the Chamber’s 
requisitioning of the NAD and state legislation (for a national state yet to be born) to 
                                                          
100 Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 82. 
101 Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 118. 
102 Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 105. 
103 Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 108. 
104 Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 106 – 110. 
105 Jeeves, Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 109. 
47 
 
control its labour market, as well as a common interest in a controlled low wage labour 
system. The NAD and elements of the state were by the end of the first decade 
extremely partial to the Chamber’s demands for assistance, and the Chamber, the 
Native Affairs Department, and leaders of the Union government were forging plans 
to institutionalize the Chamber’s monopsony in the national state. 
The formation of Union in 1910 importantly enabled legislation and institutions to be 
implemented with national scope. An array of hitherto weakly enforced institutions 
was consolidated after Union. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 locked all African 
mineworkers into unskilled low wage positions with no chance of promotion, the 
Native Labour Registration Act entrenched the pass laws and the criminalization of 
contract breaking, it established the Director of Native Labour (of the NAD) as the sole 
receiver of complaints, standardized working conditions and contracts and reduced 
advances to £2, while the 1913 Land Act cemented land dispossession and authorized 
discrete recruitment zones to white farmers and the Chamber of Mines.106 The national 
state was tasked with registering recruits and certifying contracts, which did much to 
undermine the market for unscrupulous recruiters. All these institutions were 
pursued with an eye to raising the tractability of migrants at a lower cost.107  
Through labour bureaux, tax burdens, colonial political domination, the inability to 
acquire trading licenses, and limitations on land and cattle ownership, Africans from 
the Transkei were heavily constrained. These institutions purposively limited their 
choices, and if we take the expansion of political social and economic 
opportunities/freedoms as the goal of development, we see that Transkei Africans 
were blocked from developing so that the Chamber could achieve its low cost 
structure. Only in the context of this choice-constraining institutional context could 
the Native Recruiting Corporation manage to drive out competition-inducing and 
costly private recruiters, while at the same time maintaining supply and drastically 
cutting wages. The NRC required a coherent and unified state to consolidate and 
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enforce policy and legislation on a national scale. While Jeeves highlighted the 
indispensible role of private recruiters and unsustainable advances in stimulating 
migrant labour from the Transkei, it was state legislation and the increasing 
bureaucratic and administrative strength of the NAD, working in concert with the 
NRC, which drove out the costly private recruiters, retained supply, and cut wages 
drastically. This chapter turns now to examine how the NRC achieved it monopsony. 
With strong institutional backing, when the Native Recruitment Corporation emerged 
in 1912 as the Chamber’s fourth attempt at monopsony in South Africa, it was in a far 
better position to undermine private recruiters and establish control of the labour 
supply. One principal reason for WNLA’s failed monopsony attempt in South Africa 
was its inability to divert market share away from powerful but expensive and 
wasteful independent recruiters and contractors. The success of the NRC implied a 
struggle towards the weakening and eventual eradication of private recruiters as 
labour suppliers.108 The story of the NRC undermining private recruiters while taking 
control of the rural credit system, and co-opting chiefs, headman and trader recruiters 
into the NRC, is essentially a story of three institutions working in combination to 
augment, control, and sustain a migrant labour force from the Transkei. These 
institutions consisted of enabling national state legislations (including the 1913 Land 
Act, the Pass Laws, and the Native Labour Registration Act of 1911), the colonial-style 






The NRC and key shifts in the migrant labour force after 1912 
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The formation of the NRC was essentially a relaunch of WNLA, but since WNLA - or 
Mzilikazi as it was known - had lost all credibility in South Africa by 1906, the agency 
needed to be rebranded as the Native Recruiting Corporation for its launch in 1912. 
Like WNLA, the NRC was a non-profit, joint stock association owned by participating 
mine companies and mining groups.109 The NRC board, again imitating WNLA, 
consisted of group representatives, Chamber of Mines executives, a General 
Superintendent, senior recruiters, and a Chairman.110 The NRC’s mandate was to 
purchase labour for the Chamber in South Africa and the three British protectorates 
(Bechuanaland, Basotholand, and Swaziland).111 The NRC was based on a colonial 
district structure and local NRC managers were each given responsibility for their 
respective districts.112 Most of the best recruiters were absorbed into the NRC. 
Importantly, as this section demonstrates, the NRC recruited in a devolved manner.113  
The devolved system was part of an attempt to drive down costs. The NRC also 
implemented a system of “maximum average” to obviate competition between 
recruiters.114 The point was to buy labour on behalf of members at low costs and 
distribute it across the industry. In exemplary utilitarian fashion, a committee of mine 
engineers determined the optimal number of workers required for each 
group/company and labour was to be allocated to mines on that basis.115 The NRC 
offered six or nine month contracts, which were considerably shorter than those 
WNLA offered in Mozambique.116 Contract lengths were not always an indication of 
how long it would take to complete a contract, however, since a mechanism called the 
loafing-ticket system allowed mine managers to reject a mineworker’s day’s work for 
a number of trivial infringements. Depending on the mine and management, it could 
take considerably longer to complete contracts.117  An important difference between 
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WNLA and the NRC was that, like private recruiters, the NRC as far as possible 
offered migrants the choice between different mines, whereas WNLA did not.118  
Choice could never have been eradicated totally: the Chamber forged and wanted to 
forge a labour system in which limited autonomy was permitted within an otherwise 
fiercely controlled and choice-destructive institutional environment.119 Migrants were 
to have no choice but to accept mine work, yet it was important that Transkei migrants 
could choose between mines.120  
After the formation of the NRC in 1912 a number of important shifts occurred in the 
Chamber’s Transkei migrant labour force. Recall that before the formation of the NRC 
the principal problem with the Transkei labour supply was that although participation 
rates were high, the costs of securing participation were prohibitive in the longer-term. 
Before moving to a discussion of how the NRC managed to achieve monopsony by 
the early 1920s, it is worth noting the general quantitative changes in the labour force 
during this period. In 1911 Transkei migrants comprised 27% of Chamber’s unskilled 
labour force, representing some 57 901 migrants.121 By 1919 the Transkei was sending 
69 723 migrants to the mines, which represented 35% of total unskilled labour.122 
Recruiting licenses which permitted recruiters to legally recruit Transkei migrants for 
the mines plummeted from 2 069 in 1912 to 550 in 1918.123 Similarly, desertion rates – 
which had hitherto retarded productivity and wasted money spent on irrecoverable 
advances and recruiting fees fell precipitously in the Cape from 4 133 in 1909 to 474 in 
1920.124  
In sum, the absolute number and proportion of Transkei migrants to the mines 
increased markedly, the number of deserters fell by nearly 1000%, and the number of 
the recruiting licenses dropped by almost 75%. As this section argues, it was the power 
of the national state and NAD institutions, purposively working in combination with 
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the NRC, which enabled these labour force shifts to occur. To understand how these 
shifts came about, this chapter turns to a discussion of the control of rural credit and 
the co-option of chiefs and rural elites into the NRC system. Private recruiters, though 
often fraudulent, abusive, and ruthless, did have the advantage of competing against 
one another and in so doing provided a range of choices for prospective migrants. The 
NRC’s goal was to nullify such choices, and it had already by 1909 been assured of 
state and NAD muscle. 
 
Labour recruiters, management of credit, advances  
 
In the Transkei, private recruiters and traders were the major suppliers of mine 
migrant labour during the first decade of the 20th century – they augmented the supply 
from 5 751 in 1903 to 46 869 in 1910.125 In a context of deprivation, where colonial 
subjugation had made it impossible for most rural cultivators to meet their needs (pay 
taxes etc.), the trader/recruiters’ strength rested on their control of the rural credit 
system. To weaken their power the NRC needed to wrest control of the credit system 
from traders while simultaneously retaining their services – this was the pivotal 
challenge. Most recruits would accept wage advances from recruiters: although while 
on the mines, such recruits would often look to traders to extend further loans so that 
families or dependents could be assured of vital supplies in their absence.126 That 
many migrants found themselves embroiled in a cycle of inextricable debt goes some 
way to explaining the high desertion rates (contract breaking) which characterised the 
pre-NRC era. Taking control of the rural credit system and driving down recruiting 
costs were the two leading and overlapping objectives of the NRC in 1912. To achieve 
these ends the NRC looked to the national state and its increasingly close ally the 
Native Affairs Department. Conceptually, the NRC is unimaginable without enabling 
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national state legislation and the NAD: choice destructive institutions were a 
necessary feature of the NRC’s operations and success. 
The NRC had two strategies to control rural credit and cut recruiting costs: a national 
state-enforced reduction of wage advances, and a state-sanctioned and NAD-enforced 
reduction in the licensing of recruiters. Already by 1910 the Chamber had convinced 
the government to impose a £2 advance limit per recruit, which considerably 
undermined the power of private recruiters.127 By 1912 acute deprivation in the 
Transkei saw the maximum advance float to £5 where it remained for the next few 
years, until falling again to £2 later in the decade.128 This means that both legislation 
and enforcement of rules structuring the gold mines’ labour market were remarkably 
sensitive to the flow of labour from the Transkei. Although still high, in the previous 
decade it was not uncommon for advances to exceed £20 and so restricting advances 
to between £2 and £5 was a profound reduction in the credit available to mine recruits 
and the Transkei region generally.129  
The NRC took it upon itself to provide the capital which traders and recruiters used 
for wage advances. In order to establish itself as the exclusive buyer of labour, the 
Chamber of Mines in effect financed an entire rural credit system and – backed by 
state and NAD officials – used its centralised recruitment agency to control the flow 
of credit. After 1912 traders began to provide goods to migrants’ families with NRC-
financed mine advances rather than extending their own credit. By supplying 
controlled mine advances to traders at no interest and taking on the risk of defaulters, 
the NRC in essence took control of the rural credit system.130 Apart from paying a 
capitation fee for each recruit supplied, the NRC guaranteed traders that it would take 
a specified ‘quota’ of able-bodied migrants each month and compensated traders for 
recruits not taken up.131 The NRC incentivised traders to induce Transkei men into 
indebtedness, and in doing so emulated the system private recruiters and traders had 
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successfully developed over the previous decade. By 1913 the NRC had secured the 
services of 914 such traders in the Transkei, and in the same year 57 100 migrants were 
drawn to the mines in this way.132 Already by 1914 the NRC was rapidly terminating 
its use of runners: recruits by 1914 were making their own way to the trading stations, 
and so active recruitment was no longer necessary.133  In the same year a Native 
Affairs Department Chief Magistrate H.O Buckle’s Native Grievances Inquiry 
endorsed the already much accepted view that economic necessity was the principal 
force driving migrants to the mines.134 Missionary observers at the time reiterated this 
view, arguing that the “mainstay” of the population was mine wages, and that 
sustenance was in many areas dependent on money from the mines.135 Missionary 
observers, many of whom submitted evidence for Buckle’s report, grasped that the 
Reserve areas were purposively and systemically deprived so that they could supply 
labour to the external economy.136  
Assisted by national state legislation (the Native Labour Registration Act of 1911), and 
the NAD, the number of licenses secured by recruiters dropped by 75% between 1912 
and 1918. This onslaught against private recruiters and traders (the imposition of 
drastic advance limits and the refusal to license recruiters not favoured by the NRC), 
was a function of national state legislation and the NAD enforcing this policy in the 
Transkei. The NRC’s success in weakening private recruiters while taking their market 
share would be unthinkable without formal institutions.  
 
Drawing chiefs and rural elites into the NRC system, 1912 – 1920s  
 
The NRC could only make sense as an institution after South Africa was unified and 
the national state’s muscle could be counted on to enforce vital labour-controlling 
institutions. Without the co-operation of chiefs and headmen in rural labour sending 
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regions, however, the NRC would not have been able to operate. Since they could 
penetrate deep into the rural areas of the Transkei and commanded political and social 
authority over their subjects, from the earliest days the participation of chiefs, 
headmen, and other rural elites was indispensible to the migrant labour system.137 By 
1910 virtually the entire rural elite was involved in the business of recruiting for the 
mines.138 Jeeves has even argued that rural elites like chiefs and headmen were the 
“main beneficiaries” of the costly advance system.139 Since rural elites were 
indispensable in the success of traders/recruiters, and, moreover, derived 
considerable material benefits for their assistance, the challenge for the NRC was to 
extricate rural elites from the trader/recruiter system while at the same time retaining 
their recruiting services and ensuring that elites continued to receive the material 
benefits they had come to enjoy. White traders and recruiters were often merely a 
“front” for the chiefs, touts, headmen, and runners who were the “real operators of 
the system”, and as such government records and Chamber correspondence rarely 
disclosed the latter’s crucial role.140 Just as the NRC had wrested control of the rural 
credit system from traders/recruiters, the NRC needed to remove rural elites from the 
trader/recruiter system and incorporate them into the NRC’s own monopsonistic 
labour system. 
 Over the next decade the NRC devised a means of transferring the costs of rural elites’ 
services directly onto mineworkers. To do this, chiefs and other rural notables would 
be given permission to visit the compounds and mines where their subjects worked. 
In the second decade of the century mines actively encouraged such visits, and an 
NAD circular had by 1913 ordered officials to provide assistance and facilities to all 
chiefs and powerful elites wanting to visit their followers.141 The purpose of these 
state-financed and keenly encouraged visits was twofold. Firstly, the NAD, NRC, and 
mine and compound managers wished to associate their authority with that of the 
visiting chief’s. Equipped with special pass documents from the Native Affairs 
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Department, and letters of introduction from the NCR, chiefs were afforded much 
ceremony and credibility on their mine visits.142 Essentially fundraising ventures, 
these visits functioned, secondly, as a means for chiefs to impose what was in effect a 
second taxation on inhabitants from their districts.143 Trapped inside brutal and 
severely controlled compounds, migrants could not escape the financial demands of 
their chiefs. During the pre-NRC era of high wage advances and escalating 
recruitment fees chiefs could profit by demanding gifts and financial contributions 
from traders and recruiters, but after the NRC-controlled advances and fees, the 
services of chiefs and headmen could only be secured by continuing to offer material 
rewards. Despite lowered wages and widening deprivation, the burden of these 
rewards was shifted away from traders and recruiters and onto the migrants 
themselves. In the second decade of the 20th century state-sponsored mine visits were 
increasingly institutionalised, and indeed became a key feature of the NRC’s labour 
system.144  
The NRC’s efforts to drive private recruiters out of business, take control of rural 
credit, and absorb rural elites into their recruitment system was so successful that by 
1919 the Randfontein group – a large and powerful mining house which had hitherto 
refused to join the monopsony attempt – finally joined the NRC and thereby 
effectively realised the Chamber desired monopsony. Between 1913 and 1924 the NRC 
and WNLA’s recruitment costs plummeted by 20%, and for the next forty years 
African wages would remain largely unchanged in real terms.145 By the early 1920s 




                                                          
142 Jeeves, Struggle for the gold mines' Labour Supply, 162 – 163. 
143 Jeeves, Struggle for the gold mines' Labour Supply, 161 – 163, 180. 
144 Jeeves, Struggle for the gold mines' Labour Supply, 162, 180. 





In sum, major changes in the NRC’s drive to monopsony were predicated on the 
support of the state in its various permutations from 1874 to the 1920s and on the NAD 
shutting down options so that migrants would be compelled to accept the NRC’s 
reduced wages and standardised contracts. It was national state-imposed legislation 
which reduced the number of recruiting licenses, limited advances according to NRC 
requirements, put a stop to desertions, and it was the NAD’s support which enabled 
the NRC to incorporate chiefs and other rural elites into its fold. Before robust national 
state and NAD intervention, men could sell their labour to a range of competing 
recruiters and thereby select the best available option; after the institutional 
interventions, the labour market was unfree, these choices were nullified and migrants 
were compelled to accept the NRC’s low wages. Since expanded economic choice is 
one of the constitutive elements of development, this destruction of choice was itself 
an attack on the ends of development. By the early 1920s the essential institutional 
mechanisms upholding the Chamber’s migrant labour system were enshrined into 
law: pass laws prevented free movement and association; the 1913 Land Act 
prohibited the accumulation of land inside and outside the reserves, as well as carving 
up recruitment zones for the mines and white farmers; the Mines and Works Act 
locked Africans into the lowest echelons of unskilled mine labour; the Native Labour 
Registration Act criminalised contract breaking, entrenched the NAD as receiver of 
mine complaints and sharply reduced recruitment licenses and advances; the 
Industrial Conciliation Act closed the lid on African political representation on the 
mines; the imposition of various taxes forced men into the cash and credit economy; 
colonial political structures were pursued with an eye to achieving a labour exporting 
economy; and, finally, taxes paid to colonial authorities were not used to expand the 
opportunities available to Transkei inhabitants.146  
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In these ways a phalanx of institutions of unfreedom were brought to bear upon 
Transkei inhabitants. These institutions functioned not only to stem the economic 
activities of Transkei men, as Acemoglu and Robinson have argued, but imposed 
systemic constraints on their social and political opportunities/freedoms and in this 
way undermined not only one of the means to development (economic activity) but 
served as a direct assault on the ends of development.147
                                                          




Labour supply: deprivation, capability-destruction and agency, 1920s – 
1970s 
 
What people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, 
political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic 
education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives. The institutional 
arrangements for these opportunities are also influenced by the exercise of 
people’s freedoms, through the liberty to participate in social choice and in the 
making of public decisions that impel progress of these opportunities.1 – 




From the early 1920s, when the Chamber of Mines had the requisite institutional 
structures in place for its low wage labour monopsony, the NRC played a significant 
role in undermining the developmental prospects of the Transkei region and its 
inhabitants. This chapter examines how the success of mine recruiters was predicated 
upon rural deprivation, and how mine work in turn, especially in the externalisation 
of occupational disease, further kept households pinned down, negating their 
prospects for development. It examines correspondence between district 
superintendents and the NRC head office, as well as reports on ‘recruitment 
conditions’ to understand how the mining industry – with its comprehensive nexus 
of facilitating institutions – continued to rely on deprivation to secure its labour.  
Conventional measures of poverty such as the poverty datum line based on income 
and caloric counts, and even the composite count of basic needs do not go far enough 
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in enabling us to understand poverty and the extra-material effects of poverty.2 This 
chapter uses Amartya Sen’s concept of deprivation rather than traditional measures 
of ‘poverty’ to understand the hardships which characterised the Transkei during this 
period. In Sen’s understanding of development, deprivation and the absence of 
opportunity is precisely what constitutes unfreedom. And, since development 
consists in the expansion of freedoms, unfreedom is the opposite of development, 
unfreedom or deprivation is what hinders and forestalls development.3 It was the 
unfreedom of Transkei inhabitants, their institutionally informed deprivation, which 
enabled the NRC to draw significant numbers of mineworkers onto the gold mines 
during this period. Rather than understanding deprivation in narrow economic terms, 
this chapter understands deprivation as being calibrated in terms of political, social, 
and economic ‘unfreedoms’ and the absence of opportunity and choice. In terms of ill 
health and morbidity, agricultural decay, and increasingly comprehensive and 
bureaucratised political domination, the capabilities and freedoms of inhabitants of 
the Transkei diminished markedly from the 1920s to the 1960s.  
Despite a temporary easing during WWII, deprivation in the Transkei continued to 
widen and deepen in the 1960s – especially as thousands of persons were driven into 
the Homelands, which only further distressed the economically bleak and 
agriculturally traumatized region. The second section of this chapter spotlights the 
conditions of deprivation in the 1960s and 1970s. The Transkei in this period was 
marked by disease, insufficient medical facilities, poor schooling, overpopulation, 
inadequate arable land, and political oppression.4 These conditions of deprivation - an 
increasing negation of choice - provide the context for an examination of the interplay 
in which mine recruiters were involved in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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This chapter also examines changes in the NRC’s recruitment operations in Umtata 
between 1964 and 1977. The degree to which recruiters exploited the deprivations of 
Transkei persons is illustrated strikingly by the failure of the NRC – in spite of extreme 
drought conditions – to secure migrants for unpopular mines from 1964 to 1969. We 
shall see that this is evidenced by NRC labour correspondence and monthly reports 
which demonstrate that monthly estimations of labour supply by district 
superintendents were based on ‘recruitment conditions’. As deprivation increased, 
recruitment conditions improved, and monthly estimates of labour supplies 
increased.5 Also, in 1963 NRC and WNLA Managing Director James Gemmill allowed 
migrants to choose between mines initially to stem the flow of labour from the 
Transkei. However, certain unpopular mines, irrespective of the context of extreme 
drought and crop failure, were unable to secure sufficient mineworkers.6 It will be 
argued that it was often rational and preferable for work seekers and their families to 
face acute hunger rather than accept employment on unfavourable mines. The final 
section examines the disease and other burdens which the mines repatriated to the 
Transkei after depleting the strength and health from the recruited mineworkers. It 
further explains why the prospect of underground mine work on unpopular mines 
appeared to fill Transkei men with a more visceral horror than the prospect of 
insufficient food and unremitting deprivation. 
 
The context of deprivation and the role of institutions, 1920s – 1960s 
 
By the time the Industrial Conciliation Act was passed in 1924 – which forbade 
Africans from forming unions or representing themselves in industrial bargaining – 
all the major institutional features of the Chamber’s low wage oscillating migrant 
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labour system were firmly in place.7 Once enshrined into law and social thinking, 
these institutions not only remained remarkably stable, but also crucially 
underpinned the industry’s profitable gold extraction for the next six decades.8 From 
the outset the NAD was inextricably embroiled in transforming the Transkei into a 
low wage, unskilled, unfree, and otherwise deprived labour market for the 
burgeoning colonial economy. This central feature of racial domination in South 
Africa was the NAD’s heritage, and if it had pretended to position itself as a gradualist 
and paternalist governance system – weaning Africans piecemeal from ‘barbarism to 
civilisation’ – the conditions of deprivation by the 1920s, and its ever closer 
cooperation with the oppressive and freedom-destructive migrant labour system 
made such notions impossible to plausibly sustain.9 The NAD’s persistence in the 
twentieth century, as Ivan Evans put it, served as “palpable evidence that its roots 
remained sunk in the material and symbolic culture of colonial despotism.”10  
Especially after the 1927 Native Administration Act, the power of state policy was 
heavily concentrated in the hands of local magistrates (embodiments of the force of 
law), while the traditional social institution of chieftaincies were bypassed in formal 
bureaucratic structures, and loyal headmen were selected to execute NAD policy and 
assist in drawing persons into the repressive labour market.11 Since it invested the 
minister of Native Affairs with the authority to rule by proclamation as well as defer 
considerable power to local magistrates, the Native Administration Act of 1927 was a 
paradigmatic despotic imposition.12 Through this Act, NAD governance was 
increasingly bureaucratised and afforded national scope.13 Any meetings between 
Africans considered to be political in nature were outlawed by 1928 and Africans by 
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the early 1930s could be detained if so much as perceived, however illegitimately, as 
a threat to ‘peace’.14  
The NAD sought to ‘guide’ African thinking into modernity through the Pondoland 
and Transkei councils, which were based on Cecil Rhodes’ Glen Grey model of 
governance and development and operated by NAD headmen and magistrates.15 In 
1931 the Pondoland and Transkei councils were institutionally integrated to form the 
United Transkeian Territories General Council (UTTGC).16 Local colonial governance 
was increasingly comprehensive and marked by a drive to a kind of colonial 
modernism, with bureaucratic rule and political institutions central to how Transkei 
persons were politically dominated. Magistrates ruled the Transkei like “little 
kings”.17 This system of governance would remain in place until the shifts 
accompanying the Bantu Authorities Act of 1952 and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self 
Governance were realised in the apartheid state’s sad dream of ‘separate 
development.18 Under this new political system, the balance of power shifted 
increasingly away from headmen and magistrates and towards government elected 
chiefs and officials. The political and other unfreedoms of Transkei inhabitants were, 
however, in no way mitigated, and as the next section argues, may even have become 
worse.  Since political domination precedes social and economic deprivation, their 
total inability to shape the institutions which destroyed their capabilities meant that 
these institutions were like boulders chained to the necks of Transkei inhabitants.  
Serious scholars of the NAD agree that the Transkei under NAD governance became 
a land of stark and deepening deprivation and misery.19 By the mid-1920s government 
commissions documented the sharp decline of the Transkei, painting a picture of 
malnutrition, deep poverty, the denuding of land, overstocking, and unsustainable 
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population growth.20 Conceptually, this increasing immiseration is easy to 
understand. Transkei inhabitants were after all predominantly pastoralists (cattle 
farmers) and subsistence cultivators; this was their means of livelihood. After having 
demonstrated a remarkably successful adaption to more sophisticated farming 
implements and methods in the mid to late 19th century, the NAD was careful to retard 
their agricultural progress since such flourishing would otherwise immunise African 
peasants from participation in the external wage economy.  Rather than fostering 
African subsistence production, the NAD’s official policy perceived peasant 
production as inimical to the creation of a cheap labour market and used national state 
legislation to weaken Africans’ productive capacity (the Land Acts serve as 
emblematic of this policy).21  
The celerity with which industrialisation proceeded in the 20th century required 
proportionate advances in agricultural production, but this was to be undertaken by 
white farmers, such that the undermining of African peasant agriculture was central 
both to removing agricultural competition and simultaneously driving increasing 
numbers into the external wage economy. Squashed into purposively insufficient 
tracts of land and forced to use communal grazing, essentially to block Africans from 
competing with white farmers, the effect was widespread desertification of the ‘Native 
areas’.22 Whereas the Transkei was once an important agricultural exporter to urban 
centres, by the 1930s the proportion of imported food had risen sharply – 50% of all 
sorghum was imported, for instance – and Transkei inhabitants were critically 
dependent on earning cash wages.23 Agricultural output continued to fall during the 
1930s and 1940s.24  
Crush, Jeeves, and Yudelman described reserve agriculture in the 1940s as being in 
“terminal collapse”.25 The use of other animals to escape deprivation also diminished. 
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A generalisable survey in 1942 indicated that 44% of families owned no cattle and 47% 
owned neither cattle nor sheep.26 One in four Transkei inhabitants were landless by 
the 1940s. Accompanying falling crop production, greater pressures on resources, and 
shrinking incomes, malnutrition and associated diseases augmented catastrophically. 
Death rates in the Reserves were 40% higher in 1936 than they had been in 1921.27 In 
Umtata 50% of babies died before reaching their second birthday, whereas in 
Keiskammahoek 94% of total annual deaths were of children 16 years and younger.28 
Although paradoxically dependent upon institutionally informed deprivation, 
perhaps the most devastating indictment of agricultural decline in the Transkei came 
from the Chamber of Mines. Death rates were so high and agricultural production so 
inadequate that by the 1940s and 1950s, in their submissions to the Tomlinson 
Commission the Chamber of Mines positively implored the apartheid government to 
engage in large-scale investment in reserve economies.29 In 1954 James Gemmill, 
Managing Director of the NRC and WNLA, wrote to the district superintendent of 
Umtata with a three page questionnaire requesting a comprehensive resume of 
statistics and “vital information” pertaining to recruitment potential in the district, 
arguing that it would be “very useful” if the NRC could possess a brochure for every 
district in which it operated.30 Gemmill wanted to map out the recruitment potential 
of each district. Accordingly, in his letter he requested a range of information 
including details on the police establishment in the area, types of transport available, 
the principal occupations of Africans and the major avenues of employment available, 
recruiters operating on behalf of the NRC, competition from other recruiting 
organisations, “type of propaganda undertaken… in the district” and also requested 
an analysis of chiefs and their followers and taxpayers.31  
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Gemmill was also directly interested in the health and social capabilities of the 
Transkei and its peoples and requested detailed information about medical and 
educational facilities available, the health and “physique” of residents, common 
diseases afflicting the people, and the number of schools, hospitals, and clinics.32 Since 
most of their recruits were rural farmers, farming capabilities in labour sending areas 
were of major interest to the NRC, and Gemmill wanted to know the main crops 
grown by residents and their economic significance, climactic and rainfall patterns, 
and the number of livestock and cattle and their economic and cultural relevance, and 
whether or not indigenous fruits and vegetables could supplement food supplies. 33 
The NRC was by the 1950s keeping a watchful eye on the worsening capabilities of 
the Transkei and its peoples. 
The Umtata superintendent replied to Gemmill’s requests with a twenty three page 
document detailing what was in essence the recruitment potential of his district. He 
noted that the yield of maize, for instance, was “never sufficient to meet local demand” 
such that each year a large quantity of maize was imported which was available at 
controlled prices through European traders, and that no wild or indigenous fruits or 
vegetables were available to supplement diets.34 Tuberculosis was also “still a 
prevalent scourge”.35 This indicates the extent to which the NRC was preoccupied 
with closely observing the capabilities of Transkei districts and people. The purpose 
of all subsequent monthly reports was to laboriously describe the ‘recruitment 
conditions’ or conditions of deprivation in labour sending regions. The NRC clearly 
believed that worse conditions of deprivation predicted increased labour flows – since 
this was a guiding assumption in all monthly reports to head office.36  
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However, the Chamber feared that a wholesale collapse of reserve agriculture would 
undermine the basis for the reproduction of their labour force, and since most of their 
recruits were ‘tribalised’, the industry’s low wages were insufficient to adequately 
supplement meagre peasant production. The apartheid state rejected these proposals. 
Especially under the influx control policies of the 1960s, hundreds of thousands of 
African families were driven from white urban areas into the reserves, and so it was 
that while deprivation continued to deepen the Chamber’s labour supplies did not 
diminish as expected.37 If deprivation had reached harrowing proportions by the 
1940s, the heavy influx of displaced families only accelerated this terrible process. 
 
Deprivation, 1964 – 1977  
 
In terms of three principal constitutive elements of freedom – political freedom, basic 
healthcare, and basic education and/or training – deprivation became progressively 
acute from 1963 to the late 1970s. As Leeuwenburg concluded after surveying 757 
households in 1974, the majority of the Transkei people were “living in deep 
poverty… as extreme as anywhere in the world”, health, diet, family life, and the rural 
economy had all deteriorated: the situation increased in severity in the decade before 
1974.38 Other research conducted during the period also spotlighted the extent to 
which deprivation deepened from the late 1960s to the late 1970s.39 
The Transkei Bantustan received self-government status in 1963 as part of the official 
Apartheid rhetoric of self-development, and in the context of a host of African 
countries receiving independence in the 1960s, via the Transkei Constitution Act of 
1963, and the Transkei Self-government Act. The political system was anything but 
democratic, and did not bring meaningful political freedoms for Transkei 
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inhabitants.40  The Legislative Assembly which consisted of 64 unelected ex-officio 
members (all apartheid-installed chiefs or paramount chiefs) and 45 elected 
parliamentarians, and served to institutionalise tribal power.41 Since chiefs controlled 
the allocation of land in context of vast overcrowding, they were invested with 
formidable powers over Transkei inhabitants.42 Importantly, however, as Tim Gibbs 
has recently argued, the changing position of chiefs from the 1950s, and more so after 
1963, entailed a distinct shift towards chiefs becoming controllers of state resources 
(not just land), so that their power consisted in distributing state resources towards 
compliant or subservient subjects.43 Roger Southall argued that, “it was essentially the 
chiefly faction which acceded to 'self-government'”.44 In terms of legislative power, 
the Assembly remained impotent, since all legislation passed could be immediately 
vetoed at the State president’s discretion. Financially, the Transkeian government was 
near totally dependent on the apartheid government, and, since they were now 
Homeland citizens, persons considered to be of Transkeian origin lost whatever South 
African citizenship had remained.45 Self governance was indeed a marked political 
setback for Transkei inhabitants. The capability to exercise political voice or shape the 
institutions which governed one’s life was increasingly closed off.   
Transkei citizens were not meaningfully able to influence the institutional 
arrangements which governed their lives and shaped their opportunities, and became 
despondent with the political system. In spite of the number of contested seats rising 
from 45 to 59 in the same period, voter participation dwindled from 68% in 1963 to 
34% in 1973, and rose only marginally to 44% with ‘Independence’ in 1976. 
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Source: Roger Southall. South Africa’s Transkei: the Political Economy of an ‘Independent’ Bantustan 
(Nairobi: Heinemann. 1982), 141. 
 
Implemented during the Pondoland uprisings of 1960 – 1961, the politically repressive 
Proclamation 400 was not repealed by the Transkeian government of 1963, leaving 
researchers in the mid-1970s to conclude that the Transkei had been in “an effective 
state of emergency” since 1960.46 Proclamation 400 allowed persons to be imprisoned 
indefinitely without charge, condoned chiefs expelling persons from their Tribal 
Areas, and forbade meetings of ten or more people without the express permission of 
the authorities. The powers of chiefs and headmen were also considerably extended, 
and to the fury of residents headmen were permitted to confiscate livestock.47 
Furthermore, written or verbal statements which undermined the state, could incite 
boycott, or showed disrespect to chiefs were criminalised.48   
The Poqo insurgency of the early 1960s intensified under Proclamation 400.49 A 
militarised faction of the Pan African Congress (PAC), Poqo, which means ‘alone’ or 
‘pure’ in Xhosa, emerged after the African National Congress and the PAC were 
banned under the Unlawful Organisations Act in 1960.50 This politically repressive 
Act was an institutional response to a wave of riots, marches, and stay-at-homes which 
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Figure 2: Transkei Voter participation in general elections, and number of 







% of votes cast 
by registered 
voters 
1963 45 880 425 601 204 68 
1968 45 907 778 451 916 50 
1973 40 952 369 323 092 34  
1976 59 847 255 372 098 44 
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followed the Sharpeville massacre of the 21st of March 1960, where police opened fire 
on 10 000 Africans protesting the Pass Laws.51 The Transkei became a main centre for 
the PAC, with 14 separate groups operating there in the early 1960s.52 Although more 
fragmented and sporadic than the Pondoland uprisings, Poqo insurrectionists also 
embodied a popular aversion to the Bantu Authorities system which had emerged in 
1955.53 The Bantu Authorities system had carved Thembuland in two, legitimised 
unelected chiefs as instruments of apartheid, rejected popular participation in politics, 
and afforded paramountcy of a newly established ‘Emigrant Thembuland’ to Kaiser 
Matanzima.54 Since Thembuland was heavily dependent on migrant labour by the 
1960s, and peasant farming was needed to supplement these wages, the rehabilitation 
and land reforms programs undertaken after 1955 were fiercely resisted.55 To Poqo, 
Kaiser Matanzima epitomised the Bantu Authorities system, the installation of chiefs 
as apartheid stooges, and threatening land reform policies. By late 1962 migrant 
workers belonging to Poqo had made three attempts on Matanzima’s life.56 During 
the 1960s several groups of migrant workers travelled from Langa to the Transkei to 
kill Matanzima.57  As Poqo men arrested for attempting to assassinate Matanzima put 
it, 
The first thing he [Matanzima] did was to introduce fencing and now he is 
moving huts and kraal to some other place. It appears that he has sold the plots 
where the kraals were to the Europeans because there are huts there. Now he is 
assaulting us...  
Chief Matanzima has sold our land; we are going to kill him.58 
Headmen and chiefs were also frequently murdered during the early 1960s.59 The 
apartheid state and Matanzima’s police and security forces clamped down firmly on 
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rural resistance. Thousands of Poqo insurrectionists were pre-emptively arrested and 
convicted under the draconian Proclamation 400.60 After the apartheid state and 
Transkei police cracked down on Pondo and Poqo resistance, Southall describes 
Transkei residents as generally withdrawing to a “state of sullen acquiescence”.61  
The activities of the Department of Justice, headed by Kaiser Matanzima’s notoriously 
ruthless and corrupt brother, George, were keenly prioritised above education in the 
Transkei. More resources were directed towards exerting political control over 
inhabitants than towards expanding social and human freedoms through education. 
For the first five years of self-governance (1964 – 1969) more money was spent each 
year and in total by the Justice department, than was spent on education (R15 575 000 
versus R13 147 000).  
Figure 3: Transkei Justice and Education expenditure from 1964 – 1972 in Rands 
(thousands) 
Year Education and Culture Justice 
1964/65 1 409 2 407 
1965/66 2 454 2 757 
1966/67 2 670 2 900 
1967/68 2 879 3 473 
1968/69 3 735 4 038 
1969/70 4 421 4 169 
1970/71 5 487 4 512 
1971/72 6 191 5 677 
Source: Benbo, Transkei Economic Review (Johannesburg: Benbo, 1975), 68. 
 
The Department of Justice emerged in 1963 when the Transkei received its self 
governance status.62 All magistrates and headmen, whose power had previously been 
derived from the Bantu Administration Act of 1927 were NAD employees until ‘self-
government’. In 1963, these officials, the courts, and local and security police from all 
26 Magisterial districts were incorporated into the Transkeian Department of Justice. 
(Until 1963 the Act of 1927 had invested the Minister of Native Affairs with the 
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authority to rule by proclamation as well as devolve power to any NAD 
administrators and magistrates.63) The powers of magistrates were greatly enhanced 
by Proclamation 400, such that at the time of self-governance, and in the wake of Poqo 
insurgencies and the Pondo uprisings, the people of the Transkei were governed by 
impenetrable magisterial hierarchies. After self-government in 1963, political 
freedoms were further diminished. Southall described the powers afforded to 
magistrates, chiefs, and headmen as casting a “long dark shadow over the political 
sphere”.64 Between 1963 and 1966 at least 900 people were detained under 
Proclamation 400, and the threat of state power was ever present.65 Self governance 
meant that the Transkei had entered a new era of despotism. 
 Details on how the Department of Justice spent its budget are hard to come by. The 
Benbo report on the Transkei economy, which released the only figures on Transkei 
government spending during the 1960s, describes the department’s activities in 
tautological terms: 
The Transkeian Department of Justice was established in 1963 and is responsible 
for the administration of justice in the Transkei. 
When conducting research in the Transkei in the early 1970s Jeff Leeuwenburg noted 
that interviewees were “extremely anxious about official ‘come back’ on them” and 
described the atmosphere in terms of “ever-present layers of security forces”.66 This 
illustration of political unfreedom and the Transkei government’s preoccupation with 
political control was endorsed by all independent researchers. As Jeff Peires 
concluded,  
[e]very serious analyst of the homeland system since Harold Wolpe in 1972 
shares the view that the primary function of the homelands within the political 
economy of South Africa has changed from one of 'being primarily the 
reproducer of cheap labour . . . to the fundamental institutions for the 
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containment and control of the country's absolute surplus of population of 
Africans'.67 
The few resources that were directed toward education were for an education system 
that was not intended to expand the opportunities and capabilities of Transkei 
inhabitants. Although 71% of spending on education in homelands in 1965 came from 
the apartheid government, the state refrained from publishing statistics on the number 
of school age children attending school in the Transkei.68 An inquiry into teaching in 
Transkei primary schools in 1962 was strongly critical of the syllabi and condemned 
the over-emphasis on moulding children at too early an age for their post-school life, 
since this pre-empted children from acquiring basic arithmetic and language skills.69 
Education in the Transkei was not a means of expanding the freedoms and 
opportunities of Transkei persons, it served rather to cement their station as 
disposable labourers in the white economy.  The idea that education should not open 
opportunity and expand choice cohered neatly with Verwoerd’s notorious view that 
Africans were to be hewers of wood and drawers of water in the white economy.70 
Economic Advisor for Bantu Development J.J.S Weidemann in his 1968 review of 
‘Bantu Homelands’ revealingly announced that it was “not possible to compile a clear 
population catalogue worth mentioning of entrepreneurs, managers, technicians, 
scientists, educationists, labourers, unemployed, etc.”71 Despite warning that the 
priorities of homeland development were “obviously in many instances not 
empirically measurable” and in doing so excused himself from offering a clear and 
quantitatively informed depiction of homeland development, he did go on to point 
out that of the homeland children in school in 1965 only 3% were in Secondary tuition, 
while 0.3% were in technical tuition.72 By 1970 93% of rural Africans had either no 
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education whatsoever, or were educated below grade 8.73 Between 1970 and 1974 in 
the Transkei less than 1% of students were enrolled in grades 11 and 12, while those 
receiving trade and technical training did not rise above 0.1%. 
 
Source: Benbo, Transkei Economic Review (Johannesburg: Benbo, 1975), 42. 
 
Health indicators were no better. On one basic indicator, the paucity of hospital 
capabilities (ignoring the quality of these hospitals as well as access to them) the 
situation in the Transkei was desperate. Of the 26 hospitals in the Transkei in 1973, 
which served a de jure population of close to 2 000 000, 21 were elementary missionary 
hospitals, while the remaining five were supplied by the apartheid government.75 By 
1980 the African population as a whole was 51 220 beds short of having the WHO 
minimum required number of beds (defined as 4 per 1000 persons).76 
 
Figure 5: Number of hospitals and beds (1973, 1975, 1980) 
Year Hospitals Beds 
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1 – 4 
Grade  
5 – 7 
Grade  
8 – 10 
Grade  







1970 67.9 26.7 - - - - - 
1971 66.5 27.4 5 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 
1972 66.5 28 5.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 
1973 64.8 28.6 5.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 
1974 63.9 29.2 5.4 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.2 
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1973 26 4974 
1975 32 7132 
1980 32 7795 
Source(s): Benbo, Black Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Benbo, 1976), 60.  South African Institute 
of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1981), 405. 
Wolfgang H Thomas, Socio-economic Development in Transkei: A Preliminary Overview (Cape Town: 
Centre for Extra-Mural Studies, University of Cape Town, 1983), 30. 
  
But even the number of hospitals and beds does not adequately quantify the 
deprivation during this period. Low migrant wages meant that disease and 
malnutrition from decreasing.77  
As Dr Mary McGregor put it in the early 1970s: 
Medical work in the Transkei becomes increasingly disheartening as it becomes 
obvious that the biggest enemy is malnutrition… The health problem rapidly 
becomes one beyond the scope of the medical man [sic].78 
 
As they were converted into cash and a form of food, the generally decreasing number 
of nonhuman animals in the Transkei testifies to the increasing human deprivation of 




Figure 6: Number of nonhuman animals owned in the Transkei  
(1956 – 1974) 
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1956 1 348 468 2 459 133 1 095 181   
1960 1 392 041 2 209 063 1 022 409   93 795  
1965 1 333 020 2 324 117 1 117 172 115 785 265 872 
1970 1 116 901 2 824 692 1 339 967 111 681 272 448 
1971 1 127 467 2 238 195 1 311 894 111 572  
1972 1 184 989 2 604 480 1 314 229 114 287 267 402 
1973 1 180 815 2 246 358 1 283 702 118 548 418 590 
1974 1 194 181 2 347 830 1 330 312 119 760 320 232 
Sources: Benbo, Black Development in South Africa (Johannesburg: Benbo, 1976), 112; Benbo, 
Transkei Economic Review (Johannesburg: Benbo, 1975), 46. 
 
While the absolute number of cattle and sheep declined, pigs and beasts of burden 
(mules, donkeys, and horses) increased marginally, it was only goats which increased 
significantly (235 131 between 1965 and 1974). The majority of persons, however, did 
not have nonhuman animal property. A survey of 757 households in the Transkei in 
1974 found that 55% of households owned no sheep, while 45.3% owned no cattle. 
Only 0.2%, or 3 of the 757 of the surveyed households were able to generate an income 
from selling wool, and only 2% of households owned 20 cattle or more.80  
Accompanying the phenomena of overburdened and denuded land, overpopulation, 
overstocking, overgrazing, and inappropriate but intensive farming methods, 
agricultural production in the Transkei declined from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, 
and the Transkei was compelled to import ever greater proportions of food. Starvation 
and famine were discussed urgently and frequently in Transkei Legislative Assembly 
debates from 1964 to the late 1970s.81 In five districts of the Transkei in the late 1960s, 
when Transkei men were still refusing to accept work on unfavourable mines, one 
researcher estimated that 40% of children were dying before the age of ten as “direct 
or indirect result of malnutrition”.82 In 1964 one member of the Legislative Assembly 
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claimed that the majority of Transkei inhabitants were “starving and without 
means”.83 The drought and famine in 1965 which had “accustomed” the people to “a 
number of years of starvation” was so severe that Mr N.C Nogcantsi noted that “we 
are even restless while we are sitting here as to whether we shall find those remaining 
at home still alive”.84  
Imploring the Transkeian government to subsidise foodstuffs, Mr. N. Jafta in 1969 
argued that “throughout the history of the Transkei never have we had a drought such 
as we are having now…the whole of the Transkei has been impoverished to an extent 
never seen before”.85 In two districts surveyed by independent researchers in 1968, 
some 85% of households were found to be beneath a poverty datum line designed to 
indicate the minimum requirements for short term survival.86 By October 1975 an 
official of the Xhosa Development Corporation announced that the Transkei was 
importing 90% of its total food requirements.87 This was a function of denuded land, 
soil traumatized by decades of intensive farming, overstocking, overgrazing, and 
overpopulation. 90kg sorghum yields fell precipitously from 78 000 in 1971 to 48 691 
in 1975.88 Similarly the 90kg yields of maize, a staple in the Transkei, diminished from 
2 088 000 in 1971 to less than half (1 003 783) in 1975. This implied that imports of 


















as % of 
consumption 
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1971-2 580 000  
2 088 
000 
3.6 111 407 299 327 37% 
1972-3 426 000 
1 131 
000 
2.7 183 831 285 621 64% 
1973-4 433 710 
2 152 
460 
4.9 163 023 356 744 46% 
1974-5 409 764 
1 003 
783 
2.4 183 364 273 704 69% 
Source: Debbie Budlender, et al., Transkei Independence: Report of the Transkei Study Project 
(Johannesburg: Wages and Economic Commission, University of Witwatersrand, 1976), 53. 
 
Land too was in impossibly short supply. In 1956 the Tomlinson commission had 
found that to generate an annual income of R120 (which it declared sufficient to 
support a household) the agricultural holding would need to be 110 acres in extent.89 
The land in the Transkei would then be able to support 51% of its inhabitants, while 
the remaining 49% would have to find means for sufficient income elsewhere, i.e., as 
migrant workers.90 By the late 1960s, however, 95% of families had less than 11 acres, 
while the average household had 4 to 5 acres – a disturbing distance from the 110 acres 
required to survive.91 
Since food was increasingly imported into the Transkei, labour had to be exported to 
pay for the food. The number of Transkei persons recruited to work in South Africa 
shot up from 115 777 in 1963 to 425 230 in 1978. The increasingly vast exodus of labour 
is clear evidence of a greater absence of economic opportunity for the increasing 
number of Transkei inhabitants. In 1960 48% of GNP consisted of remittances from 
migrant labourers working in South Africa, by 1970 this had increased to nearly 70%.92 
As one Legislative Assembly member, Mr Madikizela, put it in 1974, “[t]he reason 
why these people leave the Transkei is because of starvation”.93 
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Source: Roger Southall. South Africa’s Transkei: the Political Economy of an ‘Independent’ Bantustan 
(Nairobi: Heinemann. 1982), 209. 
 
The evidence for stark and relentless deprivation of the Transkei in the period under 
examination – the clear absence of basic opportunities for employment or sustenance 
– is overwhelming. Southall described the Transkei during this period as facing a 
Hobbesian dilemma: either it sold its labour to South Africa or allowed its people to 
languish from deprivation.94  Clearly people were facing extreme choices: hunger was 
widespread and acute among prospective work seekers.  
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Year Transkei migrants recruited to work in SA 
1963 115 777 
1964 124 000 
1965 139 586 
1966 160 093 
1967 132 294 
1968 155 329 
1969 174 223 
1970 184 788 
1971 191 600 
1972 225 330 
1973 231 969 
1974 256 971 
1975 303 233 
1976 377 760 
1977 403 828 
1978 425 230 
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The next section argues that in the case of mine work on unpopular mines, NRC 
recruiters found that between 1964 and 1969, in spite of the extreme deprivation facing 
the unemployed, potential recruits would often rationally prefer to face acute hunger 
over underground mine work.  
 
The interplay between recruitment and deprivation 
 
As shown in chapter 2 trader recruiters were of crucial importance for the NRC. In the 
1950s a senior NRC official G.O Lovett claimed that trader-recruiters “exert a powerful 
influence” on Africans and should be perceived as a “necessary and integral part of 
the industry’s recruiting machinery” such that any policy or act which would 
constrain relations with traders should be rejected.95 Whereas 19 709 Transkei men 
were signed into mine contracts in 1959 by the 95 trader recruiters operating in the 
Umtata area, this number more than halved to 8 808 when the number trader-
recruiters dwindled to 51 in 1969; by 1970 only 45 trader recruiters were left in the 
Umtata area.96 When the Transkei achieved its self-government status in 1963 the 
Xhosa Development Corporation’s policy of purchasing white trading stations was 
implemented and the number of trader-recruiter licences decreased along with the 
number of Transkei men signed up mine contracts by white traders.97 
 Trader recruiters were integral to recruitment because they held food; by pre-
advancing food to desperate families and backed by institutional mechanisms which 
made it illegal for Transkei men to break contracts, traders were able to lock them into 
accepting mine contracts.98 As the Umtata district superintendent put it in 1967: 
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With the exodus of so many of our large trader-recruiters from the Transkei, there 
are now fewer potential recruits tied to the gold Mining Industry through pre-
advancing, so that workers are free to offer their services to other industries. In 
past years, a trader-recruiter, because of his pre-advancing, was able to bring 
pressure to bear on potential recruits to induce them to go forward even in times 
of good harvest.99 
 
Figure 9: Trader recruiter output (1959, 1963, 1969) 











Elliotdale 15 2 860 14 2  170   4   449 
Libode 10 2 981 10 2 869   8  1 902  
Maclear   1    401   1    512   1   318 
Mqanduli 16 2 191 14 1 594   9   591 
Ngqeleni 19 4 995 17 4 527 10 1 744 
Port St. 
Johns 
11 2 916 10 2 205   6 2 056 
Qumbu    9 1 202   7    895   3   535 
Tsolo   8 1 293   8 1 474   4   539 
Umtata   5    870   8    986   6   674 
Total 95 19 709 89 17 232 51 8 808 
Source: District superintendent to James Gemmill, 1 April 1970. ‘Umtata monthly Report’, 3. NRC file 
B1093 pad 7. 
 
As formal institutions like the white trader monopoly changed, so the quantity of 
labourers supplied by these mechanisms changed too. In 1959 15 trader recruiters in 
Elliotdale supplied the NRC with 2860 migrants, when their number dropped to 4 in 
1969 the traders supplied only 449 migrants. This pattern was similar in all nine 
districts in figure 9 and in total the output of these districts almost halved (19 709 to 
8 808) between 1959 and 1969 in consequence of the number of trader recruiters falling 
from 95 to 51 over the same period.  This indicates the manner in which labour 
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supplies were highly sensitive and responsive to institutional changes (such as the end 
of the white monopoly on trading licences). 
That mine recruitment in the Transkei was premised upon deprivation can scarcely 
be doubted. The exclusive intention of monthly reports sent from NRC district 
superintendents to the NRC and WNLA head office in Johannesburg was to determine 
in light of recruitment conditions the estimated number of recruits for the following 
month.100 Recruitment conditions – especially rainfall, the condition of crops, the 
number of livestock, the health of the population, and the efficacy of propaganda – 
were the indicators the NRC themselves used to calculate recruitment estimates.101  
Since its business was to draw workers onto the gold and other mines, the NRC was 
extremely concerned to keep its finger on the pulse of the Transkei’s employment 
prospects – as well as any other opportunities which would allow men to escape mine 
recruitment. More than that, however, it follows that insofar as securing large 
numbers of recruits was predicated on degrees of deprivation sufficient to compel 
men to accept mine work, the NRC and the Chamber of Mines were guided by the 
perverse incentive not to commit to anything which would develop the Transkei, since 
doing so would undermine the key factor (deprivation) on which successful 
recruitment was premised. If mine work provided a means whereby Transkei people 
might escape deprivation, then mine work would undermine the basis of successful 
recruitment. This goes some way to explaining the chronically low wages paid to 
mineworkers. 
 
The relevance of agency in the interplay between recruitment and deprivation 
 
Despite the fact that the value of gold mining wages for Africans had in real terms 
eroded by 14% from 1911 to 1961, so vast and deep set was absence of freedom and 
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deprivation in the Transkei that the NRC was inundated with an oversupply of 
recruits.102 Since Umtata was by the 1960s a major labouring sending area in the 
Transkei, this section focuses on this district.103 By January 1964 the NRC was in fact 
taking measures to limit the number of workers forwarded from the Transkei since, 
as the James Gemmill put it in correspondence with the Umtata superintendent, “[i]n 
keeping with the experience of recent years, all the mines are employing labour in 
excess of their requirements”.104 He proposed that before using further restrictive 
measures stricter weight (of no less than 52kgs) and medical standards and a limited 
choice of mines be employed to see whether that would stem the excess labour 
forwarded from the Transkei.105 By March of 1964, a distinct shift had taken place in 
Transkei mine recruitment. Heavy influxes of labour meant that mines could in fact 
not find accommodation for the number of men arriving at the mines.106 District 
superintendents were given maximum numbers of labourers to be engaged for the 
mines, rather than being asked to forward all available workers.107  
Yet by April of the same year (1964) something fascinating had occurred: in spite of 
pervasive deprivation in the Transkei, certain mines were in fact finding that they 
could not secure sufficient workers.108 The Umtata district superintendent attributed 
“mine selection” as the “main reason” for the shortfall.109 He explained that under the 
new procedure of accepting only prescribed numbers for specific mines, potential 
recruits, who would arrive at NRC recruitment offices in groups, would refuse to 
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break up the group and accept employment on distinct unpopular mines.110 Even in 
conditions of deep deprivation and absence of opportunity, it was preferable for 
workers and their families to face quite severe deprivation rather than accept mine 
work on unpopular mines. This inability to secure mineworkers on unpopular mines 
became a problem for the NRC, and eight months later Gemmill announced that all 
workers offering their services should be accepted.111 
In January of 1965 the district superintendent from Umtata cautioned that the 
procedure of limiting the number of recruits accepted for each mine “acted as a break” 
at all offices with the effect that workers preferred to return home when they could 
not find placement in mines of their choice.112  The superintendent was in fact puzzled 
by this rational exercise of agency on the part of Transkei men, and, amidst 
widespread reports of acute hunger in the Transkei, argued that “[g]enuinely starving 
people are not selective in taking up employment”, but committing a classic non 
sequitur concluded that “whether or not orders during the month are achieved will 
depend on the popularity of the mines open to recruiting”.113 Rather than explicitly 
claiming that prospective migrants were acting irrationally, he simply denied that 
many Transkei inhabitants were facing such deprivations. In the midst of crop failure 
and drought, that men refused to work on euphemistically termed ‘unpopular’ mines 
is remarkably revealing, for it implies that it was rational and preferable for many men 
to face acute hunger rather than accept work on ‘unpopular’ mines. 
By May of 1965 James Gemmill had decided that in light of the considerable hardship 
caused by “widespread and severe drought” it was likely that many potential recruits 
would not measure up to the “present standards of physical fitness by reason of the 
malnutrition which [was] expected” and concluded that the stricter weight 
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measurements of recent years should be relaxed.114 Those too weak and malnourished 
to work underground would be given surface work until they were “sufficiently fit” 
for underground work.115 In times of drought the superintendent cautioned that it was 
a “necessity” to provide recruited workers with a few bags of mealies to leave at home 
for the maintenance of their families.116 There is overwhelming evidence to support 
the view that significant numbers of Transkei persons faced acute hunger in the 1960s.  
The drought conditions of the mid-1960s persisted. In January of 1969, after describing 
the “severity of the prevailing drought”, Umtata’s district superintendent still found 
that large numbers of prospective mineworkers preferred to return home when mines 
of their choice were not open to recruiting.117 The superintendent refused the 
conclusion that these prospective mineworkers actually preferred to try to withstand 
the deprivation they and their families faced rather than accepting work on 
unfavourable mines, and repeated confidently that this “state of affairs indicates that 
so far no serious starvation exists among the African population”.118 The cognitive 
dissonance exhibited by the Umtata district superintendent was extreme. Indeed, the 
next month, February 1969, he reported that as a “result of the drought” crop yields 
were at 15%- 30% of the average harvest, and that the condition of cattle was “very 
poor indeed” with “thousands” having died and the survivors “thin and weak” due 
to lack of grazing and inadequacy of water supplies. However, he could still conclude 
that their refusal to accept mine work on available mines implied that “the Area was 
not under severe pressure”.119 The non sequitur was paradigmatic. It certainly was 
not the case that the NRC did not understand the severity of the suffering afflicting 
the Transkei. Widespread malnutrition among children is evidenced by the fact that 
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in the years preceding 1971, two Relief Distress Schemes were implemented by the 
Transkei government, providing relief work for 10 000 men per day and the feeding 
of close to 360 000 pre-school and primary school children.120 The feeding of children, 
the NRC’s Umtata district superintendent himself reported in March 1969, was to 
“combat the increase of kwashiorkor in Transkei schools”.121  
While the Transkei experienced acute deprivation, it must be noted that the bulk of 
mine labour came from labour sending regions beyond South Africa.122 Hundreds of 
thousands of mineworkers were recruited in Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi, 
and Mozambique.123 The harshest deprivations entailed in mine work and 
exacerbated in unpopular mines were also disproportionately reserved for foreign 
labour.  Whatever the severe deprivations suffered by Transkei residents, they were 
until the mid-1970s able to refuse contracts on unpopular mines, and it was 
predominantly ‘foreign’ migrants who were compelled to accept the worst working 
conditions to perform the worst jobs on the worst mines.124 
 
Gold mine work as capability-destructive and antithetical to development 
 
A harrowing assortment of disincentives can be marshalled to explain why African 
men considered it preferable for themselves and their families to face acute hunger 
(and even languish from it) rather than accept mine work. Among others, the 
significant respects in which mine work was anathema to prospective migrants would 
include: inadequate or a total absence of occupational injury compensation; distinctly 
high injury rates; impossibly low death benefits and the failure to inform relatives of 
such benefits; systemic violence and brutality on mines and in compounds; the loafing 
ticket system (which meant days of work could be discounted for a number of trivial 
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reasons); severe psychological harms including post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); 
the institutionalised inability to be promoted above unskilled pay grades; chronically 
low wages; the inability to escape a contract; social and family life disruption and 
dislocation, and; the loss of significant agricultural labour inputs at home.125  
Ex mineworker Phello, who worked at a Western Deep Levels mine near Carletonville 
for 13 years recalled his experience underground in moving terms, 
You are most likely to die or become crippled by the time you leave this place... 
I cannot get used to underground accidents, particularly rockfalls... I have seen 
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just too many horrible accidents underground... we are never sure if we will 
make it back to the surface alive and well. All the time we pray silently.126 
Mineworkers were also dejected by their inability to raise above low wage pay grades, 
as a mineworker named Telekiso put it, 
I have been working [here] for 12 years and have never been promoted. I do not 
feel respected in any way. My existence as a mine employee and my services are 
not recognised nor appreciated... When are these people going to see that we are 
human beings too?127    
Another ex-mineworker described the institutional deprivation of migrant labour in 
vivid terms, 
I feel like a prisoner who is serving a sentence ... because for most of my life I do 
not live with my family. The mine also treats us as if we have no right to live our 
lives as we wish. I visit home once a month... Even when we are due for leave we 
have problems because there are some individuals that we have to bribe so that 
our leave forms can be processed.128 
This thesis contends that having to endure such capability-destructive work was a 
function of institutionalised deprivation dating from the late 19th century and material 
conditions in the Transkei worsening through the 20th century. Only in the context of 
political unfreedom, the prohibition against unionisation, as well as general 
deprivation afflicting labour sending regions like the Transkei would men endure 
underground mine work. The migrant labour system’s associated institutions shut 
down the agency of mineworkers – otherwise the imposition of mine work’s multiple 
burdens would not have been tolerated. It is reasonable to assume that in the case of 
euphemistically termed ‘unpopular’ mines, working and living conditions would 
have been significantly worse than on other mines. This is not the focus of this study.  
                                                          
126 Matsheliso Palesa Molapo, “Job Stress, Health and Perceptions of Migrant Mineworkers,” in Crossing 
Boundaries: Mine Migrancy in a Democratic South Africa, ed. Jonathan Crush and Wilmot James (Cape Town: 
International Development Research Centre, 1995), 92. 
127 Matsheliso, “Job Stress, Health and Perceptions”, 93. 
128 Matsheliso, “Job Stress, Health and Perceptions”, 92. 
88 
 
This section specifically highlights externalised disease burdens, i.e., the removal of 
workers suffering from mining diseases to the rural areas. Even a narrow focus on this 
single aspect of underground mine work goes a long way to explaining why so many 
men could choose to face acute hunger rather than accepting mine work on unpopular 
mines. On unpopular mines incredibly high disease rates would be compounded by 
the above disincentives thus making the prospect of such work altogether too 
loathsome to bear.  
Professor Neil White of the Lung Institute of Groote Schuur Hospital has claimed that 
the  
South African gold mining associated silicosis and tuberculosis epidemic is 
without parallel in human history, when its extent in terms of duration, intensity 
and magnitude are all taken into account.129  
Statistics on the disease burdens suffered by labour sending communities during this 
period are hard to come by. The Leon Commission of Inquiry into Safety and Health 
in the Mining Industry in 1994 decried the fact that the most recent research on the 
health of black former miners was from the 1930s.130 Yet two studies on ex-
mineworkers from the Transkei offer striking insights as to why Transkei men could 
find it to rational to watch their families languish rather than take up gold mine work.  
In an endeavour to determine the prevalence of occupational lung disease in former 
migrant mineworkers, a team of medical researchers in the late 1990s used chest 
radiography and spirometry to examin two hundred and thirty eight ex-mineworkers 
recruited between 1969 and 1980 from Libode in the Transkei.131 The prevalence of 
pneumoconiosis was found to be between 22% and 36% (variation by reader) among 
ex-mineworkers.132 Trapido et al showed that between one in five and one and three 
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Transkei mine migrants could expect to suffer from pneumoconiosis. Legislation and 
national and apartheid state run medical facilities for mining related occupational 
lung disease had been in play since 1916, but the legislation and compensation was 
racialised and only in 1993 was the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 
No. 78 of 1973 amended to include African persons.133 Before 1993, the extent of lung 
diseases in ex-migrant Africans was both undiagnosed and uncompensated. The 
researchers concluded that the social and economic burdens of occupational lung 
disease were borne by labour sending communities, with the effect that rural 
communities were in this respect subsidizing the mining industry’s costs of 
production.134 They pointed out that in the context of low levels of education and a 
high dependency on physical labour even a “minor degree of disability can be a major 
impediment to employment”.135 As developmental theorist and practitioner Robert 
Chambers has put it 
At a sudden blow, the body, the poor person’s greatest and uninsured asset, is 
devalued or ruined. From being an asset, at one stroke it becomes a liability that 
has to be fed, clothed, housed, and treated. A livelihood is destroyed, and a 
household made permanently poorer.136 
In terms of pneumoconiosis and tuberculosis, as this section argues, the mine 
recruitment system locked Transkei men into forms of employment which converted 
what was often a family’ best asset (male labour power) into a debilitating liability – 
at a rate of between 20 to 50% of all Transkei mine migrants.  
In association with the Eastern Cape Department of Health, the Director of the Medical 
Bureau for Occupational Disease, and a health advocacy NPO, the Health Systems 
Trust, Rhodes University researcher Jaine Roberts in 2009 published a research project 
on health burdens among former mineworkers in ten villages from the Ntabankulu 
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region of the Transkei. The conclusions – which Roberts argued were generalizable to 
the rest of the Transkei – came to similar and even more devastating conclusions than 
the Trapido et al study.137 Of the ex-mineworkers interviewed in the early 2000s, 
whose terms of employment on gold mines ranged from five to forty years, indicating 
that many of them were migrants in the period examined in this chapter, Roberts 
argued that it would be accurate to describe the majority of former mineworkers as 
“pulmonary cripples”.138 When participants were medically examined, 96% were 
coughing, 71. % had experienced or were experiencing dyspnoea (breathing 
difficulty), 82. % fever, 83. % pain, and 82. % suffered from fevers.139 After in these 
respects having effectively sacrificed their bodies to the gold mines, the majority were 
moreover left destitute after their terms of employment: a paltry 8% reported that they 
did not on a monthly basis experience hunger and food shortages.140  
As late as the 1960s and 1970s, then, mine work did not offer a means of escaping 
deprivation and poverty. Less than one in ten mineworkers could expect to not 
experience hunger and food shortages after their careers ended. Rather, mine work 
was accompanied by severe disease burdens which already deprived inhabitants and 
chronically under-resourced and insufficient rural health systems were expected to 
shoulder.  Devastatingly, some 52% of former mineworkers had suffered tuberculosis 
after mine employment, while 26% had been afflicted by it while in mine 
employment.141 Not only were the majority of former mineworkers left financially 
poor after their years of service on the mines, but in excess of 50% were left to languish 
from tuberculosis in rural areas unequipped to mange such health catastrophes. In 
this respect, mine work and the migrant system into which men were recruited was 
unmistakably capability-destructive and inimical to the development of these regions. 
Roberts concluded that the Transkei and Ciskei could 
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well be described as the “field hospitals” for the externalization of occupationally 
acquired disease, a process of “exporting” disease, through the migrant labour 
system, back to rural areas where it has largely remained hidden. It is in these 
rural areas that the real costs of occupationally acquired disease are borne by the 
former miners themselves; borne in pain and suffering, in wasting away in a slow 
suffocation and susceptibility to all manner of respiratory infections, in the 
inability to work even in subsistence agriculture to generate support for their 
families, and in premature death.142 
The effect of the family’s breadwinner becoming sick and unable to work – 67% of ex-
mineworkers had dependent children under 18 – did not only imply the loss of his 
immediate and future household income, it also implied that another family member, 
usually a woman, would have to care for him, which then prevented her from finding 
employment elsewhere, and so further diminished the family’s prospects for securing 
income and necessities.143 The mineworker’s body, from having been a source of 
income, would be transformed by the gold mining industry into a debilitating and 
impoverishing liability. 
As a former mineworker who contracted TB on the mines described his retrenchment 
and subsequent poverty, 
I was told I’m old and that old people must leave the mines. It has changed me. 
I receive no money, I am very hungry. There are many times we go hungry. My 
sickness has destroyed my way of life. I am not able to perform the jobs that I 
was able to perform before.144 
Some mineworkers were aware that the mines swindled them out of compensation 
and other money, and that their lack of human capital prevented them from protecting 
their interests. As an ex-mineworker who worked underground for 29 years put it, 
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I think if someone can help investigate about our money, with that money we 
can be able to help support our families. Because a lot of money was left in 
Gauteng in the mines due to the fact that we are not educated. 145 
The capability-destroying effects of mine work largely escaped quantification in the 
1960s and 1970s. But the degree to which mine work undercut and pre-empted 
development (destroyed the prospects and capabilities of Transkei men and their 
families) was not lost on labour sending communities such as those in the Umtata 
area.146 By the mid-1970s rising mine wages, shorter contracts, overpopulation 
exacerbated by forced removals, and ever deepening deprivation shifted the balance 
of prospects in favour of mine work and once again made it reasonable for Transkei 
men to accept morbific mining employment – even if it meant they would almost 
certainly face increased deprivation later on. 
 
The Transkei as principal labour sending region, post-1974 
 
By August 1972 recruitment output in Umtata showed a strong upward trend and was 
attributed to poor crop yield in several districts and the increasing popularity of non-
gold mines.147 In March the next year the NRC head office sent word to Umtata that 
labour strengths on the mines were at a “very high level”, that virtually all mines had 
more labour than they could use, and advised, moreover, that district offices were to 
strictly apply age and physical standards so that all recruits would be fit for any class 
of work on the mines.148 The oversupply of labour was largely a function of increased 
WNLA recruitment in Malawi and Lesotho in the previous decade. From 1964 – 1973 
labour supplies from Malawi and Lesotho rose from 35 658 to 119 141, and 53 292 to 
78 995, respectively.149 In turn this explained why the refusal of Transkei men to accept 
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work on unpopular mines in the late 1960s did not pose a serious challenge to the 
NRC. In 1972 South African mineworkers comprised only 25% of the labour force, its 
lowest proportion since the 1920s.150 James Gemmill, still the general manager of 
WNLA and the NRC, was confident that the vast supplies of labour coming onto the 
mines in 1973 showed no signs of declining.151 But this view was about to change 
dramatically.  
When the WNLA Air Services aircraft en route to Blantyre, Malawi on the 4th of April 
1974 crashed and killed 74 Malawian mineworkers, the South African mining 
industry’s labour supplies were seriously threatened. Malawi was at the time the 
largest supplier of labour to the South African mines, with Malawians comprising a 
third of the industry’s labour force. Four days later, on April 8th word was sent from 
the President of Malawi, Dr Hastings Banda, stating that in future no Malawians were 
to be recruited for mine work in South Africa, and that all Malawians were to be 
returned at the completion of their contracts.152 By December of 1974 the gold mines 
were 78% of required labour.153 In 1974 roughly 108 431 Malawians were at work on 
the South African mines, in 1975 27 904, and by 1976 there were 571.154 
Also in April of 1974 Marcello Caetano’s regime in Portugal was overthrown, and by 
September the new leaders in Lisbon arranged a transfer of power from the colonial 
authorities to Mozambique’s liberation movement FRELIMO.155 The longstanding 
reciprocal relationship between WNLA and the Portuguese colonial administration 
was drawn to an abrupt close. On June 25 1975 the Portuguese finally left 
Mozambique. By 1976 FRELIMO closed down seventeen of WNLA’s twenty-one 
offices in Mozambique and in the same year Mozambican mineworkers dwindled 
from 114 385 in January to 48 565 by the end of the year.156  
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Since Dr Banda has suspended all recruiting to the South African mines, and 
FRELIMO had taken control of Mozambique, WNLA and the NRC in 1974 had to find 
means to attract labour from elsewhere. With its widespread deprivation, 
overpopulation, and firmly established recruitment systems, the Transkei became a 
singularly important labour-sending region in the NRC’s drive to maintain supply.157 
James Gemmill in May 1974 wrote to each district superintendent in the Transkei, 
urgently imploring them to indicate any means, over and above the rise in wages in 
1973, whereby the NRC might be able to attract more labour from their areas.158 The 
rise in wages had become possible in 1971 because the United States moved to 
abolishing the fixed price of gold, which had remained static at $35 per fine ounce 
since 1934.  By February 1973 the price of gold had risen to $42.2 and the cash pay of 
African mineworkers rose by 36%.159 This rise in African wages was not, however, 
much of a stimulus to those in the Transkei (between 1973 and 1974 the number of 
recruits from this region actually dropped by 680) and the ratio of white to black 
wages for underground work was still more inequitable than it had been in 1921.160  
In response to Gemmill’s request for advice, the Umtata district superintendent 
replied that since the early 1960s and during the decade the NRC had “broke[n] just 
about every golden rule of recruiting by the restrictions [they] were obliged to 
impose”. By closing down the Assisted Voluntary System (which provided 
mineworkers free but ultimately deductable transport to the mines), making the 
longer 270 shift contracts compulsory and imposing quotas for each mine, he argued 
that potential recruits had simply refused to accept mine work.161  The contract output 
in his area had dropped from 20 326 in 1959 to 12 710 in 1973, despite recruitment 
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conditions otherwise improving (that is to say, despite deprivation worsening).162 He 
argued further that mine wages were simply inadequate, and that to compete even 
with what manual labourers in Umtata were paid (R1 per day), underground workers 
should be paid at least R1.20 per shift.163 Echoing extremely frustrated and persistent 
complaints by Transkei members of the legislative assembly on behalf of 
mineworkers, he bemoaned the “cynical indifference” of the mine managements to 
the convenience and wellbeing of ex-mineworkers who came to district offices to 
collect their outstanding wages. Months would pass before the local offices were able 
to pay ex-mineworkers their wages, voluntary deferred pay, and other remittances – 
despite mine managers disingenuously promising that their wages would be paid as 
soon as they returned home.164 In the eyes of the local population, the image of the 
mining industry was acutely negative. Frequent and desperate trips to local offices 
were costing impoverished ex-mineworkers money that they could not afford to pay.  
An NRC review of competing employment opportunities in the Transkei revealed that 
even if only considering terms of remuneration – that is ignoring health burdens and 
other terrible disincentives associated with mine work – NRC recruiters could not 
compete with recruiters from other sectors.165 The massive propaganda drive 
undertaken by the NRC after 1974, an entirely new board of directors and a new 
strategy towards rendering the mining industry a favourable employer had little 
effect. It was the rise in wages (165% in real terms) coupled with shorter contracts (26 
rather than 52 weeks) which finally drew Transkei men onto the gold mines in large 
numbers in 1975, and enabled the NRC to achieve a numerically full complement of 
labour.166 Shorter contracts, unavailable to foreign recruits, exerted a strong influence 
on prospective mine migrants. In 1976 95% of recruits from Umtata opted for 26 week 
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contracts, while those who chose 40 or 52 week contracts did so only when returning 
to a mine on which they had previously worked and were more or less assured of a 
job of their choice.167 Only by increasing wages and reducing the length of contract in 
the face of acute deprivation, overpopulation, and scarce opportunity to feed 
themselves and their families did the balance of incentives shift so that accepting mine 
work become an option.  
By refusing mine work wherever they could, Transkei men demonstrated in large 
numbers that before the mid-1970s deprivation and hunger was rationally preferable 
to gold mine work.  After having increased 36% in 1973, wages for African 
mineworkers in the following two years increased by 61% and 68% respectively.168 
The number of Transkei recruits more than doubled from 40 281 in 1974 to 88 496 in 
1976.169 In the context of the extreme deprivation which Transkei persons faced, by 
1977 when wages increased and contracts were shortened, gold mine work became 
preferable to acute hunger and deprivation for themselves and their families. 
 
Conclusion 
Once formal institutions were in place in the early 1920s and the NRC had established 
a monopsony in the Transkei, the prospects for development deteriorated steadily. As 
deprivation worsened throughout the 1930s and 1940s, that is, as people’s choices 
narrowed, so recruitment conditions improved and the NRC was more likely to secure 
adequate workers. We saw that the general manager of the NRC kept a close and 
meticulous eye on the prospects and choices of persons in labour sending regions, and 
that monthly reports estimated their expected supplies based on ‘recruitment 
conditions’, or conditions of deprivation. Importantly, this chapter delineated the 
multiple disincentives and hardships entailed in migrant mine work, and described 
the disease burdens which the NRC routinely repatriated to the Transkei. Not only 
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did formal institutions purposively foster conditions of unfreedom and deprivation, 
which pushed men onto the mines at low wages, but the migrant labour system 
further demolished their prospects for development by subjecting them to a 
smorgasbord capability-destructive elements.  
Underground mine work not only required deprivation so that it would be ‘chosen’, 
but in light of its repressive institutional architecture, such work further destroyed the 
capabilities and freedom of migrants and their families.  The chapter argued that men 
refusing mine work in the context of harsh drought conditions in the late 1960s 
commands our attention, and that this preference can be explained by the 




The Deferred Pay Interest Fund (DPIF): endorsing control, 
constraining freedom and development, 1914 – 1978 
 
Seeing development in terms of the substantive freedoms of people has far-
reaching implications for our understanding of the process of development and 
also for the ways and means of promoting it. On the evaluative side, this involves 
the need to assess the requirements of development in terms of removing the 
unfreedoms from which the members of the society may suffer. The process of 
development, in this view, is not essentially different from the history of 
overcoming these unfreedoms.1 – Amartya Sen 
 
The Deferred Pay Interest Fund, 1914 – 1960s  
 
In chapter 2 it was argued that in order to achieve monopsony, the NRC by acting in 
concert with national state and NAD institutions, imposed and enforced limits on the 
size of mine advances and the number of recruiting licenses issued. The NRC financed 
the state-curtailed advances that drew migrants onto the labour market and in that 
way essentially established control of the rural credit system.2 Despite the sharp 
reduction in money spent on advances over the second decade of the 20th century, the 
NRC ideally wanted to remove advances altogether.  
The idea of a deferred pay system, as a solution to the advance system, was born in 
1914. In NAD Chief Magistrate H.O Buckle’s 1914 Native Grievances Inquiry report 
he advocated the use of a deferred pay system whereby migrants would be compelled 
to receive a portion of their wages (at least 50% of total) as a lump sum after 
completing their contracts.3 Before this, under the large pre-advance system, migrants 
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could receive advances large enough to ensure they could spend years repaying their 
advances (and thus receive little if any money after the completion of contracts).4 The 
deferred pay scheme would still ensure that wages would remain in the rural areas, 
providing a market for trader’s goods and otherwise perform the customary function 
of stimulating the local economy, but that wages would be received after completing 
contracts rather than before. The Botha government in 1914 indicated its support of 
the deferred pay system as a means to eliminate pre-advances.5 From the outset, then, 
the deferred pay scheme was endorsed by the NAD and the national government. The 
deferred pay system commanded wide appeal: families of migrants were guaranteed 
that some wages would return to the rural area; traders were guaranteed a market for 
their goods; colonial authorities were able to impose their taxes; remittances 
stimulated the domestic economy, and finally; the Chamber of Mines did not have to 
risk deserting migrants defaulting on their advances.  
It was the NAD which determined the objective and regulations of the deferred pay 
scheme. In 1917 the Secretary for Native Affairs directed that “all monies accruing 
after allowance for a floating balance for working expenses [should] be invested in 
Treasury Bills”, and most importantly that “after meeting the costs of administration, 
any surplus will be devoted to matters connected with the welfare of Natives 
generally”.6 The Secretary for Native Affairs’ instructions were vague in the details, 
but clear that decisions on how the interest was spent was to be principally informed 
by a concern for ‘the welfare of the Natives generally’. A Board of Control, which 
consisted of two Native Affairs Department officials and three industry 
representatives, soon emerged and by 1918 the Deferred Pay Interest Fund (DPIF) had 
commenced its operations. The chairman of the board was to be occupied by the 
Director of Native Labour, and no accumulated interest could be spent without the 
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express approval of the Minister of Native Affairs.7  The task of the Board of Control 
was to allocate accrued interest to welfare work in labour sending regions.8  As a 
corollary it was also the Board of Control’s duty to determine what constituted welfare 
work, since they alone could authorise payments to welfare work or projects. That the 
Minister of Native Affairs had the final say on how the interest was spent constituted 
a profound conflict of interest: the Native Affairs department by no stretch of the 
imagination could be understood as genuinely responsive or sensitive to the wellbeing 
of Africans. The deferred pay scheme was thus the NAD’s brainchild in 1914, received 
the president’s endorsement the same year, and was operated jointly by the NAD and 
the NRC. In this respect the deferred pay scheme symbolised perfectly the deep 
institutional collusion in which the mine migrant labour system consisted. The 
deferred pay system was operated at the behest of colonial governments in 
neighbouring countries like Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique, since it 
acted as an economic stimulus as well as supplying tax money.9 Moreover, since it 
guaranteed that a large portion of mine migrant wages would end up in the coffers of 
Transkei’s monopoly traders, it was the increasing use of the deferred pay system 
which finally reconciled traders to the removal of advances by the early 1920s.10  
Although discussions of the DPIF surfaced at intervals in the United Transkeian 
Territories General Council (UTTGC), very little is known of how the deferred pay 
scheme operated from the 1920s until the 1960s. The first time any mention was made 
of interest earned on deferred wages was when in 1931 the chairman of the council 
revealed that an institution known as the Deferred Pay Interest Fund had agreed to 
finance the living quarters for African nurses at Umtata’s Sir Henry Elliot Hospital.11 
The chairman disclosed that he had himself made entreaties to the Native Affairs 
minister, beseeching him, as a personal friend, to allocate money from the DPIF for 
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the construction of African staff living quarters.12 Beaming with pride, the chairman 
could confirm to the council in 1931 that the DPIF board had agreed to donate £2 500 
to this end, and noted that the donation was a “very generous grant”.13 If the chairman 
wished to cast himself and the DPIF board as philanthropic and beneficent toward the 
Transkei people, it certainly made this impression on members of the council. 
Apparently not grasping the more general point that the interest in truth belonged to 
individual mineworkers (it was their money and the NRC was registered as a non-
profit organisation), or the wider notion that the Transkei’s function was largely to 
subsidise mining interests, the Thembu chief D. Dalindyebo described the allocation 
of funds as a “generous donation”, and remarked effusively that: 
We have not adequate words to thank the Chairman for obtaining this for us. If 
we are short of words you will realise that we as children are satisfied.14 
Mr. E.C Bam joined the chorus to say that “actions like these” showed that the 
chairman was “our father” and a motion to send formal thanks to the DPIF board was 
carried unanimously.15 At least as far as the rural elite in the UTTGC were concerned, 
the DPIF’s benevolence was unmistakable. As chapter 3 argued, however, the disease 
burden callously imposed on the Transkei via the NRC’s migrant labour system was 
immense and extremely debilitating. Far from being a philanthropic gesture, the 
piddling donation of nurses’ living quarters (financed by interest that rightfully 
belonged to workers) was nothing more than a duplicitous marketing ploy to curry 
favour with the Transkei people. Given the vast disease and disability challenges the 
mining industry (through the NRC) imposed on the Xhosaland people, as described 
in chapter 3, the donation was a timid compensatory gesture financed by 
mineworker’s wages. These so-called donations showed signs of an implicit 
recognition of the social and health burdens which the mining industry exported into 
labour sending regions, but in a manner which played into the Chamber and NRC’s 
charade of benevolence and concern. There is a certain cynicism detectable in the fact 
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that this marketing charade was financed by the interest earned on mineworkers own 
predominantly compulsorily deferred wages.  
 In response to a request in 1936 for the figures on how much money was remitted 
home by Transkei mine migrants, it emerged that roughly £200 000 was remitted 
annually via the NRC’s deferred pay system in 1936 and 1935.16 Notice, however, that 
until 1938 the DPIF was receiving 3.5% interest on deferred wages, which implied 
accumulated non-compound interest of £14 000 for 1935 and 1936 (£200 000 + £200 000 
÷ 100 × 3.5 = £14 000).17  By 1940 African members of the UTTGC inquired point-blank 
as to how much interest accrued on wages from Transkei migrants via the DPIF.18 
Before concluding that it was not their business to ask such questions, the chairman 
launched into a long-winded but vacuous sermon about how the interest was spent to 
“help public purposes of benefit to the Native people generally” and noted that 
Transkeians should be grateful that the DPIF existed to make philanthropic 
donations.19 That the chairman simply had no real examples to offer in making his 
case that the deferred pay funds were used to benefit the Transkei people, was 
extremely curious, however. Reaching back almost a decade, in his feeble attempt at 
providing evidence he again invoked the donation of living quarters for African 
nurses at Sir Henry’s hospital (£2 500 in 1931) and funding for similar quarters at St. 
Cuthbert’s hospital.20 Apart from those two examples, one of which was no less than 
nine years old, the chairman simply had nothing to motivate his assertion that the 
DPIF was concerned with the wellbeing of Transkei residents. If the donation of living 
quarters at St. Cuthbert’s hospital cost roughly the same as those at Sir Henry’s 
hospital in Umtata (£ 2 500), the value of the donations called upon by the UTTGC 
chairman would only come to £5 000, or £2 000 less than the interest earned in 1935 
alone (£ 7 000). Yet the DPIF had been in operation for 22 years, and the chairman 
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should thus have had a veritable arsenal of powerful examples to share – the chairman 
of the UTTGC and the NRC had after all been showered with praise after the nursing 
quarters were donated in 1931.   
Despite the absence of positive evidence, it remained the NRC’s formal position over 
the next 20 years that the deferred pay scheme worked “directly to the advantage of 
mine Natives.”21 In his 1961 submission to the Seventh Commonwealth Mining and 
Metallurgical Congress, J.A Gemmill, general manager of WNLA and NRC, took it 
upon himself to explain why the migrant labour system was “best suited to the type 
of unsophisticated Native on whom the Industry very largely depends”.22 Describing 
Africans as “unsophisticated Native[s]” gives a sense of the kind of ideas informing 
the NRC’s perceptions of African mine migrants: like the Chamber of Mines and its 
associated migrant labour institutions, African persons occupied an ontologically 
ancillary position; Africans were seen as not possessing full personhood. In this view, 
ontologically ancillary persons, or less-than-full-persons, would merit ancillary 
welfare. The wellbeing of Africans, this ideology betrayed, was not the same as the 
wellbeing of white persons. Given these assumptions, and without offering an iota of 
evidence, Gemmill in his 1961 essay asserted that the deferred pay scheme constituted 
a “direct advantage” to black mineworkers and labour sending communities.23 
Without qualification Gemmill considered the fact that wages entered rural areas at 
all was sufficient to describe the deferred pay system as a ‘direct advantage’. With 
respect to the Deferred Pay Interest Fund (DPIF), Gemmill announced that “the 
interest is utilised by the boards for the assistance of approved Native causes and 
institutions” and, further, that the “well-being of the Native mine labourers is at all 
times under consideration by the industry, whose welfare services are maintained and 
extended to accord with Native needs and the Native capacity to appreciate them.”24 
Again the NRC’s conception of Africans occupying an auxiliary ontological position 
emerged unmistakeably. Examining the uses to which the deferred pay interest was 
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put reveals with forceful clarity how Gemmill and the NRC conceived of African 
wellbeing.25 This examination is pursued in the following three sections of this 
chapter. 
 
The Deferred Pay Scheme’s projects, 1958 – 1975 
 
An examination of the projects to which surplus interest from the deferred pay scheme 
were directed brings into focus the peculiar notion of ‘welfare’ underpinning the 
NRC’s donations. Having witnessed the marketing success of contributing 
“substantial sums” to the building of a Sports Stadium at Maseru in Basotholand, such 
that the NRC was perceived as a magnanimous and open-handed provider for the 
Basotho people, a sum of £8 000 was in 1957 donated by the Deferred Pay Interest 
Fund’s Board of Control to the building of a similar sports stadium in the Transkei’s 
capital, Umtata.26 Although Xhosaland people were at this time afflicted by extreme 
deprivations (described in chapter 3), it was in line with the Deferred Pay Interest 
Fund’s mandated preoccupation with “Native welfare” to ignore issues of acute 
hunger, inadequate medical and schooling facilities, and other definitively urgent 
welfare needs. Unlike supporting education, the allocation of funds to glamour 
projects like a sports stadium would not attenuate the labour supply. The provision 
of a stadium allowed the NRC to at once appear big hearted and curry favour with 
the local inhabitants. In the most duplicitous manner, the NRC could be perceived as 
munificent, despite at the same time ensnaring Transkei persons into the capability-
destructive migrant labour system. Sometimes the NRC’s donations were openly 
trivial and unapologetically unrelated to human welfare. The Umtata Social Club, for 
instance, was another recipient of Deferred Pay Interest Fund donations. In 1961 the 
Club received financial assistance for its annual ballroom dancing and tennis 
championships, and the Umtata district superintendent in 1963 wrote to the Board of 
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Control recommending that a similar donation be provided for that year.27  Likewise, 
in Malawi WNLA funded youth rallies and beauty competitions.28 
But the DPIF was not simply about providing recreational infrastructure for young 
men to kick a ball around, or funding European cultural activities like ballroom 
dancing, beauty competitions and tennis championships in a context of systemic and 
increasingly severe deprivation. And while the DPIF refused to donate funds for 
exclusively educational purposes, the NRC did at intervals seek to be perceived as a 
playing a positive role in labour sending communities, and by 1961 the DPIF Board of 
Control had accepted the principle of giving financial support to a school’s tree 
planting committee and accordingly donated R2 000 to the endeavour.29 By 1965 
assistance for the establishment of orchards in fourteen schools in the Ciskei and four 
in the Transkei had been secured by the DPIF.30 While the Umtata district 
superintendent was apprehensive about veering from the NRC’s principles,  the 
general manager J.A Gemmill assured the superintendent that, he, Gemmill, was “of 
the opinion that the schools tree planting scheme was one with which the NRC was 
beneficially identified”.31  
This was a perfect opportunity for the NRC: by paying for the planting of trees at 
schools, the NRC could be perceived as valuing ‘education’, while at the same time                                                                                                 
refusing to support specifically educational projects on principle (since education was 
the enemy of the Chamber’s labour system).32 After all supporting tree plantings at 
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schools had precious little to do with promoting education: it was about being seen to 
value education when really the opposite was true. When the NRC used deferred pay 
funds for matters relating to education, it was done in the interests of the NRC rather 
than in the interests of those who would benefit from the projects. This insight is borne 
out in the case of the Red Cross Society’s appeal for funding. 
In early 1970 the Umtata district superintendent was approached by the South African 
Red Cross Society, who asked for renewed financial support towards establishing an 
organization in schools in the Transkei.33 First approached for financial support in 
1963, the Board of Control had agreed to donate R2 500 per annum for three years to 
the South African Red Cross Society, an agreement which was again renewed in 1966 
after Gemmill illuminatingly expressed concern that “the work of the Red Cross was 
concentrated upon schools, whereas the Industry obtains its labour from the 
uneducated classes”.34 In relaying the Red Cross Society’s renewed appeal to the NRC 
general manager in February 1970, the district superintendent revealingly pointed out 
that,  
our gold mineworkers are mainly raw tribal Africans, and not many of them have 
been to school. As soon as they acquire a little education, they tend to seek 
employment elsewhere, and this tendency is increasing, and is one of the reasons 
the Transkei labour supplies of the Gold Mining Industry have dwindled in 
recent years.35  
The superintendent argued that “in view of the fact that… its activities are 
concentrated on the schools… further support from the Company should be 
withheld.”36 The Board of Control in the end agreed to renew donations to the Red 
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Cross Society in 1970.37 Most of the Red Cross Society’s work consisted in teaching 
first aid, “good citizenship”, and the “promotion of life and health” to school 
children.38 While the NRC agreed to continue to support the Society, strong 
reservations regarding the paucity of the society’s work among “tribal” Africans were 
expressed. 39 These reservations reveal that the NRC was not concerned with the 
welfare of labour sending communities per se, but were rather concerned to render 
themselves favourable to potential recruits – who were situated among the “tribal” 
rather than the more educated classes.40 Insofar as those who acquired even “a little 
education” refused to work on the gold mines, the NRC in the 1960s and early 1970s 
had no incentive to support projects which would enhance the education and 
opportunities of Transkei residents.41 The NRC recruited most successfully among 
persons with fewest opportunities and freedoms, and, since education expanded 
freedoms and opportunities, the NRC was persistently disinclined to fund educational 
projects. Despite an explicit mandate to direct DPIF funds towards the welfare of 
labour sending regions, and education being a crucial element of both welfare and 
development generally, in terms of its interests – i.e., securing uneducated “raw tribal 
natives” for the gold mines – the NRC was still by the late 1960s totally opposed to 
advancing education in the Transkei.  
Providing small sums towards District Agricultural Shows was also undertaken by 
the Board of Control of the DPIF, but these were mostly petty branding efforts. In 
September 1975 the superintendent in Umtata motivated that insofar as the NRC and 
staff had been closely associated with district’s annual Agricultural show for many 
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years, he was of the opinion that it would serve NRC interests to offer them financial 
assistance, and recommended that R20 be reserved for this purpose.42 Again, in effect 
the superintendent disclosed that, whereas officially surplus interest was to be spent 
on welfare, the NRC directed funds towards those projects which served their own 
advertising interests. 
Significantly, NRC donations from the DPIF were very often used to purchase gifts to 
celebrate and endorse the installation of chiefs. After their institutionalization into the 
state apparatus with the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, chiefs often functioned, in Fred 
Hendrick’s words, as “agents of social control”.43  Before the 1951 Bantu Authorities 
Act, where apartheid-installed chiefs were afforded formal positions of power, 
headmen were stationed above chiefs in bureaucratic political structures.44 Headmen 
before 1952 principally executed NAD policy, and were directly inserted into formal 
NAD structures, whereas the role of chiefs was more ambiguous.45 That is not to say 
that chiefly power did not exist before 1951, it surely did. The power possessed by 
chiefs and the role they played was, however, uneven and equivocal since magisterial 
rule had been imposed on all Transkei districts after the annexation of Pondoland in 
1894.46 Rather than deriving their power from formal NAD institutions (as headmen 
did), chiefs derived their power informally through traditional social and cultural 
institutions.47 Chiefly power, although very important for the NRC’s recruiting 
operations, was located outside of or alongside formal bureaucratic structures, rather 
than within them.48 After 1951, when chiefly power was inscribed in formal 
institutions, it became important for the NRC to publically endorse chiefs as well 
associate the NRC with their formal power. Chiefs now formed part of the all 
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consuming institutional nexus which acted, for hundreds of thousands of men, to 
nullify all alternatives to mine work and thereby augment and sustain supply.  
Hammond-Tooke indeed saw the 1951 Act as that which “approximates to the 
classical concept of 'indirect rule'”, a system whereby the apartheid state installed 
chiefs to do their bidding.49 Similarly, Jeff Peires has remarked that chiefs should 
simply be regarded as functionaries like policemen and magistrates, and that installed 
chiefs like Kaiser Matanzima, Lucas Mangope, and Gatsha Buthelezi depended on the 
apartheid state “for their very status as chiefs.”50 Other commentators on the period 
also noted that chiefs and headman strengthened and preserved their power by 
allegiance with the colonial government “rather than by popular support”.51 Kaiser 
Matanzima occupied the apex of the chieftaincy system in the Transkei and it is thus 
worth noting that Peires has described him as “Dr Verwoerd's most sincere black 
disciple”.52 The importance of chiefs in the recruitment of mineworkers had been 
institutionalized within the NRC for six decades already, and the NRC’s spending of 
mineworker’s deferred pay interest in the 1960s and 1970s strongly reflects the NRC-
chieftaincy-collusion.53 Suffice it to say that the NRC was concerned to endorse these 
“agents of social control”.  
The DPIF frequently used its funds to celebrate and reassert Bantu Authorities’ 
systems of control and governance, since these were systems upon which its 
recruitment operations relied substantially. To associate themselves with chiefly 
power, the NRC used the deferred pay system to finance installation and other 
ceremonies as well as pay material tributes to newly installed chiefs. 
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On the 10th of August 1959 the Umtata district superintendent wrote to the general 
manager of the NRC, informing him that he, the district superintendent, had received 
an invitation from the Port St. Johns magistrate to attend the opening of new Public 
Offices by the Minister of Bantu Education and Development, Mr de Wet Nel, on the 
27th of August 1959.54 In light of the expected large gathering of persons at the sports 
ground who would be addressed by the Chief of Western Pondoland, Victor Poto, as 
well as the Minister, the district superintendent suggested that two head of cattle be 
donated by the NRC to mark the occasion. He noted that the gesture would be very 
much appreciated by the Paramount Chief and the Port St John’s magistrate, arguing 
that it was expected of the NRC to provide slaughtered livestock for the occasion.55 
Three days later confirmation was received from that the gift of dead cattle bodies was 
approved, but that the amount should not exceed the value of a gift given at a similar 
ceremony in Lusikisiki.56 The NRC directed funds from the deferred pay interest fund 
towards the magistrate’s new Public Office buildings, and therefore the NRC 
deployed funds which were explicitly earmarked for the welfare of mineworker 
communities to celebrate apartheid institutions of control. Unaware and without 
consent, mineworkers were in this respect financing the very institutions which 
contributed towards their unfreedom. The magistrate of Port St. Johns wrote to the 
district superintendent of Umtata expressing “personal appreciation” as well as the 
appreciation of Paramount Chief Victor Poto and “Heads of Bantu Authorities” in the 
district for the gift and remarked that an announcement of the gift was duly made at 
the gathering (allowing the NRC to feel at ease about its publicity objectives having 
been met).57 Clearly the authorization of these funds had nothing to do with the 
welfare of the Port St. Johns labour sending community. The NRC’s use of interest 
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earned on mineworkers’ wages to finance repressive and popularly rejected Bantu 
Authorities institutions persisted into the 1970s. 
On the 12 of October 1970 word from the Transkeian Government magistrate of 
Ngqeleni in Pondoland was sent to the NRC district superintendent expressing 
“sincere gratitude” on behalf of chief Ferguson Gwadiso and the Councillors of the 
Konjwayo Tribal Authority for the “magnificent desk” presented by the NRC to Chief 
Gwadiso.58  In his report to the general manager a week later, the NRC superintendent 
remarked that the desk had made “a very good impression indeed.”59 In the same year 
the Ngqeleni magistrate wrote to the NRC, informing them that the Mtakatye Tribal 
Authority under Chief Douglas Ndamase had recently completed “the erection of an 
imposing Courtroom and Offices” at Mampondomiseni and that the “Authority” was 
“now soliciting assistance from traders and other well-wishers [like the NRC] in the 
form of donations of office furniture”.60 A week later the purchase of an office desk 
was authorised by the Board of Control.61 Similarly, an office chair and an inscribed 
plaque was purchased for the installation ceremony of Chief Bambilanga Mtirara 
(introduced to the Board of Control as “half brother” to Paramount Chief Sabata 
Dalindyebo of the Tembus) on the 2nd of April 1972 – at an event which the 
superintendent attended bearing the NRC’s gifts.62 Likewise in 1974 the installation of 
Chief Tutor Nyangilizwe (who was succeeding his father Victor Poto) as Paramount 
Chief of Western Pondoland was attended by three NRC officials. The NRC officials 
were initially unsure whether to mark the occasion by contributing R200 to catering 
or two head of cattle (both had been approved) , but in the end decided that a writing 
desk and inscribed plaque would be most becoming of the organisation.63 Likewise, 
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when Chief Jackson Ndamase was appointed Chief of the Ndluzula tribe, with 
jurisdiction over six administrative areas, part of the installation ceremony was 
funded by the DPIF.64  
While the formal concern underpinning donations made to labour sending regions 
was the “welfare” of these communities, the NRC, whose Board of Control was 
invested with executive control over the money, sought rather to curry favour with 
chiefs, who, as “agents of social control” were well placed to assist the NRC in 
bringing influence to bear upon potential recruits. In celebrating and endorsing the 
installation of chiefs, who often engendered the political unfreedoms of Xhosaland 
people, and thereby arrested one aspect of their development (the attainment of 
political freedoms), the NRC refused to meaningfully participate in the development 
of Transkei and its people. Rather than promoting wellbeing and development, the 
NRC used the interest earned on mineworkers wages to celebrate illegitimate chiefs, 
and thereby endorsed the freedom-constraining political elites and systems which 
controlled the Transkei. If we consider the three freedoms underpinning Amatya Sen’s 
conception of development (basic education, health care facilities, and political 
liberties), we see that the NRC was loathe to spend money (even though it strictly 
belonged to mineworkers) on the promotion or fostering of any of them.65 For the NRC 
as a labour recruiting institution, and in contradistinction the its declared focus on 
welfare, it was preferable that Transkei men remained uneducated and politically 
unfree since this would render them more likely to accept mine work. 
After the loss of labour from Malawi in 1974 (then the Chamber’s principal labour 
source, see chapter 3) and the closing down of 17 out of 21 WNLA recruitment offices 
in Mozambique (with a concomitant 58% reduction in the Mozambican labour supply 
in one year), the Transkei became the South African mining industry’s most important 
labour sending region.66 The Chamber of Mines was by 1975 critically dependent on 
securing labour from the Transkei. By 1976 the Transkei had received bogus political 
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‘independence’ and the oppressive and undemocratic power of Kaiser Mantanzima 
(appointed by the apartheid state to govern the Transkei in 1963) was further 
entrenched.67  
Until 1975, when the obligations of the DPIF changed formally with its remaking into 
the TEBA Trust, no interest was paid to mineworkers whose money was invested with 
the Fund.68 The Chamber of Mines had refused to pay the interest earned on 
individual deferred wages to individual mineworkers and argued that the 
administrative cost of paying interest to each mineworker would be prohibitive.  
Under an agreement with the Registrar of Financial Institutions in 1975, the TEBA 
Trust was obliged to pay interest to individuals at a fixed but undeclared and 
untraceable rate and use the surplus interest (i.e., the interest not paid to mineworkers) 
for “welfare work and services” which were to be distributed on a pro rata basis.69 At 
an Executive meeting held on 17 September 1975, the TEBA Savings Fund Trust Deed 
was approved and the sums invested with the Public Debt Commissioner were 
transferred to the TEBA Savings Fund Trust Deed on 7 August 1975.70 Clause 21 of the 
Deed noted importantly that “[i]n the discretion of the Trustees grants may be paid 
from any surplus interest received to provide or support general welfare work or 
services for the benefit to the black people in any area where employees are recruited 
by the Company, after provision has been made for the creation of such reserves as 
the Trustees may deem desirable in the particular circumstances”.71  
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Apart from a shift in language, from the Native Recruitment Corporation (NRC) 
donating surplus interest to “welfare work”, to The Employment Bureau of Africa 
(TEBA) donating the surplus interest “for the benefit of black people [no longer 
natives]”, the principle informing the deferred pay scheme remained much the same: 
surplus interest was to be directed towards projects enhancing the welfare of 
mineworkers and their communities. Another crucial feature of the scheme was that 
“only” “projects considered worthy by the Appeals Committee” – who possessed 
“exclusive control of the Fund and of the income arising therefrom” – could receive 
funding.72  “Assistance in respect of primary educational facilities” was “not... 
considered as a priority”.73 Projects or institutions which wanted or needed funding 
from the Deferred Pay Interest (TEBA Trust after 1975) were required to prevail upon 
TEBA’s Field Mangers (district superintendents before 1975) hat-in-hand with a 
detailed written request and motivation. Before sending the request to the Donations 
Appeal Committee at the Head Office in Johannesburg, the Field Manager would then 
examine the requests and add a recommendation regarding what should be donated.74  
The DPIF had a long history of directing money towards projects which either cast 
them in a favourable light (tree planting and support for the Red Cross Society), 
enhanced their branding efforts (supporting agricultural shows and tennis 
championships), or established associations with Bantu Authorities chiefs. Since none 
of these projects related to the neglected wellbeing or development of labour sending 
regions and their inhabitants, and quite apart from swindling mineworkers from 
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interest earned on their wages, the NRC demonstrated in its DPIF spending that it did 
not value the wellbeing and development of labour sending regions. After the DPIF 
was recast as the TEBA Trust it remained the institution’s position in the 1970s that 
financing education projects was counterproductive. 
 
1976 Independence celebrations and the gift of the Umtata Air Terminal 
 
Before construction of the Umtata airport in 1976, the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development (BAD) had indicated that financial support was 
available.75 From the mythical perspective of separate development, it was logical that 
the Transkei, upon receiving its ‘independence’ from South Africa in 1976, should be 
equipped with its own eponymously named airport.  After all, as Legislative 
Assembly member Mr S.F Mgqweto moved in his 1972 motivation for an appeal to the 
South African Government for Umtata’s own airport, ‘great leaders’ in South Africa 
were enshrined with airports bearing their names.76 Precedents were easily invoked. 
Johannesburg had its own Jan Smuts Airport, Cape Town, the D.F Malan Airport, 
Durban, the Louis Botha Airport, East London had the Ben Schoeman Airport, while 
the Hertzog Airport serviced Bloemfontein.77 By 1976, Kaiser Matanzima could 
announce in his quasi-autobiographical book, ‘Independence my Way’ (published 
tellingly by the Foreign Affairs Association in Pretoria) that:  
The new international airport in Umtata will be called the K D Matanzima 
Airport and will be open by independence. The Transkeian Airways Corporation 
will by that date be operating a daily scheduled jet-prop flight to Jan Smuts 
Airport.78 
Two powerful entities, the apartheid government, and the Chamber of Mines, through 
the NRC, played key roles in Umtata’s independence airport materializing. Forming 
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part of the vast apartheid project, whereby black persons would lose the last of their 
paltry rights and freedoms in South Africa, and in line with various African states 
acquiring independence from the 1960s, the independence of the Transkei was the first 
step towards realizing the apartheid dream of separate development.79 On the one 
hand the independence of the Transkei was a means to vindicate the existence of 
Bantustans and the general apartheid ideological claim that black persons enjoyed full 
political and civil rights in their respective ethnically segregated political territories. 
Although no foreign state bought the lie, the apartheid government would attempt to 
use the Transkei’s independence to ward off criticism of its oppressive and racist 
regime.80 On the other hand independence simultaneously intended to render 
acceptable the long term supply of optionless migrant labourers who could be drawn 
into the white economy on the latter’s desired terms.81 The Chamber of Mines was by 
1975 critically dependent on labour from the Transkei (see chapter 3) and could have 
been brought to its knees if the Transkei refused to send labour to the South African 
mines. Its relationship with the Transkei’s political elite was of vital importance. 
By the mid-1970s the political independence of labour supplying African states was 
deeply concerning to the Chamber of Mines. Already in the 1960s, soon after gaining 
independence, both Tanzania (1961) and Zambia (1964) had suddenly refused to send 
workers to the South African mines.82 From sending in excess of 14 000 mineworkers 
in 1961, by 1966 Tanzania refused to forward any workers to the South African mines. 
Similarly in 1965 more than 6000 Zambians worked on the mines, and by 1968 there 
were none.83 In the 1960s these withdrawals of labour by independent African states 
did not, however, pose a definitive challenge to the industry because Botswana, South 
Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland were still sending tens of 
thousands of migrants to the mines. In the context of Malawi’s refusal to send labour 
after 1974 and FRELIMO’s taking power of Mozambique in 1975, the mining industry 
was forced to take seriously the independence of African states. The pattern was clear, 
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as soon as some African states acquired independence from colonial rule, they were 
no longer willing to send workers to the South African mines (Zimbabwe too would 
later refuse to forward workers after achieving its independence in 1981).84  
Given that by 1975 the Transkei was the largest supplier of mineworkers, maintaining 
close cooperation with Transkei political elites became acutely important. The 
apartheid government and the mining industry thus both strongly desired that the 
Transkei received its independence under the leadership of Kaiser Matanzima, who 
endorsed the migrant labour policies upon which both entities were markedly 
dependent, and was a keen advocate of separate development.85 In 1974 (the same 
year that Dr Hastings Banda froze all recruitment of Malawians), the apartheid state 
approved a motion by Kaiser Matanzima for full independence within five years. The 
apartheid state authorities was further galvanized in 1975 when FRELIMO took 
control of Mozambique and independence was set for October 26 1976.86 One key 
symbolic feature of an independent state is the possession of an airport, and 
Matanzima was adamant that the Transkei would be able to boast its own airport in 
Umtata. This airport was funded jointly, though without mutual cooperation, by the 
apartheid government and the Chamber of Mines.87 What follows is a discussion of 
how and why the Chamber of Mines paid for the K. D. Matanzima airport terminal, 
which was ceremoniously handed over on the 23 of October 1976. 
By early December 1975 the Chamber of Mines was carefully investigating the form 
its independence gift to the Transkei should take. A WENELA memorandum from 
December of 1975 enumerated WNLA’s DPIF spending precedents for the Chamber 
of Mines to consider in deciding what kind of gift or donation would be appropriate 
for the Transkei’s independence.88 Financing independence celebrations had been a 
trick in the Chamber’s bag for more than a decade. As in the Transkei, WNLA and the 
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NRC through the DPIF directed money towards projects which in the majority of cases 
had no direct bearing on the welfare needs of labour sending regions. One year prior 
to Botswana acquiring independence, R10 000 was donated for a sports stadium in 
Gabarone, while at independence (in 1966) independence celebrations in Francistown, 
Maun, and Skakawe were partly financed by WNLA.89 In 1974, at president Seretse 
Khama’s request, a once off donation of R5 000 was made to the elite of Maru a Pula 
school, and in consequence WNLA refused to contribute to celebrations that year 
(after having done so consistently from 1970 to 1973).90 For the NRC or WNLA to 
direct money towards education, no less than a president would need to request such 
a donation. But by 1975 WNLA reverted back to funding independence celebrations 
in Francistown, Mohembo, Maun, and Kasane.91  
In Malawi in 1966 (three years after Dr Banda had taken power of Malawi) money was 
donated towards independence celebrations around the country as well as WNLA’s 
militarily occupied Fort Manning depot.92 Donations for independence celebrations in 
Malawi, though relatively small, persisted into the early 1970s.93 WNLA also funded 
an annual youth rally and a beauty competition in Malawi.94 Examples of frivolous 
but cynical precedents abounded. In 1972 the Eastern Caprivi’s new Legislative 
Council received a gold mace and stand. When Mozambique attained independence 
from Portugal in 1975, and in the context of Portuguese destroying infrastructure as 
they exited the country, WNLA offered to build four schools (each at R25 000) and 
provide ten bursaries valued at R2 500.95 If money was spent on education, it was only 
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in extreme circumstances and contexts in which such spending, rather than stem the 
supply of labour, was consider crucial to maintaining the supply. 
Taking into account WNLA’s previous independence donations, a meeting was held 
on the 19th of December 1975 to discuss what form the Chamber’s gift to the Transkei 
might take.96 Anglo American, Rand Mines, Johannesburg Consolidated Investments, 
and the NRC were all represented.97  At the meeting it was noted that for many years 
gifts and funds hitherto donated by WNLA and the NRC to labour sending regions 
had been paid for by the DPIF and that these had in 1975 reached a height of R600 
000.98 Since the introduction of the TEBA Savings Scheme Trust in 1975 which 
stipulated that interest earned on deferred pay would be paid to mineworkers at an 
undisclosed fixed rate and that only surplus interest could be used for welfare 
projects, a portion of the deferred pay interest funds used for ‘welfare’ projects would 
soon run dry.99 At the meeting, industry representatives conceded that WNLA and 
the NRC “had enjoyed a degree of goodwill from these gifts which was not wholly 
justified.”100 The Chamber and the NRC were under no illusion as to the mendacity 
and illegitimacy of their marketing gimmicks.101 At the meeting in December it was 
decided that a gift to the Transkei was “expected” and that this obligation could not 
be escaped “without damaging relations with the newly independent territory”.102 It 
was decided that the amount involved should be in the order of R1 million and that 
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the gift should be made through the Mine Labour Organisations (it was also noted 
that it may thus be possible to avoid taxation if the donation, like other NRC and 
WNLA donations, formed part of its costs). Five distinct categories of gifts were 
discussed: a University library; a sports stadium “of Olympic Standard”; the provision 
of hospital buildings or equipment; a gift in the field of health, or; the provision of an 
airport.103  
On the 21st of January 1976 an industry delegation, consisting of the NRC general 
manager, an architect and civil engineer from Anglo American, and a senior Chamber 
of Mines official travelled to Umtata to meet with one Mr Faure, secretary to Kaiser 
Matanzima, and his assistant, Mr Wronsley, as well as Mr Jager of the Transkei Public 
Works Department, and Mr Leech of an architectural company working in Umtata.104 
It was decided that it was unviable to build a stadium by October 1976, and that at 
any rate, the industry delegation was informed, the South African government had 
set aside finances to erect seating for 50 000 people to attend the celebrations at the 
Transkei rugby fields.105 To the industry delegation’s suggestion that the industry 
provide contributions towards a library or cottage hospital, Mr Wronsley pointed out 
that the South African Government’s allocation of funds to the Transkei had been 
severely cut and that if the proposed air terminal at the newly constructed 
International Airport was to be funded from these reduced funds, other items such as 
schools would have to be omitted from the budget. He suggested that the Chamber of 
Mines consider contributing towards the air terminal, which was to be known as the 
K.D Matanzima Air Terminal.106  If the Chamber refused to finance an air terminal, 
they would essentially be taking finances from education spending – such was Mr 
Wronsley’s argument. The architect from Umtata showed the delegation sketch plans 
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of an air terminal and indicated that the cost would be in the order of R250 000, which 
was 75% less costly than what the industry had been willing to pay.107 
By 11 February it was agreed that the Chamber of Mines would finance an airport 
terminal building costing roughly R250 000, which would then be handed to 
Matanzima by the mining industry at the Transkei’s independence ceremony, and 
noted that an appropriately worded plaque commemorating the industry’s gift should 
be affixed to the building.108 By March a tender of R246 272 by LTA Construction (the 
cheapest tender) was accepted.109 The entire airport was not to be financed by the 
mining industry, since, as the assistant to the Secretary to Matanzima explained, the 
runway for the airport was to be a donation from the South African Government at a 
cost of R1.7 million.110 That the industry was initially prepared to pay R1 million as 
part of its independence gift, while the South African Government was willing to pay 
R1.7 million rand towards the airport provides some quantitative indication of just 
how keenly the industry wanted to please Kaiser Matanzima. At a meeting later that 
month it was decided that the official handing over of the building should take place 
at the independence celebration when the new run-way was handed over by the South 
African Government.111 
The costs of the donation, the Chamber of Mines Board of Directors, concluded by 
early March 1976 should “be recouped through the N.R.C.” 112 Although they did not 
reveal how the NRC would “recoup” the amount, it is likely that the money would 
come from the DPIF or by otherwise inscrutably deducting it from mineworkers’ 
wages. Whatever the method of regaining the funds, that the Chamber of Mines 
determined that the airport terminal donation would be “recouped through the NRC” 
implies that mineworkers’ too would in effect pay for the independence gift, just as 
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they had paid for a number of dubious welfare projects, chieftaincy installations, other 
independence celebrations, and sports stadiums since the opening of the Deferred Pay 
Interest Fund in 1918.  
At the handing-over ceremony the mining industry was represented by the president 
and two vice presidents of the Chamber of Mines, as well as the general managers of 
the Chamber and the Mine Labour Organisations (WNLA and NRC) and their 
wives.113 Upon arrival the industry’s delegation was met by the ceremony’s host and 
Minister of Roads and Works, Chief G. Ndabankulu.114 During the ceremony, and 
before the Chamber of Mines president Mr R.A Plumbridge formally handed over the 
building Chief Ndabankulu addressed the crowd on the airport complex in exulting 
terms. 115 Immediately after the terminal was ceremoniously handed over by the 
Chamber of Mines the Ngangelizwe choir broke into jubilant song. Thereafter the 
airport runway was officially handed over by Mr I.P van Onselen, Secretary for Bantu 
Administration and Development, after which the Ngangelizwe choir again treated 
the audience to songs of celebration.116 Then it was the turn of Dr. the Honourable 
Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima to address the guests on “this supreme moment” 
and unveil, among other things, two Chamber of Mines plaques (one in English and 
one in isiXhosa) which recognized the “strong links forged over the years between the 
people of Transkei and the South African Mining Industry”.117 As a publicity venture 
and to symbolize the relationship between the oppressive and undemocratic Transkei 
elites and the mining industry, the 1976 celebrations and gift of an air terminal was a 
key success. The Transkei’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs wrote to the NRC general 
manager (Mr Fleischer) on behalf of the Prime Minister Kaiser Matanzima, conveying 
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thanks for attending the celebrations, and stating that his presence in Umtata “on this 
historic occasion” was greatly appreciated, and one which the people of Transkei (who 
had not endorsed Matanzima and by implication not endorsed the KD Matanzima 
Airport) considered a “supreme moment”.118 Essentially the Chamber of Mines could 
symbolically style themselves as an entity which spurred forward the Transkei’s 
development towards approximating white South African cities, and use money that 
would be “recouped” from the NRC to do this. 
The Chamber of Mines was willing to go to great lengths for the Transkei to remain 
one of its major labour sending regions. Although ready to spend large sums of money 
on CSR style projects, the Chamber recognized by the mid-1970s that the DPIF money 
it had been using to this end was unjustified. Nevertheless the Chamber was ready to 
endorse and promote the Transkei’s independence, which formed a crucial part of the 
apartheid state’s Bantustan and separate development program, so long as this meant 
that Matanzima would respect the Chamber’s labour requirements and continue to 
send tens of thousands of migrant mineworkers.  
 
TEBA Savings Fund Trust, 1976 – 1978 
 
As discussed above, the Chamber of Mines in 1975 conceded that the “goodwill” the 
NRC and WNLA were accorded by committing money earned on mineworkers’ 
deferred wages towards a variety of projects, celebrations, and events, was unjustified 
and articulated concerns that this source of funding would “dry up” with the 
transformation of the Deferred Pay Interest Fund into the TEBA Savings Trust Scheme 
in 1975. This fear was, however, largely unfounded, since strong continuities existed 
between the TEBA Savings Fund Trust and its precursor the Deferred Pay Interest 
Fund. Whereas the latter did not pay any of the interest earned on deferred wages to 
mineworkers, the TEBA Savings Fund Trust at least formally committed itself to pay 
individuals at a fixed rate, but like the DPIF was permitted to use any surplus interest 
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for “welfare work or services and geographically distributed in terms of the number 
of recruits forwarded from each area”.119 Although the TEBA Savings Fund Trust was 
formally obliged, according to its own Trust Deed, to pay interest to individuals, this 
obligation must be understood in the context of the unfreedom which marked the lives 
of mineworkers from Transkei. Mineworkers were excluded from politics, they did 
not have recourse to processes of justice, they could not unionise to voice unfair 
treatment, and there is no reason to believe that that the NRC and WNLA would have 
informed mineworkers that they were entitled to a fixed rate of interest earned on 
their deferred wages. Whereas interest on mineworkers’ wages were held in the DPIF 
and administered by a Board of Control from 1918 to 1977, from 1977 onwards the 
interest was held in the TEBA Saving Fund Trust and used at the discretion of the 
Donations Appeal Committee, which first met on the 23rd of June 1977.120 This closing 
section of the chapter indicates that the TEBA Savings Fund Trust in effect continued 
to operate as the Deferred Pay Interest Fund had done before 1975, paying out 
substantial sums to institutions and instalments which were considered favourable to 
the NRC, rather than to the welfare of migrants to whom the funds belonged and for 
whom they were reserved. 
In August of 1976 the Inspector of Religious Education in Transkei, Mr F.L Matyumza, 
wrote to the NRC’s Umtata district manager requesting a sum of R300 for assistance 
in order to host a conference for inspectors in charge of Religious Education in the 
Homelands, arguing that it “would strengthen the Transkei Independence if the 
conference met in Umtata”, and that since Pretoria refused to finance the conference, 
and the Transkei Department of Education was short of funds, the Inspector 
“earnestly” appealed to the NRC to bring the conference into being.121  The Umtata 
district manager then wrote to the NRC general manager informing him that while he 
had already informed Mr Matyumza that “it is not normally the policy of our 
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Company to donate monies for educational purposes”, he proceeded to advance that 
in this case a donation was in the interests of the NRC and recommended that a third 
of the requested funds be forwarded to Mr Matyumza.122 The general manager replied 
reiterating the district manger’s point that it was not the Company’s policy to make 
donations for educational purposes and argued further that since providing the funds 
would only “create a precedent” he could not authorize the payment.123 The NRC’s 
line with respect to education was clear. After an application for assistance for repairs 
to the Dinizulu J.S School in Elliotdale, the district manager contended ruthlessly that 
although it had “been substantiated that the school is in need of considerable repairs” 
he did “not recommend that assistance be given to it in view of the fact that this would 
create a precedent” and that the NRC would be “inundated” with requests from other 
schools in the Transkei.124 This was the NRC’s paradigmatic response to requests for 
education funding. In September the district manager wrote a terse letter to the 
Principal of the Dinizulu School informing him that the NRC’s “Donation policy does 
not extend to schools”.125 The NRC’s notion of ‘development’ –in terms of which the 
NRC interpreted their own donations policy – did not see expanded access to 
education as constitutive of development. The continuity in policy was clear, even 
after the transformation of the Deferred Pay Interest Fund into the TEBA Savings Fund 
Trust, it was explicit NRC policy that interest earned on mineworkers’ wages was not 
to be spent on education. 
But that claim is slightly too strong. It was not the case that the NRC refused to fund 
any educational facilities or projects, but rather that the NRC refused to fund any 
educational projects or facilities which catered to able-bodied persons whom the 
industry could potentially draw onto the mines. The case of the Efata School for Blind 
and Deaf children illuminates this nuance.  In 1976, for example, R28 000 for a 
swimming bath was donated to the Efata school from the Deferred Pay Interest Fund, 
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and in 1977, under the TEBA Savings Fund Scheme, the Efata school successfully 
applied for R5 250 for school house renovations.126 In mid-1978 another R30 000 was 
donated to the EFATA school for the erection of a school hall.127  While on principle 
refusing to donate trifling sums to schools for able-bodied persons, the NRC was all 
too ready to depart with large sums for the assistance of schools and institutions 
supporting disabled persons (since the latter was a class the NRC’s labour system 
considerably helped to augment). 
From its outset, the DPIF’s “CSR-as-philanthropy approach” exhibited the problems 
which Ralph Hamman would later describe as general to mining companies’ CSR 
endeavours.128  CSR efforts by the NRC refused to acknowledge the contributions of 
their “core business” to social, economic and health burdens in labour sending 
regions.129 Hamman describes the mining industry’s historical relationship with its 
institutional context as being a “vicious cycle of irresponsibility and lack of 
collaboration”.130 Neither the mining industry nor the national and apartheid states 
wanted to accept responsibility for the burdens imposed on labour sending regions. 
But it was important for successful recruiting that the NRC pretended to care about 
the ill health and injuries which afflicted mineworkers, and it used the DPIF to 
generate this image. The NRC through the DPIF constructed a CSR charade. The NRC 
was an institution implicated in externalizing the costs of thousands of injured and 
sick mineworkers back into labour sending regions, but through its DPIF scheme it 
                                                          
126 District manager to A.C Fleischer, 14 April 1978. ‘TEBA Savings Scheme: Donations 1978: EFATA School for 
Blind and Deaf,’ 1. UJSC, Umtata Donations; TEBA administrative officer to district manager, 29 September 1977. 
‘TEBA Savings Fund: 1977 Donations: Efata Welfare Organisations’, 1. UJSC, Umtata Donations. 
127 TEBA administrative officer to district manager, 11 July 1978. ‘TEBA Savings Fund: Donations 1978: EFATA 
School for Blind and Deaf,’ 1. UJSC, Umtata Donations. 
128 Hamann, “Partnerships and Institutional Change”, 288. Patrick Bond, "Social Movements and Corporate Social 
Responsibility in South Africa," Development and Change 39, no. 6 (2008): 1037-1052. Gabriel Eweje, "The Role 
of MNEs in Community Development Initiatives in Developing Countries: Corporate Social Responsibility at Work 
in Nigeria and South Africa," Business & Society 45, no. 2 (2006): 93-129. Ralph Hamann, "Mining companies' 
Role in Sustainable Development: the 'Why' and 'How' of Corporate Social Responsibility from a Business 
Perspective," Development Southern Africa 20, no. 2 (2003): 237 – 254. Ralph Hamann and Nicola Acutt, "How 
Should Civil Society (and the government) Respond to 'Corporate Social Responsibility'? A Critique of Business 
Motivations and the Potential for Partnerships," Development Southern Africa 20, no. 2 (2003): 255-270. 
Subhabrata Banerjee, "Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly," Critical Sociology 34, 
no. 1 (2008): 51-79. 
129 Ralph Hamann, “Corporate Social Responsibility, Partnerships and Institutional Change: the Case of Mining 
Companies in South Africa,” Natural Resources Forum  28, no. 4 (2004): 288. 
130 Hamann, “Partnerships and Institutional Change”, 288. 
127 
 
constructed an image of itself as benevolently concerned with sick and disabled 
Transkei residents.  
The Ikwezi Lokusa Rehabilitation School and Sheltered Employment Society of 
Umtata, which, among other things, offered pottery classes to disabled persons, 
provided for the NRC (and TEBA after 1977) an excellent opportunity to demonstrate 
their unbounded magnanimity and commitment to the welfare of those in need. The 
NRC in 1976 donated R3 000 for the maintenance of Ikwezi’s school for cerebral 
palsied children (and another R4 000 for the same purpose the following year), an 
additional R3 000 for general running costs, as well R30 000 to for the provision of 
essential services like lights, water, and sewerage removal for the sheltered 
employment centre and R6 000 for the purchase of pottery kilns in 1977.131 Likewise 
in 1978 R30 000 was donated for the construction of a pottery workshop, and R5 000 
donated for a play-room for small boys.132 In the context of refusing to donate even 
piddling sums to legitimate education facilities, the NRC’s donations to schools for 
disabled persons were prodigious.   
The TEBA Savings Fund Trust maintained the strong desire to assert the authority and 
recognize the power of newly installed chiefs. When Chief Zwelivumile Mtwa was 
installed as Chief of the Xesibe Tribal Authority in the Mqanduli district by Sabata 
Dalindyebo, both the Umtata district manager and the NRC’s Mqanduli 
representative attended the ceremony to among other things present to the Chief the 
“usual clock” as a gift from the NRC.133  When Chief Dumisa Meji was installed into 
the Manzamhlope Tribal Authority in early 1976 the NRC provided the loudhailer as 
well as financial assistance for the ceremony. The magistrate of St John’s wrote to the 
NRC’s Libode representative thanking him for the gesture and conveyed that the 
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Tribal Authority happily anticipated hosting NRC representatives at the forthcoming 
installations in February of 1976.134 With white supremacy inscribed into virtually 
every sphere of society, it is a gloomy fact that even mere association with white 
persons generally conferred social prestige and otherwise signalled influence in rural 
areas.135 Similarly, being perceived as allied with chiefly powers, the NRC derived 
important influence by such associations.  
Since it related to the reproduction of the labour force the NRC was also interested in 
donating money to maternity homes. The St Mary’s Maternity Home in Umtata, for 
instance, repeatedly received financial assistance, both from the Deferred Pay Interest 
Fund and the TEBA Savings Fund Trust. In 1976 R7 650 was donated for the provision 





In 1917 the NRC and NAD devised a Deferred Pay Interest Fund (DPIF), the industry’s 
first Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) endeavour, and used this fund to present 
the mining industry as philanthropic and concerned with the wellbeing of migrants 
and their communities. Money from the DPIF was to be directed to projects for the 
“welfare” of Africans in labour sending regions.137 ‘Deferred pay’ was a confusing 
industry-speak term for the portion of individual wages (usually between 50 and 
100%) which mineworkers were compelled to remit to their rural homes from the 
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1920s.138 Because mineworkers were away for 6 to 9 month spells, at any given time 
the collective payments (of deferred wages) held by the NRC comprised a very large 
sum.  As part of the DPIF scheme, the NRC invested to-be-remitted wages on its own 
behalf and earned large sums in accumulated interest. This chapter demonstrates that 
the NRC declined to hand this interest to the mineworkers (to whom it belonged) and 
instead used the money according to their own marketing ends.  
Since the NRC’s stated intention was to donate the accumulated interest to “matters 
connected with the welfare of natives generally”, an examination of the manner in 
which DPIF money was spent reveals how the NRC understood the ‘welfare’ of 
African mineworker communities – and how this conception changed over time.139 If, 
in line with Amartya Sen’s notion of development, human wellbeing (/welfare) is the 
ultimate point or telos of development, then an examination of how the money were 
spent over time, discloses not only where the NRC’s values lay (what it is they valued), 
but also discloses how the NRC conceived of development.  
Since African labour sending communities were refused the opportunity to 
themselves decide what constituted “welfare” projects, they were denied agency to 
act in their own interests. Discretion over the allocation of the interest earned on 
mineworkers’ wages was left firmly in the hands of the DPIF or TEBA Savings Trust 
Trustees, and the scheme further restricted the choices and opportunities of Transkei 
residents. The scheme in this respect served to constrain, rather than enhance, the 
freedom of Transkei people. Whereas in 1974, one researcher found that households 
in the Transkei were spending between 20 and 70% of their total family budget on 
education (fees, books, uniforms), which indicates the supreme value families in the 
Transkei placed on education, as this chapter demonstrates, the Deferred Pay Interest 
Fund (and later the TEBA Trust) refused to direct funds towards education. As an 
impatient letter to the Umtata district superintendent in 1965 memorably read, the 
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“Deferred Pay Interest Fund, as you are aware, does not make grants for purely 
educational purposes.”140 This approach to education remained immutable in the 
Transkei. Despite the NRC and WNLA’s rebranding into TEBA in the mid-1970s, their 
conception of welfare and development, as this chapter argues, did not transform so 
as to include directing surplus towards education projects in the Transkei. Schools 
catering to able-bodied persons were denied funds in the TEBA era for the same 
reasons they were refused in earlier decades.141  
Constructed through the lens of development as a process of expanding freedoms, the 
achievement of education or a skill is both constitutive of development (a social 
freedom possessive of intrinsic value) and simultaneously the means to further 
development in the generation of economic growth.142  From this perspective the 
NRC’s and later TEBA’s funding prejudice against education, implies that - while 
claiming to be spending the money with an eye to enhancing the welfare labour 
sending regions’ citizens – these labour recruiting institutions, actively refused to 
promote development. Funds seemed to have been endlessly available to finance 
sports stadiums, gifts for chiefs, ballroom dancing and tennis events, and all manner 
of developmentally irrelevant projects or indeed projects positively inimical to 
development. The NRC was also supposed to be a non-profit organisation, and thus 
generating interest on mineworkers’ deferred wages and then using this money for 
CSR projects, or to finance the installation of Bantu Authorities chiefs contravened the 
NRC’s own business model and was thus illegitimate even according to its own 
terms.143 
The literature on deferred pay reveals virtually nothing on how interest earned on 
mineworkers’ deferred wages was actually spent.144 A brief article by Martin Plaut 
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published in 1976 in the ‘South African Labour Bulletin’ discusses the interest earned 
on the deferred pay scheme (less than two pages), but does not advance evidence on 
how the interest accrued on deferred wages was spent, and does not discuss the causes 
and projects to which it was directed.145 After noting the NRC’s declared intention to 
donate the interest earned on mineworkers’ deferred pay to general welfare work 
relating to the African mineworkers and their communities, and calculating that in 
1973 these proceeds amounted to R376 381 (by earning interest at 1.8% less than that 
offered by commercial banks), Plaut declared that the manner in which the DPIF 
money was spent constituted a lacuna in the literature.146 As he put it: “The question 
must be asked as to precisely what use the above funds are put, as they form a 
substantial pool of cheap finance.”147  This chapter has gone some way in answering 
Plaut’s question and linking the response to the thesis of deprivation by examining 
how interest accrued on deferred pay was spent in the Transkei from 1958 to 1978. 
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While the central focus of this thesis is on migrant labour at the height of apartheid, the story 
cannot be abandoned here. The demise of apartheid in the 1980s did not bring about the 
dismantling of migrant labour institutions but their reinvention and promotion as 
developmental. This dénouement discusses the reforming and partial dismantling of white 
supremacist mine labour institutions from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s. It shows that 
major institutional features of the mine migrant labour system such as the colour bar and 
influx controls were removed during this time. It explains that since the market was 
saturated with an oversupply of unskilled labour, mine migrants were readily available. It 
begins with a brief discussion of how the NRC (rebranded as TEBA after 1977) was 
compelled to shift from earlier aggressive marketing tactics to marketing itself as a 
favourable employer and agent of development. In spite of a name change and a grand 
marketing effort to suggest otherwise, TEBA’s view of development and general values in 
the 1980s remained those of the NRC.  
By the mid-1970s national economic growth was faltering and would remain low for the 
next three decades. A number of constraints beset the South African economy, including 
low productivity (high unit labour costs), chronic skill shortages, an uncompetitive 
manufacturing sector, a small domestic economy, a near absence of economies of scale, 
imported and capital intensive mechanisation, as well as balance of payments constraints.1 
The early apartheid view (expressed by the Minister of Labour in 1957) that ”[e]ven though 
it might intrude upon certain economic laws” the “European worker… must be protected 
or else European civilisation will go under”, came into clear conflict with an economy 
constrained by an uncompetitive manufacturing sector and a critical shortage of skills and 
human capital.2 As Feinstein put it, 
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Most other countries strive to raise the quality of their human resources; only 
South Africa made it an express purpose of official policy to lower standards and 
frustrate the aspirations of those who wished to improve their contribution to the 
economy.3  
Deep constraints to economic growth and development saw the apartheid state set into 
motion a number of institutional changes. By 1987 three principal migrant labour 
institutions – the ban on African trade unionism, the colour bar, and influx controls – were 
abolished and the labour relations machinery was deracialised. Throughout the 1970s the 
Chamber of Mines’ stance towards African political freedom in the workplace (the 
capability to unionise) had remained right-wing and conservative. In 1978 the Chamber 
submitted to the Riekert Commission that its black labour force was too simple-minded and 
tribal for trade unions.4 Breaking from state institutional mechanisms which emerged after 
Union (the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911), the state permitted the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM) was legally permitted to unionise the African labour force legally 
in 1982.5 
The apartheid state attempted in the late 1970s to uphold pass laws, and even fined 
companies whose workers’ passes were unacceptable: however the enduring apartheid 
vision was institutionally abandoned in 1986 when the pass laws were finally abolished.6 At 
the same time, the apartheid regime could no longer afford racialized job protection and 
began to allow blacks into skilled jobs and apprenticeships, which had been institutionalised 
as the preserve of whites. The state adhered to the Wiehahn Commission’s 
recommendations that the colour bar be completely abolished, and in 1983 removed the 
clause which blocked African apprenticeships, although the colour bar was only finally 
abandoned in 1987 when parliament removed racial clauses in the Mines and Works Act.7 
However, in practice very few Africans occupied skilled and senior positions in the mines.8  
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The economy’s structural weaknesses had effects far beyond crumbling apartheid 
institutions.  For the Transkei – overcrowded, denuded, and heavily dependent on migrant 
labour – a sluggish and embattled economy implied vast unemployment and misery. 
Seekings and Nattrass described the 1970s as a shift from labour shortages to “massive, open 
unemployment”, and have argued that overcrowding (from forced removals) and the 
worsening crisis of subsistence agriculture meant that “millions” were unable to find work.9 
They noted further that the bulk of unemployment was shifted to the reserves.10 The 
Transkei’s context of widespread and open unemployment, agricultural collapse, 
landlessness, and overcrowding (i.e., deprivation) had amounted to ideal recruitment 
conditions for TEBA in the late 1970s. However, in the early 1980s TEBA discarded its 
recruitment networks in the Transkei.11 With thousands of people desperate for work, 
labour agents and runners became redundant; the days of TEBA informing chiefs and 
headmen of labour requirements were over.12 In Matatiele in 1981 all mines were ‘closed’ to 
recruiting from January to October, which was not uncommon at the time.13 One TEBA 
official noted that, 
The TEBA recruiter has an easy time of it these days. He must just sit back and 
wait for them to come in. I remember when I had to address meetings, give all 
sorts of parties, drive all over. Those days are in the past.14 
Accordingly, the composition of the labour force changed. After the labour crisis in the mid-
1970s, only 10% of recruits in the Transkei were novices, and it was near impossible to attain 
mine work without a Valid Re-engagement Guarantee (VRG) certificate, which mining 
companies reserved for ‘desirable’ workers.15 The Chamber of Mines exerted considerable 
influence over desperate mine workers and ‘stabilised’ its workforce by two means.16 The 
first was the VRG certificate which became a virtual prerequisite for recruitment after the 
labour crisis in the mid-1970s, and was not automatically received after completion of a 
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contract. If management felt that a mine worker was “not the right material”, no VRG 
certificate would be issued and effectively the worker would be unable to find mine 
employment in the future.17 Secondly, TEBA would receive 463 “blacklisting” forms, which 
enumerated both a mine worker’s offences and penalties incurred from previous contracts. 
Offenses listed on these forms included instances of disobedience, “loafing”, possession of 
alcohol, and participation in a one day strike, while penalties included bans from mining 
houses, groups, or the entire industry for 3 – 60 months.18  
While the pass laws and other formal migrant labour institutions had played a crucial 
functional role in stripping away choice, by the time they broke down, unemployment was 
so concentrated that TEBA essentially faced a buyer’s market and did not need the 
bolstering of state institutions. The immense oversupply of unskilled labour also 
undermined the NUM’s efficacy. Despite orchestrating a three week strike involving 40% 
of the workforce in 1987, very few of the NUM’s demands were met and the Chamber 
simply responded with strategic mass dismissals.19  
TEBA faced a new challenge: how to brand itself as a new and attractive employer. 
Propaganda was a critical component of the rebranding of the NRC as TEBA. Like the NRC, 
TEBA required optionless work seekers in order to maintain supply. After the labour crisis 
of the mid-1970s, the NRC created a Public Relations Media Division which undertook an 
aggressive marketing campaign to rescue the NRC’s image (TEBA after 1977) and also 
promote the recent wage increases and shorter contracts. 20 Cinema vans visited deep into 
the rural areas with promotional films and entertainment, while TEBA staff gave live 
presentations. TEBA increased its support for local charities and community projects, all of 
which were well publicised – events were sponsored; publicity and branding gifts were 
widely distributed.21 Later, as employment opportunities on the mines dried up and 
unemployment further deepened in the Transkei, TEBA shifted its marketing campaign 
away from recruiting and towards depicting itself as a publicly responsible institution 
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concerned with the wellbeing of mine worker communities. This signalled an important 
shift towards a stronger emphasis on shaping perspectives and neutralising criticisms of the 
mine migrant labour system. In the late 1970s, after a series of decolonised countries refused 
to send labour, the NRC and WNLA had become exceedingly self-conscious about their 
public appearance.22  
As was shown in chapter 4, the NRC had refused to use DPIF money to finance legitimate 
education projects in the Transkei because they feared it would attenuate labour supplies. 
However, by 1983 TEBA was distributing hundreds of thousands of educational magazines, 
‘TEBA Topics’, in rural schools and moreover promoted this as one of their major “corporate 
responsibility” projects.23 The point was to have TEBA marketing in the homes of school 
children so that they could maximise their imaginary positive image. Having stabilised the 
labour force by way of VRGs and blacklisting, and since supply was no longer a problem, 
by the early 1980s TEBA was in a position to fashion itself as an organisation concerned with 
the education of “disadvantaged” black children.24 The magazine was paid for by 
advertisers and money from the TEBA Fund (which was still generating an income from 
investing mine workers’ deferred wages).25  
In chapter 3 we saw how droughts (since they exacerbated deprivation) created favourable 
recruiting conditions for the NRC in the late 1960s. By the 1980s TEBA was concerned to 
publicise their alleviation of hardships in labour sending regions. A draft document for 
‘TEBA Times’ noted that the industry’s reaction to the droughts of the early 1980s was to 
allocate “some millions of rands of aid from the surplus in the TEBA Savings Fund.” The 
article continued in giddy and exultant terms, 
[W]e know at first hand [sic] how the drought and the depression are matters of 
life and death, what the real effects are on those “little people” [sic] who are least 
able to stand against them! The families whose gardens rattle in the wind, whose 
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grazing is dust, whose springs are baked mud, whose breadwinners can find no 
opportunity to win their bread. We know the hunger and the despair. 
Our board did this [donated aid in the form of TEBA Fund money] from a sense 
of responsibility and community of interest with the “little people” … It is 
programmes like these that give TEBA a human face and make our organisation 
so worthwhile an enterprise.26 
The migrant labour system run by the NRC and TEBA, this thesis has argued, was 
contingent upon deprivation; deprivation enabled the NRC to draw work seekers onto the 
Rand. The NRC and TEBA also repatriated disease burdens (further deprivation) into the 
Transkei. Yet once the labour market moved from one of shortage to oversupply, TEBA 
began to fashion itself as imminently concerned with the afflictions of labour sending 
regions. TEBA was by the 1980s preoccupied with publicising itself as a philanthropic 
institution. When TEBA’s migrant labour system was criticised by the Archbishop of Cape 
Town, TEBA responded with a volley of breathtaking assertions.27 The most relevant 
include the following from a letter to the Archbishop: 
At the regional level, TEBA is a development agency – the conduit for millions 
of Rands worth of earnings that help to support a sub-continent and the first step 
on the path to the acquisition of skills on which developing nations can build. 
We believe the TEBA acronym could just as well stand for Training and 
Enterprise Build Africa.28 
Many thousands of men owe their literacy to free lessons on the mines. 
A total of R305.8 million was distributed in 1982 by TEBA in deferred pay, 
remittances and savings. This money does a lot of good in Southern Africa.29 
This letter to the Archbishop demonstrates the extent to which TEBA was willing to conjure 
up all manner of illusion to create an impression of benevolence. While this thesis argued 
that the migrant labour system entailed severe capability-destruction and constituted a 
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major obstacle to development, and that TEBA (and the NRC) were in many respects 
antithetical to human development, since human development diminished labour supplies, 
this organisation was by 1983 depicting itself as a “developmental agency”.  It was a classic 
case of Orwellian doublespeak. The monetary, social, and political costs of the multiple 
disincentives accompanying mine work were not factored into the impressive sounding 
sums paid into rural areas. Despite the fact that the colour bar remained institutionalised in 
1983, which meant that only the smallest minority of Africans could occupy semi-skilled 
occupations, TEBA declared that the migrant labour system promoted the acquisition of 
skills. Amidst the grinding deprivation of the 1980s, TEBA projected an image of itself as a 
gracious provider and a stepping stone en route to development. The opposite was closer 
to the truth. 
In sum, TEBA’s Public Relations Media Division strategy by the late 1970s was an attempt 
to create an illusion of concern for mine workers and labour sending regions. Their publicity 
endeavours were always driven by a desire to change or neutralise perceptions of the 
migrant labour system, rather than changing or mitigating those aspects of migrant labour 
which generated the negative perceptions.30 While TEBA’s values were not different from 
those of its predecessor, there was a pronounced effort after 1983 to appear to value 
education, human wellbeing, and human development. This dénouement has shown that 
deprivation was sufficiently deep and widespread for the apartheid state to withdraw its 
institutional back up for mine labour recruitment. The Employment Bureau of Africa 
(TEBA) was overwhelmed with prospective recruits in the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s.31 
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This thesis has shifted the analytic preoccupation away from the means to development (the 
efficient generation of wealth or the unfolding of ‘capitalist development’) towards a focus 
on the ends of development:  that is, towards a focus on what development is for, the telos 
of development, what development is or should be trying to achieve. Following Amartya 
Sen, the ends of development have been constructed in terms of the substantive economic, 
social, and political freedoms which operationalise autonomy and enable persons to live 
lives they have reason to value.  
By examining the effects of migrant labour institutions from 1886 to the late 1980s in terms 
of how they purposively circumscribed autonomy and frustrated efforts to expand 
capabilities and freedoms, this thesis has drawn attention to what really matters, that is, the 
ends of development, the ways in which the mine migrant labour system constrained the 
freedoms and development of the Transkei and its inhabitants. This autonomy-centred 
conception of development enables us to examine migrant labour institutions in terms of 
how they directly impinged on social capabilities like education and health, political 
capabilities like freedom of association and the right to unionise, and economic freedoms 
like the capability to access markets and sell one’s labour freely. By pre-empting all three 
principal elements of freedom, the effects of mine migrant labour extended beyond the more 
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